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In the dissertation, I use verisimilitude to explain first, how the force of visual 
rhetoric operates in works of art; second, for understanding how visual rhetoric 
influences audiences framed as both rhetorical and aesthetic viewing practices; and 
finally, how art is mediated in cognitive and emotional ways. Works of art call our 
attention to the power of these types of intercommunication because “as often as 
language teaches us to see,” Michael Ann Holly wrote, “art instructs us in telling.” 
Specifically, this framework highlights that audiences of visual rhetoric rely on 
two types of viewing practices: first, a rhetorical practice that focuses on argument, 
function, and symbol and second an aesthetic practice that focuses on the sensory, 
emotional, and artistic features of an image. These practices help us understand how 
audiences historically may have experienced works of art that evoked an emotional 
response and a symbolic meaning. 
This framework is simultaneously novel and traditional. It is novel because 
contemporary visual rhetoric scholarship has focused mainly on the functional and 
symbolic aspects of visual images and my dissertation (re)introduces aesthetic aspects of 
visual images in seeking to create a more holistic perspective on visual rhetoric. It is 
traditional because we can locate an aesthetic or visual theory in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, for 
example in the enigmatic metaphor, bringing-before-the-eyes. In two case studies in two 
chapters—Comparing Pity and Fear in Rhetoric and Poetics and The Rhetoric of Vanitas 
 
 
Painting—I demonstrate that the effect of this metaphor is not explicitly cognitive but 
instead a perceptive and emotional capacity. Aristotle’s theory allows the audience to 
participate in the persuasive process and encompasses its role as the target of emotional 
appeals. 
This dissertation offers an alternative approach to the study of visual rhetoric and 
reminds us that we should revive an ancient perspective on rhetoric. Ultimately, I argue 
that rhetoric circumscribes aesthetics, which is a challenge to the conventional 





For his steadfastness and compassion
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
 




1 THE RHETORIC OF VERISIMILITUDE .............................................................1 
  
 Overview ..................................................................................................................1 
 Goals, Purpose, and Research Questions .................................................................5 
 Definitions................................................................................................................7 
 Theoretical Framework ..........................................................................................24 
 Justification of the Framework ..............................................................................27 
 Literature Review...................................................................................................30 
 Method ...................................................................................................................37 
 Site Visits ...............................................................................................................42 
 Chapters .................................................................................................................42 
 Conclusion .............................................................................................................49 
 Bibliography ..........................................................................................................52 
 
2 COMPARING PITY AND FEAR IN RHETORIC AND POETICS.....................63 
 
 Section Overview ...................................................................................................69 
 Comparing Pity and Fear in Rhetoric and Poetics .................................................70 
 The Actor and the Spectator ..................................................................................75 
 Pleasure ..................................................................................................................86 
 Techne ....................................................................................................................94 
 Epideictic ...............................................................................................................96 
 Unified Elements .................................................................................................102 
 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................104 
 Bibliography ........................................................................................................107 
 
3 THE RHETORIC OF VANITAS ..........................................................................112 
 
 Terms ...................................................................................................................118 
 Historical Background .........................................................................................121 
 Case Study of Herman Steenwyck’s Vanities ......................................................125 
 Ekphrasis and Content .........................................................................................135 
 Epideictic and Form .............................................................................................149 
 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................158 
 Bibliography ........................................................................................................166 
 
4 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................173 
 
 Section 1: Theme .................................................................................................176 
 Section 2: Visual Strategies .................................................................................181 
 Section 3: Vocabulary ..........................................................................................185 
 Section 4: Seminal Texts .....................................................................................189 







These printed pages represent far more than the end of many years of study and 
writing. This dissertation also represents the relationships with many generous and 
inspiring people since I began my graduate work at the University to Utah. I truly 
appreciate each contribution to my development as a scholar and teacher. 
To my committee chairs, Danielle Endres and Tarla Rai Peterson, who helped me 
navigate the dissertation process and whose edits on numerous revisions helped me to 
focus on the main points and to clarify confusing passages. They demonstrate in their 
work the notion that rigorous scholarship must be accessible to everyone; they inspired 
me to do my best. Most of all, they were gracious mentors. 
To my committee members James A. Anderson, Leonard Hawes, and Matthew 
Potolsky for their encouraging words, thoughtful criticism, and time and attention during 
busy semesters. To Connie Bullis: her suggestions, understanding and support made a 
difference. 
To my professors for showing me by example and through challenging 
coursework how to think critically and how the best teachers teach: James Anderson, 
Matthew Potolsky, Marouf Hasian, Mary Strine, Helene Shugart, Paul Haanstad, and 
Mark Bergstrom. To my colleagues for sharing their ideas and thoughts through 
stimulating and thoughtful discussion.
 
 
To the Department of Communication staff for assisting me with the 
administrative tasks necessary for completing my doctoral program, particularly Jessica 
Tanner. I am grateful for my amazing copy editors, Gemma Gough, Laura Rawlings, and 
David Linford. 
To all, I appreciate your contribution to my work in ways that are difficult to 





THE RHETORIC OF VERISIMILITUDE 
. . . we prefer seeing to everything else. The reason is that [sight], most of all the senses, 
makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. 
Aristotle, Metaphysica, 980a 
. . . because a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing. 
Kenneth Burke 
Overview 
It was not when I was 18 or 21 that I fell in love with Dutch 17th century painting. 
Then, on my semester abroad in Paris, I preferred Monet’s atmospheric shores. When 
was it that my eye grew fond of paths crossing rutted flatlands, blasted trees, and 
forsaken ruins by painters whose names I could barely pronounce? Dutch realism was at 
first (well) just a little bit dull. Slowly and with time, Dutch art began to reveal its 
symbolic metaphors, its rich, complex, and exquisite aesthetic detail. 
So, it is fair to question why 17th century landscape painter Aelbert Cuyp—who 
concentrated on naturalized realism—would paint glowing cows. Was it because they 
were simply there? Undoubtedly not. The cow is but one metaphor for the Dutch. 
Holland was the cow. Superior to any other cow, it was the source of prosperity and 





stands in for “freedom, security and the tranquility of living life in accord with nature.”1 
There is something of the sacramental rite in the way Cuyp chose to portray the cows and 
the glow hanging over the city. The motif appears as homage to scriptural motif, a 
reminder that the symbolic nature of Dutch art is not that far from the meditative and its 
Biblical antecedents. 
Art is fiction. We are not perturbed that Cuyp’s cows, so neatly at home in their 
landscape, are not precisely the cows we may have seen, rather they are a verisimilitude 
or type of representation. The concept of verisimilitude guides this dissertation. It is the 
process in which fiction becomes plausible. As audience to fiction, we willingly suspend 
our disbelief to justify nonrealistic elements in art or literature and engage with the 
representation.2 The process enables communication between an audience and artwork or 
drama. We know that we are watching an actor or looking at marks on a canvas, but we 
willingly accept them as representational in order to experience what the poet or artist is 
attempting to convey. More than a copy of nature and reality, verisimilitude is a type of 
truth likeness or mimesis.3 Verisimilitude re-presents a plausible reality in visual form, 
relying on both resemblances and culturally representative metaphors. To be significant 
for a situated audience, works of art should demonstrate a degree of reality, or 
verisimilitude. 
In the dissertation, I use verisimilitude to explain how the force of visual rhetoric 
                                                          
1 Alan Chong, Wouter Kloek, Celeste Brusati, Still Life Paintings from the Netherlands, 1550 −1720, 
(Amsterdam, Waanders Publishing. 2000); Arthur Wheelock Jr., Aelbert Cuyp, 2001, 16. 
2 The idea was put forth in English by the poet and aesthetic philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who 
suggested that if a writer could infuse a “human interest and a semblance of truth” into a fantastic tale, the 
reader would suspend judgment concerning the implausibility of the narrative. 
http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/biographia.html. 
3 Poetics is Aristotle’s treatise on mimesis. He stated that human beings are mimetic beings: they create 





involves both rhetorical and aesthetic viewing practices and how the term is a heuristic 
framework for understanding how visual rhetoric influences audiences. Specifically, my 
claim in this framework highlights that audiences of visual rhetoric who lived in a 
particular milieu relied on two types of viewing practices: 1) a rhetorical practice that 
focuses on argument, function, and symbol and 2) an aesthetic practice that focuses on 
the sensory, emotional, and artistic features of an image. These practices help us 
understand how situated audiences may have experienced works of art that evoked an 
emotional response and a symbolic meaning. 
Rather than a theory, the dissertation offers an approach to visual understanding. 
The lenses, concepts, and method include discussion, analysis, and evidence in case 
studies and demonstrate how we can frame as practices the way art might have been 
viewed and why this matters to visual rhetoric. 
This framework is simultaneously novel and traditional. It is novel because 
contemporary visual rhetoric scholarship has focused mainly on the functional and 
symbolic aspects of visual images, and my dissertation (re)introduces aesthetic aspects of 
visual images in seeking to create a more holistic perspective on visual rhetoric. It is 
traditional because we can locate an aesthetic or visual theory in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. My 
dissertation offers an alternative approach to the study of visual rhetoric and reminds us 
that we should revive an ancient perspective on rhetoric. 
Ultimately, I argue that rhetoric circumscribes aesthetics, which is a challenge to 
the conventional assumption that rhetoric and aesthetics are different phenomena. In this 
study I am interested in using verisimilitude as a lens to show how works of art can be 





attention to the power of visual and verbal intercommunication because “as often as 
language teaches us to see, ” Michael Ann Holly wrote, “art instructs us in telling. The 
exchange works actively in both directions.”4 Sidney Zink’s remarks focus our attention 
on how aesthetics mediates and completes rhetoric: 
I think there is a simple way out of the dilemma of the. . . [work of art’s] 
immediate aesthetic value and the symbolic [rhetorical] nature of its medium. 
This is to recognize that linguistic meanings are, like colors . . . themselves 
particular qualities.5 
 
Much as verbal depictions rhetorically confine what we are prompted to see, visual 
depictions contain our verbal responses. Rhetorical viewing shapes what we imagine we 
see. Conversely, visual texts foster, interrogate, and display visual and expressive 
elements when words fail. Zink suggests we regard rhetoric and aesthetics as types of 
visual understanding. Symbolic concepts and experiential perceptions focus our attention 
on two different but important dimensions. 
The above provides a brief overview of the theme of the dissertation. This 
dissertation is a rhetorical project. It extrapolates from certain classical theories and 
concepts as a way to understand aesthetic and rhetorical viewing practices and how these 
rhetorical viewing practices in the chapters merge form and content. 
The next section explains the dissertation’s purpose, goals, and research 
questions. A second section establishes definitions of terms important to understanding 
the discussion, analysis, and case studies in the dissertation. The section is a rationale for 
the terms and how they will appear in the dissertation chapters. A third section presents 
the theoretical framework for viewing practices of works of art. The fourth section 
                                                          
4 Michael Ann Holly, Past Looking: Historical Imagination and the Rhetoric of Image, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 11. 





presents a literature review of seminal works. The fifth section explains a method for 
viewing works of art using the heuristic of verisimilitude. The sixth section previews the 
case studies for chapters. A conclusion synthesizes work in a brief observation and offers 
directions for future work. 
Goals, Purpose, and Research Questions 
The dissertation’s goal is to extend the scope of visual rhetoric by utilizing 
insights from linguistics and art history and reviving classical rhetorical concepts to better 
account for the role of aesthetics in visual rhetoric. The investigation expands the scope 
of the subfield of visual rhetoric by examining ways audiences may have viewed works 
of art. 
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine two sides of visual rhetorical 
analysis: symbolic meaning and aesthetic experience. Viewing is itself a communicative 
artifact. So, if viewing art is a relationship between art and the viewer, then investigating 
the way a situated audience may have practiced viewing shows how viewing mediates 
works of art. Whether these particular audiences were aware of correspondences of 
objects—cultural, religious, and artistic techne—under examination depends on the 
criteria specific audiences discussed in the chapters used to test these discriminations. 
Rhetoric interprets art in symbolic ways; aesthetics evaluates artistic properties. 
The key that makes possible the transmission between an artifact and its situated 
audience lies in the concept of perception. Perception is first a manner a particular 
audience may see an image and second, how that audience may perceive an idea within 
an image. 





aesthetics (or art theory) as types of perceptive visualizations of images and ideas. The 
ancient idea of perception is the faculty of awareness, according to Aristotle: to the 
thinking soul, images serve as if [my italics] they were contents of perception. When 
perception operates in a rhetorical sense it enables a particular audience to discern 
symbolic meaning; when it operates in an aesthetic sense it relates only to having these 
discriminations. The perceptive lens creates questions of what (the aesthetic) and how 
(the symbolic) milieu’s audience may have visualized in practice. In other words, what a 
situated audience may see is color, line, and brush strokes; how they may have seen is 
influenced by the period’s cultural frame. 
The dissertation will further the examination of how art is an appropriate subject 
of rhetorical investigation; it will suggest how examining viewing as rhetorical and 
aesthetic practices in historical frames contributes to the subfield of visual rhetoric. No 
study has yet probed an approach to art in this manner. 
Research Questions 
1. If, as Sonja Foss has indicated, rhetoric is defined as “the human use of symbols 
to communicate, ”6 then 
a) Is the purpose of art to communicate as rhetoric and propose meaning? 
b) Must art be symbolic? 
2. What difference does the historical or cultural framework make to our 
understanding of rhetorical and aesthetic viewing? 
3. What difference does aesthetics make to the subfield of visual rhetoric? 
                                                          
6 Sonja K. Foss, “Theory of Visual Rhetoric.” Handbook of Visual Communication: Theory, Methods, and 







This section defines the terms important to this dissertation and how they support 
the purpose, goals, and questions I am proposing. Each term stands in relation to other 
terms; the terms are the guiding concepts that will undergird dissertation chapters. 
Aesthetics summons commonplace associations of feelings and sensibilities. In 
the dissertation, aesthetics is broadly more of an approach to the what of artistic content. 
The question of how things appear is generally a rhetorical question. When art engages 
with those who become audience to it, aesthetics enables consideration of the experience 
of those addressed. Aesthetics relates philosophically to the sensibility of having 
discriminations—and describing experientially—what we see through the capacity of 
perception. Aesthetics embraces reasoning the integrity of artistic properties. When art is 
judged aesthetically, artistry, form, color, and movement are important. 
Aesthetics was coined in the German form Æsthetik by Alexander Baumgarten in 
1735. Derived from the Greek, it meant esthetic, sensitive, sentient; it is the “perceptible 
to the senses.” Designated as a new branch of philosophic inquiry, Baumgarten defined 
the discipline broadly as “the science of perception.”7 He understood that the arts 
constitute a distinctive and significant realm of “sensuous cognition, ” in which emotion 
plays an important part. He specified how artistic judgment relies on discrimination at a 
sensory level and examines art’s effect and affect. Overall, he was mainly concerned with 
the nature of perceptual knowledge conveyed through the arts. 
Immanuel Kant specifies separate realms for aesthetics and reason (Critique of 
Judgment 1790). Aesthetics carries no proposition; rather it is “objective purposive.” 
                                                          
7 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials. Watkins, ed., Project Gutenberg, 2009). 





[B]y an aesthetical Idea I understand that representation of the Imagination 
which. . . cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language. . . . 
[It] is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational Idea. . . . 
 
The Imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is very powerful in 
creating another nature, as it were, out of the material that actual nature gives 
it . . . and by it we remold experience, always indeed in accordance with 
analogical laws. . . . 
 
Such representations of the Imagination we may call Ideas, partly because they at 
least strive after something which lies beyond the bounds of experience, and so 
seek to approximate to a presentation of concepts of Reason (intellectual Ideas), 
thus giving to the latter the appearance of objective reality.8 
 
Kant speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things, similar to Zink’s view. If one 
proclaims something to be beautiful, then one requires the same liking from others and 
judges not just for the self but for everyone (a variation on the Categorical Imperative). 
Aesthetics could be said to originate (but is not named) as a type of visual theory 
in Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor in Rhetoric and Poetics “vivifying language [and 
image] . . . the imagistic bringing-before-the-eyes, ”9 and bringing-fear-and-pity 
(emotion) before-the-eyes in Poetics and as phantasmal viewing discussed in De Anima. 
Chapter 1 of the dissertation examines the idea of bringing-pity-and-fear-before-the-eyes 
by comparing how pity and fear are rendered in Rhetoric and Poetics. The texts show 
specifically how orators and actors use gestures and movement (energeia) to rhetorically 
perform and communicate emotions. Aesthetics functions as dialectic to rhetoric. 
Aristotle’s theory of visualization first appears in Poetics, considered the older of the two 
books, but Rhetoric examines his visual theory in detail. 
Ekphrasis is a literary and vivid description of a work of art. Anciently, the term 
referred to a description of any thing, person, or experience, as in Homer’s extended 
                                                          
8 Kant, Critique of Judgment, Div. 1, part 22. 





description of Achilles Shield in Iliad, Book 18, and in Horace’s ut picture poesis10 in 
which one medium of art relates to another medium by defining and describing its 
essence and to illuminate form; it provides liveliness for audiences. 
Emotion is the effect and affect that art produces in audiences in aesthetic ways 
such as sadness, praise, and joy. The response is associated with visual metaphor as well 
in Rhetoric. 
Energeia is the human capacity to activate visual effects. Discussed in Rhetoric, 
energeia in metaphors signify, transfer, or associate a familiar thought; energeia achieves 
a desired effect by aiding audiences to see or visualize images. Aristotle actualizes 
metaphor in the term energeia to show how emotions come before-the-eyes in a visual 
sense. Aristotle does not discuss how energeia achieves its desired effect in metaphor, 
only to indicate that metaphorai’s origin is in perception. Two examples are analogy, 
such as “. . . the stone is to Sisyphus, ” (a symbolic thought in perceptive action) and 
“now and then the Greeks darting forward on their feet”11 (visualized action), and 
transference: exchanging or associating one concept or image for another as in the 
exemplary Homer—“he makes everything move and live, and energeia is motion.”12 
“[And] In all his work, he gains his fame by creating activity . . . then to the plain rolled 
the ruthless stone’ and ‘the arrow flew, ’ and [the arrow was] ‘eager to fly. . .’”13 The 
vivid descriptions activate visual and cognitive mechanisms. 
                                                          
10 That poetry and painting might be linked was not original to Horace, though he coined the phrase, ut 
pictura poesis. Horace would have known the work of Plutarch, who attributed the quotation “Poema 
pictura loquens, pictura poema silens” to Simonides of Keos in his book De Gloria Atheniesium. Plutarch 
employed the association to laud historians who wrote imagistic prose so that readers could see the 
moments they were reading. (The Princeton Handbook of Poetic Terms), 288. 
11 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1114b, 28–9. 
12 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1412a. 





Richard Moran says, “It is no exaggeration to say that the primary virtue of 
metaphor for Aristotle is the ability [my italics] to set something vividly before the eyes 
of the audience.”14 Richard Moran’s point emphasizes visual capacity: bringing-before-
the-eyes is a gloss in terms of energeia and epideictic, the visual activity that makes 
inanimate things appear alive. We see movement; “the explication of energeia in 
metaphor is progressively refined from the representation of movement to the 
representation of something alive. . . ”15 John Kirby’s point is similar: “energeia and 
bringing-before-the eyes appear synonymous since metaphor and energeia overlap.” 
George Kennedy says that energeia is characteristic of Aristotle’s emphasis on the visual: 
“it is sometimes but not always personification.”16 
Epideictic was historically a unified theory that intertwined aesthetic excellence 
and cultural meaning in the context of community values. In the first sense, the term 
relates composition and intention, artistic inventiveness and scientific order and 
designates excellence of technique in art and in performance. In the second sense, the 
term conveys civic and aesthetic virtue. Epideictic in the dissertation applies to both 
aesthetic judgment of material artifact and to symbolic rhetorical judgment of art. Each 
aspect conveys types of audience identity. 
Jeffery Walker suggests that the epideictic shapes and cultivates “basic codes of 
values and beliefs by which a society or culture lives . . . it [epideictic] shapes the 
ideologies and imaginaries . . . the deep commitments . . . constituting the very grounds 
                                                          
14 Newman, Aristotle and Style. (Lewiston, NY, Edwin Mellon Press, 2005), 232. 






of culture with which a society shapes itself.”17 
Lawrence Rosenfield’s reading of Aristotle shows that the purpose of epideictic is 
simply and solely to display the luminosity of timeless excellence. It makes known and 
shows forth an idea or image or techniques of excellence in order to persuade us to gaze 
at the presumed moral aura glowing from within works of art. The interpretation 
emphasizes that effects of technique combine with moral affects to edify audiences. 
Critically, Rosenfield asserts that the fleeting nature of the appearance of excellence is in 
the present rather than a sustained reality. In the 15th century, audiences understood that 
the term’s moral virtue was synonymous with displays of artistic merit. The practice and 
interpretation continued into the emerging Scientific Age in the 17th century. 
Identification is the process in which a situated audience connects on a moral, 
personal, or experiential level. The term draws on rhetorical conditions that create 
powerful moments of symbolic identification with works of art. Morality and religion are 
types of identification: they convey a communion between art and community values. For 
example, 17th century Dutch audiences identify moral and nationalistic values and 
meaning within art. 
Kenneth Burke’s Grammar and A Rhetoric of Motives shows how visual 
metaphors give voice to the way contemporary audiences affiliate and identify with 
works of art—and the ambiguity that exists between those audiences and their cherished 
values, especially moral identities. Burke describes as rhetorical any encounter that 
prompts a “persuasion ‘to attitude, ’” which would permit poetic engagement.18 Rather 
                                                          
17 Rhetorics of Display. Lawrence, J. Prelli, ed, “Introduction.” (Columbia, SC: USC, University of 
Carolina Press, 2006). 3, 4; 154. 





than rhetoric as persuasion, identification includes any experience that does the work of 
“symbolic inducement of social cooperation.” Burke says in Grammar,  
. . . the simples case of persuasion is less a sort of argument than it is a kind of 
human relationship, you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language 
by speech, gesture [my italics], tonality, people interact using symbols and are 
influenced by that interaction to understand themselves and their relation to each 
other differently. That different understanding prompts a change of identity, and 
this change may involve identification not just with mankind or the world in 
general, but with some kind of congregation that also implies some related norms 
of differentiation and segregation.19 
 
Gregory Clark observes that “[Burke’s] . . . key term of identification teaches the lesson 
that rhetorical power operates well beyond the boundaries of conventional public 
discourse”20 and includes a full range of symbols mined by audiences. In Chapter 3, 
entitled The Visual Rhetoric of Vanitas, I discuss interconnections between identities of 
17th century Dutch Calvinists; how these audiences encounter symbols and align 
themselves with them in religion and in secular works of art. The aesthetic experiences 
are as rhetorical for audiences as listening to a sermon. 
Mimesis is sometimes interpreted as imitation; however, ancient perspectives 
show that the term means much more. The concept is central to the dissertation because 
of its rhetorical and aesthetic significance. Aristotle emphasizes the visual and material 
status of works of art because the meaning of mimesis is to embody or enact likeness 
from an art’s material form. What we see or hear is art’s significance; mimesis resides in 
the representation of the object itself. 
It is striking, for example, that Aristotle emphasizes in his discussion of 
perception and of metaphors that the visual action of placing objects (or emotion as 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 50. 





object) “before-the-mind’s-eye, ” “this is that” is a mimetic action that requires energeia 
or activity to enable the transference.21 
Nelson Goodman diverts attention away from the mimetic nature of the arts: the 
“cognitive turn in aesthetics” in Languages of Art (1968) explains that when we see a 
visual representation in art we are viewing a symbol system. We discover in Rhetoric and 
Poetics, however, that the language of art is fundamentally mimetic, not symbolic. 
Stephen Halliwell’s insight shows that in mimesis and in metaphor we do not so 
much consciously observe or make a connection; rather we see one thing—the material 
work of art—as another in the representational field of the represented world. Halliwell 
says,  
. . . if this is correct, we see that Aristotle’s idea of mimesis allows for the 
necessity and centrality of the mimetic medium: representational works do not 
offer us deceptive pseudo realities [as Plato claimed]. . . but the fictive 
signification of possible [plausible] reality in artistic medium that allow such 
reality to be recognized and responded to coherently . . . because mimetic works 
need not [my italics] . . . represent independently attested particulars. . . aesthetic 
understanding cannot be limited to matching a copy with a known original, nor 
can it be reduced to the merely factual and immediate registering that a certain 
kind of thing has been represented.22 
 
Whereas imitation attempts a copy of an original (Plato), mimesis re-enacts and re-
presents in a nonliteral yet clear way. Chapter 2 specifically discusses how in art mimesis 
should be clearly separated from symbolic and semiotic interpretation because it is 
different in kind from language: it conveys understanding of the critical nature of the 
form or medium to other types of representational likenesses. The term helps explain the 
emotional impact and visual immediacy of a protagonist’s moving performance in an 
                                                          
21 Aristotle, Rhet., III, 10; Poetics, VX, 11.1455a22−30. 
22 Stephen Halliwell, Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems (New Jersey: Princeton 





Attic play or the polished brushstrokes on a vanitas canvas. 
When Baumgarten and other 18th century aesthetic theorists spoke of art they 
meant preeminently, the mimetic arts. The term mistakenly came to be known as the 
“fine arts.” The 18th century misreading might explain why visual rhetoric dismisses 
mimetic representation from its field of study. 
Perception premises the what and how of viewing practices. De Anima describes 
perception as “a synthesis and retention of sense-perceptions” and “applies [directs] 
thought to objects of sense-perception.”23 In the dissertation, perception is a theory of 
reception and a general faculty. In the theory of reception, perception is the soul’s 
capacity for awareness of sensory experience (some scholars prefer body to soul). When 
perception is aesthetic, seeing in the largest sense is whatever we are aware of in art, the 
act of noticing itself and associated experiences of emotion in visual awareness of 
sensory objects. As a faculty, perception is the capacity to enform and change the 
affected thing’s becoming-like. 
Audiences rhetorically transform a visual image into a concept, a symbol, or an 
emotion. Perception then enables us to receive sensory properties of works of art: colors, 
textures, other visual aspects of artistic forms; and interpret symbolic meaning. If we say 
an object seems to contain the craftsman’s soul, it is a way of imparting to some matter 
made to exemplify it. “. . . the perceptive faculty is in potentiality such as the object of 
perception already is in actuality.”24 It is clear that Aristotle has both ideas in mind: 
reception designates a theory and a capacity. Perception then premises how aesthetic and 
rhetorical viewing practices evolve from ancient rhetorical understanding of the term. 
                                                          
23 Aristotle, de Anima ii 5, 418a3–6; ii 12, 424a17–21. 





Phantasia is sometimes interpreted simply as imagination. However, phantasia 
always entails perception and is cognitive and imaginative. It is an affectation that lies in 
our power whenever we choose to use it because it is always possible to call up mental 
pictures.25 Aristotle sometimes recognizes phantasia as a distinct capacity, on par with 
perception and mind and imagination, 26 but it is not exactly any one of these entities. 
Chapter 1 introduces a type of visual theory in Aristotle. In the discussion, Aristotle 
distinguishes phantasia from perception in De Anima iii: it is “. . . that in virtue of which 
an image occurs in us involved in thoughts, dreams, and memories.” It is the faculty 
which produces, stores, and recalls the images used in a variety of cognitive and 
conceptual ways including guiding action.27 Because he tends to treat phantasia 
pictographically, Aristotle seems to regard the images imagined in cognitive conceptions 
as representations or likenesses of external objects. In this sense, phantasia is required for 
mimesis—the focus is directed toward the material form. Imaginative thought requires 
images so that “whenever one contemplates, one necessarily at the same time 
contemplates in images.”28 Michael Frede captures the broad meaning of the terms: 
Phantasia does triple duty. It designates the capacity, the activity or process, and 
the product or the result. . . We have no single word in English that would do all 
three jobs. . . ‘appearance’ in a wider sense should be regarded as the central 
meaning of phantasia to which all functions of the terms are related. It would then 
be (i) the capacity to experience an appearance, (ii) the on-going appearance 
itself, and (iii) what appears.29 
 
In the dissertation, phantasia incorporates Frede’s terminology and links mimesis to 
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tragedian play and Dutch vanitas painting. Phantasia enables situated audiences to 
experience an appearance as emotion—and it enables creating meaning (aesthetic and 
rhetorical)—out of the experience of being with art. 
Semiotics is the study of cultural sign processes (semiosis), analogy, metaphor, 
signification and communication, signs, and symbols. It is the study of the structure and 
meaning of language. Some visual rhetors such as Marguerite Helmers assert that the 
image is itself a carrier of meaning.30 The chapters dispute this claim: symbolic meaning 
is instead a function of cultural interpretation of, not in art. Symbolic viewing of art is an 
example. 
To Charles Sanders Peirce, semiotics is not a theory of knowledge but 
phenomenological representation. Things exist in a reality outside of what we perceive or 
think about them. The triadic theory includes icon or image—the index that raises in the 
viewer a memory of a similar icon—and the symbol, or the mental representation in the 
mind’s eye. Peirce calls the symbol metaphor. Peirce’s distinctions are useful to visual 
rhetoricians because they establish a formal terminology that considers different types of 
imagistic sign systems. Roland Barthes’ insight for visual rhetoric is that the assembling 
of the sign (object), the signifier (points to, indicates) and the signified (the referent, the 
object or idea being referred to) is a rhetorical act. Semiotics, or sign-use, is antirealist. 
This is because the core of semiotic theory in art history is by definition the factors 
involved in making and interpreting signs and the development of conceptual tools that 
help audiences grasp that process in the study of works of art. 
In one sense, semiotics articulates the frame of cultural and environmental 
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references important to interpreting works of art conceptually. Mieke Bal and Norman 
Bryson posit that historical context is constructed, is itself text, “and thus consists of 
signs that require interpretation”31 because context is an illusion. Rather than context, 
Culler proposes the term “‘framing’ . . . how signs are constituted by various discursive 
practices.”32 The sign or image points out but does not tell. 
Barbie Zelizer believes that representation (mimesis) subjugates itself to rhetoric 
through subjectivity, voice, and contingency. Zelizer says we project “altered ends” when 
cultures interpret representations: inserting their desires and identity.33 In one way, 
Zelizer is right: as I suggest, rhetoric circumscribes mimesis and symbolic meaning. 
However, Zelizer misses the point in asserting that mimesis (an artistic representation) is 
the way a thing appears in objective reality. Because art is fiction, art begins with how a 
particular audience senses an object of art as plausible fiction. When locating symbolic 
meaning becomes the primary purpose of art, the role of human emotion may be missed 
altogether. 
Artistic judgment both interprets symbolic meaning and evaluates aesthetic 
properties. And the experience of art is aesthetic. Semiotics is but one interpretation of 
art. Particular audiences specify the aim—extrapolate meaning from objects—arbitrary, 
culture-specific meanings when they assign meaning to symbols such as desires and 
identity. Like cultural framing, mimetic framing establishes the centrality of the material 
form of art, thereafter how it is constituted, how signs become discursive practices. 
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In the dissertation, mimesis is the more expansive term than semiotics because it 
circumscribes rhetorical idea and aesthetic experience. Rhetorical reading in the 
dissertation is the phenomenological realities of semiotics that Peirce proposes with the 
important caveat that Bal, Bryson, and Culler propose: that cultural context is not simply 
a priori or an epistemological-cultural given fact. Semiology is rhetorical interpretation of 
specific sign cultural systems: it extends from the object and is a type of visual text that 
gives way to interpretation. 
Verisimilitude, paradoxically intensely personal and highly social, the term 
represents processes of artistic creation in mimesis outlined in Poetics and as a visual 
type of discerning in the ancient epideictic. Evident in the expressive metaphor, bringing-
before-the-eyes, verisimilitude captures the idea that an image it brought into 
consciousness (creation), the specific audience conceives of its form, independent of 
cultural meaning. Verisimilitude is vital to art in 15th and 16th century Renaissance 
humanism. In the dissertation the term is a type of mimesis or representation of plausible 
reality in visual form; it is fiction, just as works of art are fiction. 
The term permits art and explicit audiences to create truth-likenesses—visual 
resemblances and in culturally representative metaphors—authentically without worrying 
about the facts. The artist or playwright represents images imaginatively yet plausibly. 
The reader of art enters into a discourse with an artist and the visual text and agrees to 
suspend disbelief.34 Actual truth then becomes less important than the art that conveys 
images and produces ideas. Rather than seeing a work of art as another thing, that 
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audience sees the visual representation in terms of the represented world as Halliwell has 
said. Verisimilitude is an important framework for understanding rhetorical and aesthetic 
viewing practices predicated on perception, phantasia, and epideictic. Verisimilitude is 
the overall theme of the dissertation. 
Viewing practices are aesthetic and symbolic or taken together, visual rhetoric. 
The practices reveal different methods and behaviors: looking at works rhetorically in 
semiotic interpretation is different from viewing in the aesthetics of mimetic viewing. I 
am trying to present the tension between the two ways audiences evaluated the effects of 
art aesthetically and interpreted the affects in cultural meaning in art in symbolic ways. 
The two approaches in their opposition represent basic types. On the one hand, 
aesthetics’ fully material externalized description (ekphrasis) reveals creative expression. 
A situated audience becomes aware of image in the foreground of consciousness. The 
display is the unmistakable meaning of form itself. 
Aesthetic viewing momentarily releases the viewer from the existential burden of 
not knowing. Aesthetics in the dissertation is ontological, epistemological, and historical. 
Ontologically, aesthetic viewing is simply that a particular audience has awareness of an 
image. Epistemologically, aesthetic viewing identifies the artistic properties of art. Last, 
aesthetics has its origins in ancient rhetoric—the critical theory informs a mimetic 
meaning of rhetorical understanding in Rhetoric and Poetics. 
However, rhetorical viewing brings cultural meaning into high relief, the 
influence of the concealed or unexpressed background quality, the multiplicity of 
meanings, the need for interpretation, culturally specific claims, development of 





milieu that practice rhetorical viewing interpret cultural values or codes within art as to 
explain art’s symbolic meaning. Examples include the tradition of reading art as text in 
the ancient tradition of ekphrasis. In addition, rhetorical meanings reveal a good deal 
about the nature of visual rhetoric as a form of cultural communication and visual culture. 
As a viewing practice, rhetoric depends for its veracity on an explicit audience’s ability to 
construct and display concepts, desire, and identity in works of art. 
If an assumption exists that art (and genre) competes for attention through 
effective and affective strategies, then that audience examines selected works of art for 
the implication and impact of each viewing strategy. 
The framework suggests that the interpretation and evaluation of art in the ancient 
meaning of rhetorical capacitates of art embrace, rather than move beyond, aesthetic, 
expressive response. Emotional pleasure is more than cultural desire; rather when a 
particular audience reads and identifies with the object of contemplation, works reconnect 
the viewer with the human response to sensuous satisfactions. Aesthetic judgment and 
rhetorical judgment occur all at once but seem to occur separately. Indeed, readers of art 
discern and dismantle each judgment as two separate viewing practices. 
Visual metaphor, notes Stephen Halliwell, is the pleasurable affect in 
understanding of metaphor is its mimetic imaginative display of linguistic and visual 
representations unified,  
. . . our response to a mimetic work must always rest on the cognitive recognition 
of representational significance; but that such a response is necessarily a 
compound reaction [my italics] to the represented reality and to the artistic 
rendering of it. The compound quality of aesthetic experience has the important 
implication that it is wrong to regard the two components as properly 
independent. . .35 
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Halliwell’s point ties to Aristotle’s exemplary trope, the metaphor in Rhetoric that 
emphasizes the visual aspect of emotion, the subject of the first chapter. When viewers of 
all milieus see pity and fear come before-the-eyes, they enjoy the experience in emotion 
in proper proportion to the quality of artistic representation (epideictic teche). They do 
not first see pity and fear as a means of persuasion and then feel painful emotions. Rather 
the affect produced is pleasure artfully portrayed. In the case of metaphor’s imaginative 
affect in tragedy, Aristotle is analyzing what Foss might refer to as a dimension of its 
creativity. Halliwell stresses the poet’s search for “. . . vividness will be served by strong 
imagination.”36 Aristotle’s detail enables the rhetorical nature of metaphorical 
representation to fuse with aesthetic understanding of metaphor: the soul never thinks 
without image in the mind.37 
The Aesthetics of Mimesis emphasizes a compounding effect: delight and learning 
from metaphor. The richest metaphors enable us to see or visualize one thing in terms of 
another.38 Cicero notes, “there is no mode of embellishment . . . that throws a greater 
luster upon language.”39 Aristotle says, “metaphor must be transferred from things 
related, but not obviously so as it is a sound intuition in philosophy to see similarities 
between things. . .”40 
In the dissertation, visual metaphor is evident in reading into works’ cultural 
associations explained linguistically; the perspective enabled specific audiences to 
interpret and make meaning of art. A rhetorical viewing in Chapter 2 explains how 
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audiences of the period produced small sermons of moral import by discerning works 
metaphorically. For example, the metaphor, vanity, vanity, all is vanity is culturally and 
religiously linked to images of particular objects of value—such as books or swords—
curiously paired with skulls and candles in Dutch vanitas paintings in the 17th century. 
I.A. Richards explained his theory in Tenor-Vehicle Model of Metaphor.41 For 
example, the concept vanity is the tenor or the subject. The concept is the vehicle or 
image that conveys the subject—in Dutch art, painted swords, skulls, and candles. When 
visual metaphor ornaments an image, the vehicle and tenor intermingle visually and 
linguistically in the mind’s eye, such as in the phrase, bringing-fear-and-pity-before-the-
eyes in Poetics. 
Visual rhetoric’s growth is the study of visual imagery in rhetorical studies. The 
study has resulted in an emerging recognition that visual images provide access to a range 
of human experience not always available through the study of discourse alone. The 
major shift in the field of rhetoric has focused an increasing amount of the discipline’s 
attention on visual objects and the rhetorical process of interpreting art. Whether 
particular audiences decipher the variances between practices, each subtlety does 
demonstrate forms of communication and responses available to audiences. Recent 
studies in visual rhetoric have evolved from semiotic analysis to suggest that images 
contain and communicate symbolic meaning and function as ideological forces in society. 
Moreover, the symbolic is essentially a linguistic dimension. 
As currently practiced in the field of communication, visual rhetoric unhinges 
analysis of pleasure/expressiveness aspects in works in favor of a focus on art’s 
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functionality and propositions. For example, Defining Visual Rhetorics explains the 
primary difference between the Sister Arts tradition (ut pictura poesis—a picture is like a 
poem from Horace) developed by Jean Hagstrom in 1958—and visual rhetoric. Helmers 
notes, visual rhetoricians are not working with correspondences between written works 
and visual images so much as they are asking how visual images are themselves carriers 
(not producers) of meaning.42 
The dissertation challenges this notion. Visual rhetorical analysis of art does make 
certain claims and propositions on art. The claim I am proposing is that rhetoric—dating 
from visual practice in ancient mimetic form examined in Poetics and Rhetoric—
embraces perception and emotional expression of art in aesthetic ways while still 
advancing symbolic interpretation. 
Works of art (art) are human-made creations such paintings, literature, and 
theater; art is considered in its expressive artistic effect and in its role as emotional affect 
on audiences. Art in the epideictic is contemplative and morally edifying. The term helps 
explain the aesthetic effect of art’s luminosity: the timelessness of an image as it appears 
in the here and now (Rosenfield). Art’s affect prompts the viewer to read into art’s 
meaning. Foss explains artifact (art) as a cultural and creative human production. Art’s 
effects and its affect situate audiences as mediators of cultural practices and as critics of 
art; response to art displays audience emotion and identity. The dissertation simply uses 
the word art when referring to works of art. 
                                                          






Aesthetics and rhetoric identify two distinct ways audiences of a particular age 
engage with visual discourse. They are not opposites but consider different assumptions 
and methods. In the dissertation, the dilemma of art’s aesthetic value and the rhetorical 
dimension of its medium with its symbols and values recognizes that artistic properties 
and cultural meanings are, as Zink has observed, “themselves particular qualities” of art 
and require different types of analyses.43 
The concepts of visualization from ancient texts expand the analysis of how 
rhetorical judgment and aesthetic judgment are two aspects of the rhetoric of 
appearances. Specifically, I will investigate the practices as types of rhetoric that display 
the rhetorical and aesthetic viewing practices of situated audiences. Verisimilitude is the 
heuristic for understanding how traditional rhetorical theory—especially mimesis—
influence situated audiences. Viewing art can be seen as a contested set of practices that 
disputes the very definition of rhetoric itself. How practices become evident in each 
milieu is what becomes interesting in the chapters. 
Of critical importance to both viewing approaches is the foundational concept of 
perception from Aristotle, not just as a viewing practice, but rather an audience’s capacity 
to view art aesthetically and rhetorically. The approach integrates the styles or types of 
viewing practices: 1) rhetoric focuses on the engagement of art and particular audiences 
though an investigation of symbolic practice, and 2) aesthetics focuses on the experience 
of viewing in sensory, emotional, and artistic features of the image. The viewing 
practices intertwine the ways situated audiences could have viewed and experienced art 
                                                          





by reviving the ancient meaning of rhetoric that considers both the impact of visual image 
and possible symbolic meanings. The theoretical framework is more an approach than a 
theory: it brings us closer to understanding how renewing our understanding of ancient 
text contributes to visual rhetoric in the 21st century. The framework includes evidence 
for the viewing practices that refer to examples from the Attic and the 17th century 
including proposed rhetorical and visual analysis for each. 
Aesthetic viewing focuses on identifying the what of art and its particular effects 
on audiences. In one sense, it describes compositional and artistic elements in a work, 
and in another sense, shows how aesthetic experience is an independent realm; both are 
achieved through mimesis. When a viewer sees and studies the material nature of an 
image—performance on the Attic stage and daubs of paint—the analysis requires 
reflective skills different from those needed to identify an image’s symbolic nature. We 
can examine the process that condition works’ being viewed in an aesthetic manner in 
three ways: 1) by investigating diverse properties of the piece that make up the peculiar 
pictorial style and wit of an artist, 2) by the qualities that make it enduring (epideictic), 
and 3) by the emotional and conceptual appeal of the composition and material. 
Rhetorical viewing compares how symbolic meaning could have been discerned 
from art. In traditions such as the practice of reading works of art as visual text and as 
cultural metaphor, rhetoric evolved beginning in the 20th century into its sister process, 
semiology. It too codifies art by framing symbolic meaning in historical time and place. 
The chapter show how works display and produce symbolic affect. Rhetorical viewing 
includes identifying cultural and religious values, identities, and philosophical 





understanding. I build on Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson’s idea (discussed further on) 
that historical context or frame is illusion: the frame is itself a constructed text that 
requires interpretation of its lexicon and discursive practices. For example, names, labels, 
and narratives are concepts that direct attention to whatever is rhetorically and visually 
significant or desirable in a particular image. Thus, a skull conveys symbolic and 
metaphoric importance in the 17th century Dutch vanitas. Rhetorical looking designates a 
type of viewing as gaze and desire to see a thing as if it is another thing. James Elkins has 
said, “Looking is never innocent, nor is it final.”44 Visual metaphor exhibits dual 
characteristics: it directs the eye to both aesthetic experience and to rhetorical 
representations of meaning interpreted as cultural/religious concepts. The investigation of 
viewing practices of art is located in two historical milieus in case studies. 
I suggest that the visual rhetoric of a work of art is more than analysis of discrete 
objects that invite propositions and questions of functionality. Rather, I infer that visual 
rhetoric consists both of cultural symbolic analysis and visual analysis of the material 
object, two distinct processes: one interpretative, the other evaluative but linked in 
rhetorical practice. Visual rhetoric evolves not only from the way particular 
audiences/critics interpret what is taken to be art’s propositions; but is alternatively 
informed by how they discern the material nature and characteristics of art in perceptive 
ways without attaching symbolic meaning. The expanded definition highlights the 
importance of audiences having perceptual discrimination. What is more, the term now 
conforms to the broad discussion defined by Sonja Foss: “all the visual ways humans try 
to communicate.”45 Visual rhetoric designates that art and the ways audiences viewed art 
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is not limited to reason and identity, but also includes memory, expectation, imagination, 
and emotion. Ultimately, I will argue that rhetoric circumscribes aesthetics, which 
challenges the conventional assumption that rhetoric and aesthetics evolved from 
different phenomena. 
Justification of the Framework 
A historical view of material objects has generally engaged issues of 
spectatorship, pleasure, and desire. The aesthetic condition becomes full-blown in 18th 
century Enlightenment when the viewer takes hold of determining the criteria of what is 
beautiful. The commonplace interpretation of historical aesthetics betrays and limits an 
expansive view of aesthetics that includes visualization. Current scholarship in the 
subfield of visual rhetoric overlooks aesthetic origins which evolved from within the 
ancient traditions of rhetoric and is integral to it. What is at stake is the critical dialectic 
between the what of aesthetics and the how of rhetoric as symbolism in communication. 
My concern is that visual rhetoric can analyze art symbolically without speaking 
of the aesthetics of art as if visual analysis has nothing to do with the special matters of 
hearing, seeing, imagining, or understanding. Visual rhetoric’s emphasis on reductive 
logic and historical contextualization reduces the mimetic impulse that has undergirded 
analysis of art from Plato and Aristotle. In current studies of visual rhetoric, art relies on 
the epistemological perspective alone. Rhetorical viewing has reduced art to a Platonic 
facsimile in the service of cultural myths and intellectual justification. 
The disputed status of aesthetic experience arises from the evolution of rhetoric to 
an exclusively linguistic art. Visual rhetoric often equates aesthetics of an earlier age with 





along with changing social and technological conditions—with aesthetics. 
The understood goal of visual rhetoric in the field of communication is to 
interpret art as it operates as cultural production and symbolic proposition. The symbolic 
response to works, although critical, leaves out the range of mimetic perspectives that 
analyze both the impact of the effective properties of the image and the affective response 
of audiences situated in a historical frame. Current rhetorical analysis of art that fails to 
consider the impact of aesthetic judgment is of concern to John Dewey: “If viewing 
works of art is not also aesthetic in nature, it is a colorless and cold recognition of what 
has been done, used as a stimulus to the next step in a process that is essentially 
mechanical.”46 
To explore the problem under the rubric of rhetoric is altogether correct because 
at the heart of the rhetorical tradition lies the human capacity to create and reason in and 
through visual text and language. Argumentation is one side of critical interpretation of 
art but leaves out an important part of how humans visualize art from an aesthetic 
perspective. The introduction of a perceptual lens as the foundation for a viewing theory 
remedies what I perceive to be the problem: when visual rhetoric only considers 
symbolism it subsumes aesthetics. Therefore, the unique approaches and problems of 
rhetoric should discern cultural, symbolic, and aesthetic perception. 
Without delineating modes of viewing, visual rhetoric must rely exclusively on 
analysis of how visual images carry cultural meaning, and offer audiences propositions. 
For example, Anthony Blair claims that visual images are not capable of arguments; 
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rather they offer audiences propositions.47 Margurite Helmers agrees and asserts, “. . . 
products [of the aesthetic tradition] bear little resemblances to what rhetoricians are now 
investigating”48 What is more, she claims that cultural meaning can be accessed and 
examined from within the image.49 I dispute the claim. I propose instead to show that 
visual rhetoric places too much focus on conceptual judgment and ignores how aesthetic 
perception contributes to visual rhetoric. 
Informing the dissertation are visual rhetors who have anticipated the move from 
text to image: W. J. T. Mitchell, Burke (1950), Martin Jay (1993), Christian Metz (2004), 
Rosenfield, (2004), Elkins (1997), Foss (1994), and Hill and Helmers (2004). Kenneth 
Burke locates the emotional realm of identity and desire in symbolic relationships. We 
see or imagine resemblances as-if and as-it-is that we desire.50 Earlier Burke articulated 
principles of aesthetics in nonverbal communication and symbols in Counter-Statement 
(The “poetic metaphor” closes the pages of Permanence and Change), which blurs the 
boundaries between poetics and rhetorical theory to include verbal and nonverbal 
“transformative symbols, ” according to Burke. Counter Statement argues that the 
aesthetic (a perceptive act) is rhetorical in that it works to transform identity. The visual 
nature of identification advanced in the work of Christian Metz suggests that the act of 
asserting or imagining identity between two things that are dissimilar is based on 
similitude.51 Jay notes that the word “theater” has the same root as theory or theoria, “to 
look attentively, to behold, ” to see with new eyes in epideictic expectation. “Looking is 
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always framed by past experiences and learned ideas about how and what to see.”52 
What I take from the authors above is that the culturally imagined interpretation 
often supports cultural theory and may fail to synchronize with the actual material image. 
The tension is that image dislocates from text and the reverse: interpretation without 
evaluation becomes a type of misreading. From the perspective I am proposing we can 
appreciate how aesthetics and symbolic rhetoric are two sides of rhetoric and 
communicate different approaches, purposes, and goals. Symbolic communication 
depends on argument and proposition. Aesthetics requires visual judgment of art as a 
material subject. 
In the next section, I present a literature review of seminal texts. I will explicitly 
use concepts drawn primarily from Prelli in The Rhetorics of Display and from Aristotle 
in De Anima, Rhetoric, and Poetics to undergird my approach to viewing practices. The 
study of visual rhetoric furthered its momentum with the publication of two other 
important texts written in 2004: Defining Visual Rhetorics, complied by Charles A. Hill 
and Marguerite Helmers (mentioned above), and Sonja K. Foss, who subsequently 
tackled the visual in “Theory of Visual Rhetoric”53 In the method section, I improvise 
from Foss. 
Literature Review 
The three seminal texts informing the dissertation are Rhetorics of Display written 
in 2006 by Lawrence J. Prelli and Rhetoric and Poetics written by Aristotle in 
approximately 367 to 347 BC. Rhetorics of Display develops the thesis that “rhetorics of 
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display have become the dominant communication practices of our time.” Prelli’s historical 
perspective justifies the point: “. . . questions about rhetoric and display are related and did 
not originate in our time but are of long-standing significance in the history of the 
communicative arts [as rhetoric] . . . in sketches, paintings, maps. . .” Prelli is observing 
that when art displays, it engages with those who become audience to it: “Works of art 
display rhetorically and rhetorics enact display.”54 Prelli’s emphasis on visualization and 
its centerpiece, epideictic (in addition to the critical terms ekphrasis and identity), show 
that the rhetoric of art is a type of human experience that includes reason and emotion and 
is not always available through the study of discourse alone. Next, I will focus on epideictic 
and how ekphrasis and identity link to the term in the dissertation. 
Prelli and contributor Lawrence Rosenfield explain that epideictic contributes to 
the historical aspect of the way image was perceived rhetorically and aesthetically. The 
term represents processes of artistic creation in representation or mimesis outlined in 
Poetics and as a visual type of discerning in the ancient epideictic. The rhetoric of the 
visual in the epideictic, “. . . from the Greek ‘show forth, ’ [is to] ‘make known’ . . . not 
as mere display, rather it means making manifest the ‘fleeting appearances’ of excellence 
that otherwise would remain ‘unnoticed or invisible.’”55 In epideictic, an audience 
becomes a “witnesses to” the image56 in the present moment. The audience undergoes an 
emotional transformation when viewing the object of contemplation because aesthetics is 
(my italics) an epideictic encounter.57 Thus, epideictic describes how perception begins 
with the awareness of having perception. 
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Rosenfield suggests that art reveals the interplay between material display and the 
selected meaning imposed on works. For example, moral virtue was attributed to art in 
the epideictic of artistic techne. Moral seeing, techne, and reasoning are “paradigms of 
virtue”58 and open up discovery of moral truths for audiences. The concept was especially 
relevant to the visual culture of the 15th and 16th centuries: artists displayed excellence in 
technes such as chiaroscuro and other artistry of shadings, texturing, and coloring that 
enhanced elements of visual composition and, at the same time, displayed moral virtues. 
The idea of moral painting as virtue and artist as preacher was at its height in the 
Dutch vanitas paintings of the 17th century discussed in Chapter 3. The visual image of 
fruit and flowers is itself virtuosity in the minutest detail of execution. Paintings were 
intended to lead a viewer to mirror the virtue displayed in techne. Ascribing virtue to 
image through the epideictic resembles Aristotle’s description of verisimilitude in the 
phrases, “fleeting appearance, ” and “processes of artistic creation, ” detailed in Poetics. 
Chapter 3 shows how art transformed itself in the Scientific Age. The rhetoric of 
perspective that accompanied 13th century art began as an epideictic idea framed by Leon 
Battista Alberti in De Pictura in 1435. The artist introduced the first systematic 
presentation of fixed-point perspective by showing how precise artistic execution brought 
a profusion of details into proportionate, ordered, and visual perspective. Alberti’s use of 
science in explaining perspective demonstrates how the scientific method was a principle 
to be displayed and modeled for Renaissance audiences. The stance or viewing practice 
of the detached observer—so critical to the emergence of modernist science—invites the 
audience to view art as a shrewd observer of how things that are seen now appear. Prelli 
                                                          





captures the idea when he says art is “. . . enacting artistic creation as a visual 
performance for audiences.”59 Alberti saw the art of painting as rhetorical display in that 
the elements of visual composition operated according to the precepts of rhetoric, and the 
art itself aimed at giving spectators a heighted sense of virtue comparable to the ideal 
orator. 
The practice of reading image as text through ekphrasis ties intimately to 
epideictic viewing. Prelli discusses the rhetorical power of ekphrasis in which visual 
image conveys a poetic message. Seeing image as a mimesis of virtue sheds light on the 
practices of audiences that understood reading visuals as text and text as image. 
Examples of the ekphrasis of reading images can be seen in illuminated manuscripts, 
books of emblems, and crafted word pictures. From visual depictions in the Shield of 
Achilles to the Renaissance notion of ut picture poesis, painting is mute poetry and 
poetry is a speaking picture (as is painting, so is poetry), ekphrasis visually displays one 
thing in terms of another. The practice continued into the 18th century. 
When Prelli and Rosenfield apply epideictic and ekphrasis to explain historically 
the important role visual image has played in displaying cultural values, audience identity 
is also at stake: 
In whatever manifestation displays also anticipate a responding audience whose 
expectations might be satisfied or frustrated, their values and interests affirmed, 
neglected, or challenged. The identity and behavior of particular situated 
audiences demonstrate that “. . . whatever is revealed through display [of art] 
simultaneously conceals alternative possibilities . . . this is display’s rhetorical 
dimension.60 
 
What art most often conceals is the undisclosed identity of an audience that imposed on 
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art prevailing cultural and religious agendas. For example, in the chapter, “Rhetorical 
Display of Civic Religion” in Prelli, Gregory Clark and S. Michael Halloran argue from 
Burke, “The unconscious element of persuasion which identification describes has its 
source in the poetic motive.”61 The authors create an epideictic framework for identity 
that can be applied to art: “Epideictic rhetoric does not argue the ideas or ideals that bind 
people into community so much as it displays them to a witnessing public.” Epideictic 
provides an audience “the opportunity of beholding a common reality, ” of “joining with 
our community in giving thought to what we witness, ” and thereby experiencing together 
the “luminosity” of the values and aspirations they share.62 
In the dissertation, artistic images are interpreted as symbolic emblems of cultural 
and religious identities. In the third chapter discussing vanitas, I borrow Rosenfield and 
Clark’s insights to demonstrate that the visual experience of a work of art is best 
understood using Aristotle’s third category of the epideictic: the rhetorical work of 
generating and maintaining identity. 
Prelli, Rosenfield, Clark, and Halloran’s discussion of epideictic that includes 
ekphrasis and identity remind us that epideictic has been a form of rhetoric that reenacts 
visual paradigms of virtue throughout history. The terms help explain particular 
audiences’ passionate and reasoned ways of viewing art and thinking about art as values 
and virtue. The discussion has tried to show how audiences in the epochs I discuss search 
to locate mirror images of treasured values in the identity of representative signs and 
symbols. Prelli’s attention to reinvigorating rhetoric’s ancient attention to visualization 
and the role of the image subject supports the heuristic of verisimilitude in the 
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The strength of Rhetorics of Display is that each chapter clearly establishes links 
to epideictic, visuality, and rhetoric as display. The work shows how each concept 
communicates what I broadly interpret as types of viewing practices. The reason the work 
is important to the dissertation is apparent in the title: the Rhetoric of Display. Rhetoric is 
about display—how things look or appear—a premise that insists on the full range of 
how displays operate rhetorically when they engage with those who become audience to 
them. 
Another important principle for the dissertation is the aspect of how things appear 
to particular situated audiences. Images surround us; they “compete for our attention, and 
make claims upon us.”63 The idea of image as rhetoric is itself a disputed term in Prelli 
because of the full range of ways rhetoric displays both aesthetic and persuasive qualities 
especially in art as the dissertation maintains. Prelli supports the thesis of the dissertation: 
aesthetics is central to visual rhetoric and ultimately rhetoric circumscribes aesthetics, 
rather than being different phenomena. 
In the next section, I discuss Aristotle’s idea of visualization, perception, and 
phantasia. It is worth noting that although Rosenfield stresses the fundamental visual 
quality of epideictic, he ignores the term’s dependence on phantasia both in Rhetoric of 
Display and in an earlier discussion. His description argues that speaker and audience 
engage in “beholding reality impartially as witnesses of [my italics] Being.”64 The 
description offers a contemplative, objective sense of epideictic but misses taking account 
of the term’s capacity to reveal values and identity and how epideictic depends on 
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phantasia as Aristotle soon shows. On the other hand, Clark and Halloran capture the way 
epideictic reveals audience identity in their discussion of the rhetorical display of civic 
religion in the presentation of images located in national parks. 
Aristotle explains in Rhetoric that the epideictic requires phantasia (loosely 
translated as imagination) to transform one thing in terms of another, or image to idea.65 
Moreover, visual metaphor, ekphrasis (description), and epideictic (visualizing virtue 
through artistic techne) are interdependent tropes and concepts that require phantasia. The 
terms provide a visual vocabulary for consciously understanding sensory information as 
visual and imaginative data critical to metaphor.66 
Aristotle’s theory of visualization undergirds what I am discussing as an aesthetic 
viewing practice with roots in visual metaphor from Rhetoric. The rhetoric of vision is 
captured in the phrase: the mind (soul) never thinks without an image (de Anima). The 
ancient texts propose that cognition proceeds from image: that thought and concept 
depend on image. The notion suggests how rhetorical understanding can evolve from 
visualization and vivid imagery. 
When Aristotle discusses metaphor, he says that perception actualizes (energeia) 
metaphor. Newman has suggested that Aristotle’s description demonstrates that 
metaphors activate cognitive mechanisms in spectators.67 The question left unanswered 
is—if our minds emerge first with an image—how does that image transition to thought? 
Newman simply indicates the trope does activate cognitive mechanisms, but she does not 
discern how phantasia determines the transition of image to thought. Rhetoric III 
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provides some insight. It begins with a description of vivid imagery, “the source of the 
metaphor should be taken from the beautiful in effect or in visualization or in some form 
of sense perception”68; thereafter the metaphor is within reach of the cognitive 
dimension. I will expand on this theory in the chapters of the dissertation. For example, 
we can show how Aristotle’s enigmatic bringing-before-the-eyes is both actualized image 
and a descriptive process that occurs by way of phantasia and epideictic and how they 
ornament image in Aristotle’s schema. 
Phantasia in visual metaphor captures the interweaving of actualization in the 
terms. For example, fleeting visual appearance and excellence of properties in art require 
phantasia in human experience that otherwise would remain unnoticed or invisible. In 
addition, Rhetoric and Poetics frame emotion as a rhetorical aspect of viewing, 
visualizing produces audience affects and “ornaments ways of being affected or moved 
[vis-à-vis metaphor].”69 When viewing practices are rightly understood as investigations 
and apprehension of how sense perception informs reason, we rediscover the critical 
nature of visual elements in the rhetorical tradition: the human capacity to create visions 
of order and to share them with others. 
Method 
I will explicitly use visual and philosophical concepts drawn from Aristotle, 
Prelli, and Foss to guide my analyses. The visual analysis of vanitas paintings will be 
based on site visits to museums. The primary framework for method is from Foss’ 
seminal work, Visual Rhetoric. A point of view for viewing painting and interpretation 
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comes from Slavoj Zizek’s idea of retroactive memory that decides what will have been 
seen and how art will be analyzed and from Griselda Pollock’s “reading against the 
grain.”70 
The points of view help position the viewing practices. We are always rewriting 
history, according to Zizek. We read the past as a symbol of “historical memory . . . 
retroactively giving the elements their symbolic weight by including them in new 
textures—it is this elaboration which decides retroactively what they ‘will have been.’”71 
Zizek’s idea can be explained in terms of the relationship between the symbolic and the 
imaginary; we can apply the principle to art. For example, we can view art in symbolic 
and cultural ways and in aesthetic imaginative ways. Symbolic interpretations represent 
ways of using language and culture to understand that which cannot be totally understood 
by description. We require imagination to perceive and discriminate characteristics of art. 
Thus, language and art have both symbolic and aesthetic aspects. Viewing audiences 
practice both. 
Pollock describes the process of “readings against the grain.”72 The bias does not 
ignore or reconstruct historical facts; rather the readings explore ways of viewing art 
within the cultural dispositions, historical frame, and epideictic standards of the creation. 
The interest in viewing is not primarily, as Lynne Pearce posits, “in representational 
content.”73 I propose instead, that works are types of engagements with a milieu’s 
material and visual practices. In short, audiences must fill the gap with what they know at 
the time of viewing art. Reading the past offers the readers of art symbolic and aesthetic 
                                                          








choices: 1) build a symbolic interpretation and/or narrative around the cultural knowledge 
at hand, and 2) explore the material and spatial aspects of the image. Both viewing types 
must show how symbolic and aesthetic practices work together. Although visual readers 
can discriminate differences, the process might take place seamlessly in the mind. 
Next, I show how the chapters evaluate viewing practices as visual data and then 
how Sonja Foss’ theory of visual rhetoric serves as the framework for the method of 
viewing analyses. Foss’ criterion for whether an image or artifact qualifies as visual 
rhetoric transforms the visual and linguistic elements of visual rhetoric to establish 
parameters for an approach to theory and criticism. “Theory of Visual Rhetoric” has 
asserted that what now qualifies an image as visual rhetoric centers in its symbolic 
nature. Visual rhetoric involves the human action of symbol-making in the process of 
image creation, yet it only indirectly connects to its referent. Foss says a perspective is 
rhetorical when the focus is on a rhetorical (propositional) response rather on an aesthetic 
one.74 She conceptualizes that visual rhetoric occurs when an agent generates visual 
symbols for the purpose of communicating with an audience. “It is the tangible evidence 
or product of the creative act, such as [a play], a painting, an advertisement . . . that 
constitutes the data of study for rhetorical scholars interested in visual symbols.”75 Foss 
sets forth three markers that must be evident for a visual image to qualify as rhetoric: 1) 
the image must be symbolic, 2) it must involve human intervention in the process of 
image creation, and 3) it must be presented to an audience for the purpose of 
communicating with that audience. Foss’ heuristic opens an analytic window for the 
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method I will propose. I will extend the frame of analysis to ways art not only displayed 
cultural and symbolic values, but also to how art could have communicated with 
audiences in aesthetic ways. 
I elect to use Foss’ interpretive markers of visual rhetorical analyses for 
investigating the approaches and assumptions I am proposing. The method begins with 
Foss’ markers and proposes the variation (noted in italics): Visual rhetoric in works of art 
must be symbolic and aesthetic; it must involve human intervention in the process of 
creation; it must be presented to a historically situated audience for the purpose of 
communicating with that audience. Therefore, art communicates rhetorically with an 
audience. It produces symbolic references and/or identities and it creates a sensory 
aesthetic experience. 
The method departs from Foss and requires explanation. Acts of viewing are 
inherently symbolic-making processes that tie audiences to an identity. Art is interpreted 
symbolically when audiences perceive meaning in symbolic and propositional ways, such 
as when audiences create metaphor from art. Art is mediated by the language of historical 
convention and the rhetoric that attaches to it, such as moral beliefs and nationalistic 
identities. Interpretative readers ask how visual images in art are carriers of symbolic 
meaning. The method is accurate and appropriate when interpretation is at stake. 
Art historian Erwin Panofsky distinguishes between art’s “obvious and disguised 
symbolism.” He asserts that art is “symbol demanding decoding, ”76 a theory not 
completely accurate. Whether audiences were aware of cultural correspondences 
depended on the criteria they used to test these discriminations. I am interested in the 
                                                          





question of the kinds of symbolic meaning, such as identities. Locating meaning within 
art is the method favored by visual rhetors whose subject is art (Helmers, Blair). I dispute 
the point and suggest instead that audiences attach meaning to art. Finally, Foss claims 
that the image must only indirectly refer to its referent. Taking account of the historical 
frame in which art is situated is critical because symbolic and aesthetic judgment depends 
on a milieu; thus historical frames are always rhetorical or plausible fictions and central 
to creation. 
When evaluation of artistic properties is important, viewing is an act of aesthetic 
creation or simply having discriminations. Moreover, audiences judge art artistically 
according to criteria such as composition, coloration, and perspective and test these 
discriminations—the what in art. Taken together, the capability, the properties, and the 
result constitute aesthetic meaning. Aesthetics will provide the missing counterpoint to 
Foss’ exclusively symbolic cultural requirement. 
This examination—which borrows ancient rhetorical approaches to viewing and 
visualization—will demonstrate how particular audiences could have employed a two-
sided perspective when they viewed art. The symbolic shows how audiences may 
interpret meaning and function. The aesthetic method emphasizes evaluation: the role of 
visualization informs the way situated audiences may have judged art and how artists 
could have created image. Indeed, we can examine viewing perspectives as practices 
drawn from particular milieus and artistic images—seeing and looking at works’ visual 
techniques, orientations, plausible realities, emotions, symbolic ideas, and audience 
identities in the domain of rhetoric. The examination in the chapters of the dissertation, as 





classical theories/concepts as a way to understand how a type of rhetorical viewing 
practice merges form and content. 
Site Visits 
Adding to the theoretical method are site visits in which I experienced art in a 
virtual laboratory. From visits to art museums and the direct observations of painting and 
prints, I have attempted to observe paintings and plays in symbolic and aesthetic ways. 
The concepts from seminal texts and the observations constitute the construct for 
analysis. The idea of viewing images as text and text as image took hold as I explored, 
researched, and tested ideas in examinations of works of art. I am fortunate to have 
studied with curators of painting and print rooms in two museums: the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York City and the Cleveland Museum of Art. I also viewed 
exhibits in museums that included the Dutch Baroque, a traveling exhibit at the Phoenix 
Museum of Art; the Victoria and Albert Museum in London (2002); the Louvre in Paris 
(2006); the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City; and the National Gallery of 
Art in Washington D.C. (2006, 2007). 
Chapters 
The dissertation includes three chapters and a conclusion. Two case studies are 
featured in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 1 presents the thesis and topic of the dissertation. 
The conclusion synthesizes the preceding chapters. It discusses themes and general 
conclusions from the case studies emphasizing Prelli’s discussion of epideictic, identity, 
and emotion and Aristotle’s visual approach to rhetoric in ekphrasis, epideictic, and 
phantasia and the sensory/emotional impact of metaphor. Chapters 2 and 3 build from 





how the rhetoric of the visual in art encompass emotion, how it is simultaneously read in 
symbolic and aesthetic ways, and evolves historically from rhetoric. 
Chapter 1: The Rhetoric of Verisimilitude 
In the chapter, verisimilitude is a lens to show how works of art can be analyzed 
through viewing practices such as ekphrasis and epideictic and mediated in visual and 
cultural ways. Works of art call attention to the power of visual and verbal 
intercommunication because “as often as language teaches us to see, ” Michael Ann 
Holly wrote, “art instructs us in telling. The exchange works actively in both 
directions.”77 Sidney Zink’s remarks focus our attention on how aesthetics mediates and 
completes rhetoric: 
I think there is a simple way out of the dilemma of the. . . [work of art’s] 
immediate aesthetic value and the symbolic [rhetorical] nature of its medium. 
This is to recognize that linguistic meanings are, like colors. . . themselves 
particular qualities.78 
 
Much as verbal depictions rhetorically confine what we are prompted to see, visual 
depictions contain our verbal responses. Aesthetic and rhetorical viewing shape what we 
imagine we see. Conversely, visual texts foster, interrogate, and display visual and 
expressive elements when words fail. 
Chapter 2: Comparing Pity and Fear in Rhetoric and Poetics 
Aristotle says “. . . the expression of the meaning in words should be in proper 
proportion and appropriate to the plot and characters”79 “. . . the end of the tragedy is to 
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convincingly bring pity and fear before the eyes.”80 The chapter discusses and analyzes 
how Aristotle’s vivid metaphor, bringing-before-the-eyes in Rhetoric, enacts as poetic 
tragedy as bringing-pity-and-fear-before-the-eyes discussed in Poetics. Emotion is 
effected by actors; the affect is felt by audiences. Attic drama is a product and a process; 
it is mimetic or a representation performed and communicated on the dramatic stage. 
The chapter relies mainly on Aristotle’s seminal texts and on text in Prelli’s 
Rhetorics of Display for analysis. Aristotelian scholars such as Kennedy, Newman, 
Halliwell, O’Gorman, and others contribute to this analysis. Prelli has said, “. . . rhetorics 
of display have become the dominant communication practices of our time.”81 
Investigating the rhetorics of display from the Attic perspective of dramatic tragedy is 
relevant to the dissertation and to the subfield of visual rhetoric. The claim in the chapter 
is that when Attic actors depict pity and fear on the dramatic stage, they are engaging 
with strategic techniques of rhetorical display. Comparing how pity and fear is rendered 
in Rhetoric and Poetics shows specifically how actors use gestures and movement to 
rhetorically perform and communicate emotions. At the same time, it shows, 
paradoxically, how spectators take pleasure in dramatic tragedy. 
The first goal of the chapter is to compare in Poetics and Rhetoric Aristotle’s 
instructions to poets and orators that enable them to best convey to the spectator the 
emotions of pity and fear. Poetics82 and Rhetoric explain specific artistic and inartistic 
methods good actors and orators should use to elicit pity and fear in the spectator.83 The 
                                                          
80 Aristotle, Poet. XI. 
81 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 2. 
82 Poetics is a type of case study to justify fiction; it is also a handbook for playwrights. It was written as a 
way to study of all the arts—literature, drama, dance, visual art and music. Poetics defines a systematic study 
of the techniques involved in the construction of fiction for theatre. 





techniques are viewed and compared as rhetorical strategies for portraying emotion. The 
best actors enact or perform pity and fear mimetically. Through an actor’s display of 
appropriate gestures, emotion is transferred from the actor to the spectator. For example, 
Aristotle says actors should not speak too effusively nor understate the point. Portrayals 
must be convincing. To say this rhetorically, the emotions of pity and fear are mediated 
through the actor and received mimetically by the spectator. By investigating the 
interweaving of pity and fear in the interaction between actors and Attic audiences in 
dramatic tragedy, I draw attention to sensory expressions and emotions of pity and fear. 
Tragedy is drama, not narrative; tragedy shows rather than tells. “Its action should 
be single and complete, presenting a reversal of fortune, involving persons renowned and 
of superior attainments . . . [through] incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to 
interpret its catharsis of such emotions.”84 (By catharsis, Aristotle means a purging or 
sweeping away of the pity and fear aroused by the tragic action). 
The basic difference Aristotle draws between tragedy and other genres, such as 
comedy and the epic, underscores the second goal of the chapter: to examine the 
“peculiar pleasure” described by Aristotle. The tragic pleasure of pity and fear the 
audience experiences from watching a dramatic tragedy is described in Poetics XIV “. . . 
for we must not demand of Tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that which 
is proper to it.”85 The second section investigates through mimesis and the epideictic how 
the display of pity and fear creates in the spectator a peculiar pleasure. The epideictic 
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helps explain how the spectator undergoes an emotional transformation when viewing the 
object of aesthetic contemplation such as an actor’s moving performance. Epideictic 
begins with the awareness of having aesthetic perception. Lawrence Rosenfield explains 
that the epideictic contributes to the way audiences perceived rhetorically and 
aesthetically. The term represents processes of artistic creation in representation or 
mimesis outlined in Poetics and as a visual type of discerning in the ancient epideictic. 
Poetics defines a systematic study of the techniques involved in the construction 
of fiction as art. Viewing Attic tragedian plays using an epideictic frame considers 
emotion as “display, or showing forth of things, leading an audience [insight and 
desire] . . . to the formations of opinion.”86 Tragedian plays sought to offer audiences 
epideictic opportunities to gaze upon “that which is best in human experience.”87 
Bringing-before-the-eyes shows the particular effective and affective aspects of metaphor 
operating in tragedian plays discussed in Poetics. 
The concept of verisimilitude explains performance in the representational field in 
terms of the represented world: the mimetic medium makes possible fiction’s 
significance in plausible realities. The rhetorical persuasive dimension that produces 
emotional affect evolves from action: things engaged in an activity signify cultural 
representations of producing pity and fear familiar to Attic audiences. Together, carefully 
practiced gestures displayed by the skillful actor interweave vision and knowledge in and 
from the spectator’s experience. The two ways of viewing suggest how from image, ideas 
(eidos) of pity and fear transmit into emotions (pathos) of pity and fear. 
According to Halliwell, Poetics is more ancient than Rhetoric. Poetics anticipates 
                                                          






aesthetics or ideas about visualization; however, Aristotle examines visual effect and 
affect in detail in the discussion of metaphor and vivid imagery in Rhetoric III. Poetics 
provides a case study to justify fiction; it is also a handbook for playwrights. It was 
written as a way to study of all the arts—literature, drama, dance, visual art, and music. 
In Poetics, Aristotle staked the success of dramatic representation on what he calls the 
play’s probability (eikos) or in the dissertation, verisimilitude’s plausibility. The idea 
links not only to fiction, but also to the rhetorical notion of a probable proposition. 
Chapter 3: The Rhetoric of Vanitas Painting 
Memento Mori, “remember that you will die, ” describes the theme of art works 
created in the 17th century in the Netherlands. With the human skull as a centerpiece, the 
rhetorical function of theses images served to remind audiences of their mortality. The 
vanitas still-life paintings explore the idea of content through metaphor—designing 
painting to be read continues the tradition of ekphrasis and pictura poesis. Allegory is 
not a concept used in the chapter because although it is a resource of 17th century and 
contemporary audiences the chapter is making rhetorical claims, not historical claims 
about viewing practices. 
The elements that comprised good writing extended to worthy painting executed 
with precise detail. The rhetoric of the image was to move the viewer in a way that would 
be morally edifying. The understanding is a particular iteration of visual and aesthetic 
epideictic. 
The meaning of Panofsky’s phrase “disguised symbolism” prompted art historians 
to research the meanings of image in vanitas. The phrase has been interpreted as part of 





chapter, I will contest this view: vanitas were read, not as allegory or as symbols to be 
decoded, but as a puzzle of layers of associations and resemblances of one thing to 
another without meaning—as a complex metaphor—more like a 20th century abstract 
painting. The viewer has a more demanding role than merely to observe a prescribed 
narrative. Rather the viewer is required to read and interpret still-life painting in the 
tradition of emblem books and diptychs. 
In the Golden Age, objects and their arrangement can be said to be more an iconic 
sign than a symbol. The indigenous aesthetic of the Dutch vanitas long considered 
realism, is more abstract: skulls and books without a setting. This aesthetic requires the 
viewer to take an active part to complete the image. The viewer creates a personal 
experience, rather than being offered a set narrative. The experience is metaphysical, not 
narrative. Vanitas painting continues the tradition of diptychs: a form of worship in the 
Reformed Church that called for private religious experience. 
One painter who specialized in this genre was Harmem Steenwyck. His delicately 
painted objects—water pitcher, a recorder, books, oil lamp, etc—arranged neatly on the 
edge of a table entice the viewer with humble realism. As the viewer is brought into the 
tranquility, there is little to suggest that the viewing ends serenely. Nothing is natural or 
realistic about the arrangement. The composition is triangular within images set in 
diagonal fashion. In epideictic fashion, an aura of metaphysical glow lights everyday 
objects suited for an individual and at the same time displays them as idealized objects of 
the universal virtuous mind. Kristine Koozin describes vanitas as “objects [that] exist in 
God’s hieroglyphic sphere.”88 
                                                          





The artist’s duty is to point to objects, to clarify between real and hyperrealism, 
between real and the unreal, the physical/material and the metaphysical. Through reading 
art as complex metaphor the paradox of rhetorical and aesthetic conflicts are synthesized 
and finally given over to the viewer to resolve on a personal level. The metaphorical 
realism associated with painstaking execution of detail—in real and unreal rendering—
offers the viewer a stake in making meaning aesthetically and spiritually. 
Gerard de Lairesse, the first theorist of still lifes laments vanitas; indeed all still 
lifes, lack meaning. Painters are guilty of not adding “thoughts to their pictures.”89 From 
Lairesse’s reading we can imagine how vanitas were a paradox, pictures presented as 
liturgy of objects on the same plane. Paintings required the viewer to read the image as 
they would a frieze in a pediment—without meaning—but at the same time, as complex 
metaphoric signs endowed with the meaning of a personal viewer.90 
Conclusion 
The concept of verisimilitude guides the dissertation. It puts on display the 
selective ways historically situated audiences viewed art through cultural lenses and 
through aesthetic perceptions. It aims to show the way they suspended disbelief of facts 
in imagination in order to apply values and beliefs to create culturally representative 
metaphors. The chapters’ metaphorical subjects emphasize how the symbolic and 
imaginative perceptions are conveyed to situated audiences. As I have tried to show, 
effect in art turns on rhetorical strategies, cultural resemblances, and likeness to truth 
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demonstrated in symbolic metaphor. Affective response in audiences relies on the 
virtuosity and luminosity of epideictic display of art’s material form, emotional display, 
and the experience of beholding an image. 
The highlighting and muting of both effect and affect in the chapters show how 
different approaches to viewing art in different milieus create rhetorical implications for 
audiences of particular milieus. The method I improvise from Foss highlights the 
rhetorical mode of operation I employ in the dissertation: 
Visual rhetoric in works of art must be symbolic and aesthetic; it must involve 
human intervention in the process of creation; it must be presented to a historically 
situated audience for the purpose of communicating with that audience. Therefore, art 
communicates rhetorically with an audience in producing symbolic identities and in 
creating sensory aesthetic experience. 
A common thread ties the two approaches together: to be significant for an 
audience, works of art should demonstrate a degree of plausibility, or verisimilitude. 
My dissertation calls on readers to judge the criticism and analysis of the practices 
of viewers of art as they could have been seen. While the framework and approach 
attempts to justify and analyze how the force of visual rhetoric involves both symbolic 
and aesthetic viewing practices under the rubric of rhetoric, the purpose is to offer visual 
rhetoric a more expansive framework to aid and advance discussion of the rhetoric of art. 
The rhetorical perspective of image through the lens of ancient practices 
hopefully brings us closer to understanding the intertwining of ways situated audiences 
historically experienced works as a rhetoric that considers both the impact of visual 





timelessness of luminosity in aesthetic viewing of excellent techne, timeliness is never 
absent from the epideictic. The question of an audience’s readiness to view the luminous 
gleam of techne depends on what Rosenfield calls “[the situated-ness of audiences] 
beholding wonder.”91 
The question of the verisimilitude of rhetoric in art —the perspective of 
audiences, artists, and art—that display symbols and invite aesthetic experience is a 
provocative exploration. This is because we see only what we can see from where we 
stand, and there is more to be seen than any one of us can appreciate alone. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPARING PITY AND FEAR 
IN RHETORIC AND POETICS 
Lear: But we made the world, out of our smallness and weakness . . . and we have only 
one thing to keep us sane: pity and the man without pity is mad. 
Edward Bond, Lear, III.3 




Lawrence Prelli has said, “. . . rhetorics of display have become the dominant 
communication practices of our time.”1 Investigating the rhetorics of display from the 
Attic perspective of dramatic tragedy is relevant to the subfield of visual rhetoric. The 
claim in the chapter is that when the Attic actors depict pity and fear on the dramatic 
stage, they are engaging with strategic techniques of rhetorical display specified by the 
plot. Comparing how pity and fear is rendered in Rhetoric and Poetics shows specifically 
how orators and actors use gestures and movement to rhetorically perform and 
communicate emotions. At the same time, it shows paradoxically how spectators take 
pleasure in dramatic tragedy. 
The examination in the chapter should not to be construed to be an historical 
claim of actual experience; rather I am extrapolating from Aristotle and classical rhetoric 
                                                                
1 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 2. 
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to envision how Attic audiences may have viewed the tragedian play. The first goal of the 
chapter is to compare in Poetics and Rhetoric Aristotle’s instructions to poets and orators 
that enable them to best convey to the spectator the emotions of pity and fear. Poetics2 
and Rhetoric explain specific artistic and inartistic methods good actors and orators 
should use to elicit pity and fear in the spectator.3 The techniques are viewed and 
compared as rhetorical strategies for portraying emotion. The best actors enact or perform 
pity and fear mimetically. Through an actor’s display of appropriate gestures, emotion is 
transferred from the actor to the spectator. For example, Aristotle says actors should not 
speak too effusively nor understate the point. Portrayals must be convincing. To say this 
rhetorically, the emotions of pity and fear are mediated through the actor and received 
mimetically by the spectator. By investigating the interweaving of pity and fear in the 
interaction between actors and audiences in dramatic tragedy I draw attention to how 
sensory expressions and emotions of pity and fear are communicated in performances on 
the dramatic stage. The process makes use of rhetorical and visual methods as compared 
to employing historical methods. 
The basic difference Aristotle draws between tragedy and other genres, such as 
comedy and the epic, is the “tragic pleasure of pity and fear” the situated may experience 
from watching a dramatic tragedy. Aristotle says in Poetics XIV “. . . for we must not 
demand of Tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it.”4 
                                                                
2 Poetics is a type of case study to justify fiction; it is also a handbook for playwrights. Aristotle wrote it as 
a way to study of all the arts—literature, drama, dance, visual art and music. Poetics defines a systematic 
study of the techniques involved in the construction of fiction for theatre. 
3 See note 1. 
4 “But to produce this effect by the mere spectacle (opsis) is a less artistic method . . . are strangers to the 
purpose of Tragedy; for we must not demand of Tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that 
which is proper to it. And since the pleasure which the poet should afford is that which comes from pity 
and fear through imitation, it is evident that this quality must be impressed upon the incidents, Poet. XIV. 
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Moreover, “. . . the expression of the meaning in words should be in proper proportion 
and appropriate to the plot, characters . . the end of the tragedy is to convincingly bring 
pity and fear before the eyes.”5 
Tragedy is drama, not narrative; tragedy shows rather than tells. “Its action should 
be single and complete, presenting a reversal of fortune, involving persons renowned and 
of superior attainments . . . [through] incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to 
interpret its catharsis of such emotions.”6 (By catharsis, Aristotle means a purging or 
sweeping away of the pity and fear aroused by the tragic action). 
An example is the tragic hero. For the tragic hero to arouse these feelings in the 
spectator he cannot be either all good or all evil but must be someone viewers (vs. 
audience) can identify with; however, if he is superior in some way, the tragic pleasure is 
intensified. His disastrous end results from mistaken actions that arise from a tragic flaw. 
The sad end arouses in the spectator pity and fear. The point emphasizes that pleasure is 
more than cultural desire. The vicarious emotion evoked by depictions of pity and fear 
produces sympathetic pleasure toward the character. The theatrical experience vicariously 
communicates through rhetoric the pathos and pleasure of what it means to be human. 
The second goal using the rhetorical tropes of mimesis and epideictic is how the 
display of pity and fear creates in the spectator a peculiar pleasure. The epideictic helps 
explain how the spectator undergoes an emotional transformation when viewing the 
object of aesthetic contemplation such as an actor’s moving performance. Epideictic 
begins with the awareness of having aesthetic perception. Lawrence Rosenfield explains 
that the epideictic contributes to the way audiences perceived rhetorically and 
                                                                
5 Aristotle, Poet. XI. 
6 Aristotle, Poet. IX, XI. 
66 
 
aesthetically. The term represents processes of artistic creation in representation or 
mimesis outlined in Poetics and as a visual type of discerning in the ancient epideictic. 
Cara Finnegan says visual rhetoric is “a mode of inquiry, defined as a critical and 
theoretical orientation that makes issues of appearance and visuality relevant to rhetorical 
theory.”7 Visual rhetoric, she claims, is “sensory expressions of cultural meaning, as 
opposed to . . . aesthetic considerations.”8 I argue with Rosenfield that pity and fear are 
sensory expressions of cultural and aesthetic meaning. The claim I am proposing is that 
rhetoric—dating from visual practice in ancient mimetic form examined in Poetics and 
Rhetoric—embrace perception and emotional expression of art in aesthetic ways while 
still advancing symbolic interpretation. 
Lawrence Prelli claims, “When art displays, it engages with those who become 
audience to it.” “Works of art display rhetorically and rhetorics enact display.”9 
Questions about rhetoric and display are related and did not originate in our time but are 
of long-standing significance in the history of the communicative arts. The emphasis on 
visualization—the Attic play demonstrates rhetorical strategies in art and artistic 
performance—produces a type of human aesthetic experience that includes reason and 
emotion not always available through the study of discourse alone. Next, is a short 
discussion that examines how pity and fear captivate the emotions of the audience. 
It is possible to infer from Aristotle that when audiences view a tragic play, it is 
never simply about the flaws of a character; rather universal emotions indispensable to 
being human are displayed through the particularities of the characters. Pity, for example, 
                                                                
7 Olson, Finnegan, and Hope, Visual Rhetoric, 197. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 3–4. 
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draws us toward characters; in contrast, fear makes us recoil from what threatens them. 
So, if Attic audiences did not feel that tragic figures were genuine individuals, then 
heroes would have no power to engage the emotions. It is by their particularity that these 
characters make emotional claims on us, as though they are a part of our own experience. 
It is only through the particularity of our feelings that we create emotional bonds with 
them. What we cherish in our own lives makes us pity them and fear for them. We can 
see how the reverse also happens: in them our feelings of pity and fear make us recognize 
what we cherish in them. Thus, human emotion displayed in tragedy is rooted in the 
fundamental order of the universe; emotion creates a cause-and-effect chain that clearly 
reveals what may happen at any time or place because that is the way the world operates. 
When the hero in a tragic play is threated, for example, the spectator fears for 
what lies ahead. As Aristotle says twice in Rhetoric, what we pity in others, we fear for 
ourselves.10 Fear mounts when Oedipus comes to know the truth. In this sense, audiences 
feel that a valued something is threatened. Tragic fear, exactly like tragic pity, displays 
the things audiences are willing and unwilling to lose; they fear for Oedipus because his 
passion for truth results in harm that will befall him as a result of his pursuit of it. To be 
plausible, actors should express pity and fear relative to the degree of the hero’s pain in 
his devolving degradation. In Oedipus spectators see themselves only amplified; he is not 
a generalized character, but altogether particular. The suffering of the tragic figure tests 
the boundaries of what is human in all of us.11 
Aristotle directly contradicts Plato in the elder’s claim that art is an inferior appeal 
                                                                
10 Aristotle, Rhet., 1382b 26, 1386a 27. 
11 Halliwell stresses that the poet’s search for “. . . vividness will be served by strong imagination,” 
Aesthetics of Mimesis, 25–26. 
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to human emotions. When we experience pity and fear in actual life, says Aristotle, they 
are painful feelings. When they occur as a representation on the tragic stage, a mimesis; 
emotions are integrated into a poetic structure. Pity and fear interlink to hamartia, the 
tragic mistake or flaw in a protagonist evident in Oedipus: that the oracle was not 
consulted produces another condemnation in the emotional unraveling of the tragic hero. 
Tragedy therefore arouses both pity and fear because the ancient viewer can envision him 
or herself within this cause-and-effect chains—an affect response. Aristotle explains that 
Oedipus Rex is exemplary of the perfect tragedy, and Oedipus is the perfect tragic hero: 
Perfect tragedy should . . . imitate actions which excite pity and fear, this being 
the distinctive mark of tragic imitation. . . The change of fortune presented must 
not be the spectacle of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity: for 
this moves neither pity nor fear; it merely shocks us. Nor . . . a bad man passing 
from adversity to prosperity . . . [which is] alien to the spirit of tragedy; . . . for 
pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like 
ourselves [in an event] . . . neither pitiful nor terrible. . . 
 
The character [must be] between two extremes . . . a man who is not eminently 
good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but 
by some error or frailty. He must be one who is highly renowned and 
prosperous—a personage like Oedipus. . .12 
 
The description of the genre that requires a catharsis of pity and fear demonstrates 
Aristotle’s concern regarding the audiences’ response. He establishes what will be the 
central preoccupation of rhetoric. Because of the emphasis on affect, it is apparent that 
his interest in literary art leads him to ask how literary art achieves its affects, and what 
those affects are. 
At the end of the Poetics Aristotle presents the idea that the genre can be defined 
according to the spectator that it finds—a rhetorical principle also fundamental to late 
20th century concepts of the reader. Genre itself determines differences in medium, what 
                                                                
12 Aristotle, Poet. IX. 
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Aristotle calls (objects of) mimesis; modern readers refer this as the subject matter. The 
medium of imitation follows the object of imitation: form follows content. 
Section Overview 
The subject of this section is an investigation of rhetorical strategies 
recommended by Aristotle for actors and orators. Specifically, I will compare how 
rhetorical strategies for performing pity and fear compare in Rhetoric and Poetics. 
Poetics, the older of the two works, is a how-to treatise for playwrights: how they should 
construct their plots using particular visual rhetorical effects to bring emotion before the 
eyes of audiences.13 Rhetoric explores visual aspects of performance by orators. 
In Poetics IX Aristotle explains why in tragedy audiences experience pity and 
fear: 
 
Now tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of objects of 
fear and pity, and these arise most of all when events happen contrary to 
expectation but in consequence of one another; for in this way they will have 
more wonder [my italics; wonder addressed in the section on pleasure] in them 
than if they happened by chance or by fortune, since even among things that 
happen by chance, the greatest sense of wonder is from those that seem to have 
happened by design. 
 
Rather than exciting extreme emotion in audiences, Aristotle says the action of the plot 
should convey the proper degree of emotion. Emotion should be in proper proportion to 
the play’s dramatic action. 
The comparative analysis that follows investigates the notion of bringing pity-
and-fear-before-the-eyes by asking how pity and fear appear before the spectator and are 
performances of rhetorical effect. I propose to accomplish this goal by specifically 
investigating Aristotle’s rhetorical strategies for actors. Aristotle indicates that actors 
                                                                
13 Aristotle, Poet. XVII, 1455a21–24. 
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need essential skills and qualities to perform dramatic tragedy. I analyze how Poetics and 
Rhetoric instruct actors and orators to properly convey pity and fear to increase the 
mounting pity and fear in the spectator. By comparing the strategies of actors and the 
emotions of pity and fear in Poetics and Rhetoric, I locate and compare individuated 
examples of how fear and pity function as rhetoric in each work. 
The claim in the section is actors perform pity and fear as a rhetorical strategy for 
bringing emotion before the eyes of the audience. Acting behaviors are specific rhetorical 
strategies. 
By investigating the interweaving of pity and fear in the interaction between 
actors and the Attic spectator in tragic drama I hope to draw attention to how effects are 
encapsulated in acted imagery and are particular to incidents that produce pity and fear. 
In sum, my analysis examines the nature of the pity and fear, the effective techne 
required by actors, and how it is affect compared in Poetics and Rhetoric. Pity14 is likely 
the most complex emotion in Aristotle’s theory because it combines personal detachment 
with aesthetic pleasure of catharsis and imaginative emotional involvement in the 
suffering of another. A feature distinguishes pity from all the other emotions: pathe in 
Book II includes very specific visual components.15 
Comparing Pity and Fear in Rhetoric and Poetics 
Pity is held to be one of the crucial emotions identified by Aristotle in the 
spectator’s response to tragedy. Oedipus’s pursuit of truth cost him his eyes. Whereas 
Oedipus loses his capacity to see, in the end—although still blind—he gains insight. But 
                                                                
14 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1385b13–a3. 
15 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1386a28–b1. 
71 
 
what is proper pity? It is possible to miss the mark in an excess of pity or sentimentality. 
Some claim that sentimental means any display of feeling or taking feeling seriously. 
Pity, however, is different from sentimentality of inordinate feeling; feeling that goes 
beyond the source that gives rise to it. Pity is one of the instruments the poet uses to show 
audiences who they are.16 We pity the loss of Oedipus’ eyes because we know the value 
of eyes, but more deeply, we pity the violation of Oedipus’ increasing humility compared 
with his earlier hubris. Aristotle perfectly sums up this idea: 
If you consider that the part (of the soul) that is barely controlled in our personal 
misfortunes has been anxious to weep and to lament sufficiently, as it is, by 
nature, desirous of this, is the very part that receives fulfillment from poets and 
enjoys it. The part which is best in us, if not educated through rationality and 
habit, relaxes its guard of mourning, because it watches over the sufferings of 
another, and it is no shame of itself if it praises and pities another man, if he, 
saying that he is good, grieves excessively. 
 
Furthermore, there is, one thinks, a certain gain, namely pleasure, and he would 
not like being deprived of it, by despising the whole drama. Only a few reflect, I 
think, that enjoyment will be transferred from the spectacle of another’s suffering, 
to one’s own, and the one who has nurtured and strengthened the part of him that 
feels pity at those (dramas) will not find it easy to refrain from it at the time of his 
own misfortune.17 
Book II of Rhetoric introduces pathe, pity as a means for exhortation: “It is not right to 
twist the juryman by manipulating him into anger or envy or pity.” Aristotle’s 
recommendation might relate to epideictic argument, that civic extortion to values that 
occurs before a jury. Another possibility is that this view reflects a comprehensive picture 
of a theory of the emotions; logic and emotions are not antithetical for Aristotle. Book II 
sets forth specifically the nature of pity, which includes an ethical view. Ethical 
considerations in Aristotle’s tragic theory are critical to perceiving the larger context of 
                                                                
16 I think that this is what Nietzsche meant when he said “pity [that]. . . deepest abyss: the deeper man looks 
into life, the deeper too he looks into suffering.” 
17 Aristotle, Rhet. X, 606a2–b7. 
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Aristotelian works, Eugene Garver suggests.18 
Eleos, or pity, is defined as a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful 
evil happening to one who does not deserve it, and which a person might expect himself 
or one of his own to suffer, and which “seems close at hand.”19 In general, someone feels 
pity “when his state of mind is such that he remembers such things having happened to 
himself or his own or expects them to happen to himself or his own.”20 Although 
Aristotle does not use the term, the modern word empathy could be a semantic form of 
pity. An example of using pity in recollection is when a spectator fears the doom about to 
befall the hero. He imagines something similar could happen to him. Aristotle says this 
thought and memory process occurs through phantasia. Phantasia is imagination that 
makes use of mimetic interpretation; it applies to it both “feelings about another and 
memories about pity.”21 
Related to bringing-before-the-eyes is Aristotle’s baffling visual phrase, “close at 
hand.”22 The phrase is a metaphor but seems to relate to remembering certain cultural 
myths and the importance of actors performing tragedy. The skill of the actors is critical 
in displaying the proper emotion.23 
                                                                
18 Kant, CJ, 23: 245–246; Aristotle, Poet. V, 551b. 
19 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 386a1–3. 
20 Ibid. see above quote: Rhet. X, 606a2–b7. 
21 G. Watson “Phantasia in Aristotle’s De Anima 3.3 Classical Quarterly 32, pp. 100–113; Sonja Foss, 
Karen Foss, Robert Trapp. “The Congruence of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics,” (Southern Speech 
Communication Journal 38, 1973), 362–370. 
22 See note 19; also, Lawrence J. Flynn, “Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy: Culture Memory and 
Performance in Isocrates and Aristotle.” (Quarterly Journal of Speech 87, 2001), 168; Martha C 
Nussbaum, “Tragedy and Self-sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on fear and pity.” (Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy 10 1992), 107–59; and G. Watson, ‘Phantasia in Aristotle, De Anima 3.3.’ (Classical Quarterly 
32: 1982), 100–113. 
23 Lawrence J. Flynn, “Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy: Culture Memory and Performance in 
Isocrates and Aristotle.” (Quarterly Journal of Speech 87, 2001), 168; Martha C Nussbaum, “Tragedy and 
Self-sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on fear and pity.” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10 1992), 
107–59; and G. Watson, ‘Phantasia in Aristotle, De Anima 3.3.’ (Classical Quarterly 32: 1982), 100–113. 
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And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear near at hand and since people 
do not feel pity, or not in the same way, about things ten thousand years in the 
past or future neither anticipating nor remembering them (myth) necessarily those 
are more pitiable who contribute to the effect by gestures and cries and display of 
feelings and generally in their acting, for they make the evil seem near by making 
it appear before [our]eyes either as something about to happen or as something 
that has happen.24 
 
In the above quote from the Rhetoric Aristotle seems to have in mind the skills of an 
orator or an actor: comparable skills are needed when actors perform on the stage or 
when an orator performs in the courtroom; skills such as convincing gestures, voice, and 
a display of feeling. Aristotle mentions these same skills in the passage below from the 
Poetics. 
The passage in the Rhetoric indicates that pity’s effectiveness compromises when 
the playwright uses examples from thousands of years ago or the reverse or far in the 
future as the above quote clearly states. In this context, Aristotle’s rhetor is an orator 
situated in the courtroom. So that emotions of pity may stir in the audience, tragedy must 
emphasize the mimetic representation of events “close at hand” yet remotely in myth. In 
other words, the recommendation to present events “close in history” probably best 
conveys through the skills of the tragedian actor as compared with the orator of the 
courtroom. 
So, in the previous passage, Rhetoric exhibits the form of a work of literary 
theory. The relationships emphasized are the poet, the actors, and the audience. In Poetics 
Aristotle lays out his coherent method for producing the best tragedy, explaining how the 
playwright’s plot, character, and dramatic action, together with the actor’s skill, appeal to 
the audience. 
Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain 
                                                                
24 Aristotle, Rhet., 1386b. 
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magnitude, in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament (rhythm, 
harmony, and song) being found in separate parts of the play, in form of action, 
not of narrative.25 
 
Aristotle considers poetry to be a higher art than history writing. He delineates between 
poetry and history writing: 
It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may 
happen—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. The 
poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The work of 
Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with 
meter no less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has 
happened, the other what may happen. [my italics] Poetry, therefore, is a more 
philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the 
universal, history the particular.”26 
 
Aristotle provides an understanding in the Poetics of tragedy as literature; it appeals to 
the emotions as well as to the intellect. For example: 
Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of events inspiring 
fear or pity. Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by 
surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time, they follow as cause 
and effect. The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of 
themselves or by accident; for even coincidences are most striking when they 
have an air of design.27 
 
The relationship between emotion and mind is not well understood; “emotions 
themselves are not well understood,” observes Elizabeth Belfiore.28 For example, the 
plight of Aristotle’s ideal tragic hero suggests that pity’s universal appeals to and 
ultimately transforms basic human instincts. Two emotions regarding pity are mentioned 
in the Poetics; however, they are not mentioned in the context of the spectator of tragic 
drama. Rather, Aristotle emphasizes the conditions under which plot and characters open 
fearful and pitiable emotions in the endeavor to convey emotion to the eye of the 
                                                                
25 Aristotle, Poet. VI, 2. 
26 Aristotle, Poet., 5.551b; G.R.F.Ferrari. “Aristotle’s Literary Aesthetics,” (Phronesis 44 1999), 81–98. 
27 Aristotle, Poet. IX, 156b. 
28 Elizabeth Belfiore, Tragic Pleasure, Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. (New Jersey: Princeton, 1992), 343. 
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beholder. The puzzle confronting the reader is Aristotle’s slight explanation for the way 
audiences experience emotions as spectators of tragedy. Aristotle emphasizes formal 
structural elements of a play as the means of conveying eleos and phobos; he implies 
they exist for the sake of the spectator. 
In a compact phrase, Aristotle introduces three ideas essential to the poet’s 
understanding of pity. First, he elaborates the general notion of pity as memory 
mentioned above; he reasons that pity concerns emotion either anticipated or recognized 
in the past and by the suffering of others. Second, Aristotle begins to explore the reason 
why myth, such as Oedipus, is useful as a tragic trope. Third, in the specific visual 
component of pity, bringing-forth-before-the-eyes addresses the way visual tropes should 
be utilized as affect, to enable tragedy’s fear and pity as effect, their proper aim. Aristotle 
emphasizes: “. . . the [visually] concentrated effect is more pleasurable than the one with 
a large admixture of time to dilute it. . . [a certain] unity is in the imitation.”29 Aristotle’s 
visual laser opens a space to examine the actor and the experience of the spectator. 
The Actor and the Spectator 
Poetics emphasizes that the plot is the most important element of tragedy. 
However, in this section I focus on the role of effect as an artistic devise in relation to 
Rhetoric and Poetics. Aristotle’s ideal rhetorician is someone who is able to see the 
available means of persuasion.30 This is not to say that the rhetor will be able to convince 
the spectator under all circumstances. Rather, Aristotle says that he is in a similar 
situation as the physician who possesses a complete grasp of his art only if he neglects 
                                                                
29 Aristotle, Poet., 1462. 
30 Aristotle, Topics VI, 12, 149b25; Rhet. I, 2, 1355b26f. 
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nothing that might heal his patient, though Aristotle emphasizes that he is not able to heal 
every patient. The rhetor’s grasp of his method is similar if he discovers every available 
means of persuasion, although he will not be able to convince everybody.31 
Aristotle posits that good acting is able to increase the effects of pity. However, in 
other sections he laments the inability of some actors and orators to create convincing 
effects in their art of delivery; the inartistic display of visual effects. In tragedy, poets 
previously presented their artistic representations to the public. In Book III, he gives 
scant attention to actors and begrudgingly: 
Those performers [who give attention to the delivery elements] are usually the 
ones who win poetic contests, and as actors are now more important than poets, so 
it is in political contests because of the corruption of the governments.32 
 
His indictment is similar to our modern sense of the popular appeal of politicians and 
celebrities who find they can become famous for being famous. The ancients seem 
plagued in much the same way. It is puzzling that Aristotle belittles actors in Book III yet 
he argues on their behalf in Book II. Actors do appear to be essential, particularly when 
artfully portrayed pity is at stake. Poetics gives a clue to what Aristotle might have 
meant: 
One should, as much as possible, also work out the plot in gestures, since, by 
nature, those in the grip of emotions are the most convincing, and the one who is 
afflicted by misfortune makes others feel his affliction, and the one enraged 
makes others feel his anger.33 
So, Aristotle requires a particular tone of voice to accompanying the language of 
emotion— the actor’s voice must sustain a phonetic tone communicating the required 
emotion; anger, disgust, sadness, and joy, must be convincing. In other words, an actor 
                                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 14003b32–35. 
33 Aristotle, Poet. XVII, 1455a29–32. 
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must unify voice with appropriate body language. The paired speech and language of the 
body transmits to the eyes literally and figuratively. In Rhetoric III, he offers this 
instruction to orators: 
. . . to express emotion, you will employ the language of anger in speaking of 
outrage; the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when 
speaking of impiety or foulness; the language of exultation for a tale of glory, and 
that of humiliation for a tale of submission, and so in all other cases.34 
 
In addition to orators, skilled actors are needed to complement an excellent plot and 
script. Good actors enable good tragedy. Giving expression to pity, actors themselves 
should enter into the grip of emotions through practiced emotions. Tragic emotion, such 
as the pathos displayed through gestures, “expresses itself through the actor.”35 
Conversely, Aristotle disapproves of acting for acting’s sake, acting separated from 
oratory and tragedian performance. In Poetics, Aristotle instructs actors on the art of 
inducing pity and fear: 
Thus whenever it is best to make them [probably the audience] experience fear he 
should make them realize that they are of such a sort that they can suffer, and that 
others better than them have suffered; and to show others like them suffering or 
having suffered, and at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it and 
suffering things they did not expect and at a time when they were not thinking of 
the possibility.36 
Aristotle adds a note of caution in Poetics: the appeal to the eye must not resort to 
“inartistic” display of visual effects; rather through plausible representation (mimesis), 
pleasure is affected37: 
The plot should be so constructed that even without seeing the play anyone 
hearing of the incidents happening thrills with fear and pity as a result of what 
                                                                
34 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 14003b32–35. 
35 J.G.Warry, Greek Aesthetic Theory: A Study of Callistic and Aesthetic Concepts in the Works of Plato 
and Aristotle (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962), 42. 
36 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1383a7–12. 
37 McKeon, Richard P. “Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity,” Critics and 
Criticism: Ancient and Modern, R. S. Crane, ed., 1952, p. 25. McKeon’s view is that these displays have 
nothing in common with tragedy. 
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occurs. . . To produce this effect by means of an appeal to the eye is inartistic and 
needs adventitious aid, while those who by such means produce an effect which is 
not fearful but merely monstrous have nothing in common with tragedy. 
 
For one should not seek from tragedy all kind of pleasures but that which is 
peculiar [my emphasis] to tragedy, and since the poet must by ‘representation’ 
produce the pleasure which comes from feeling pity and fear, obviously this 
quality must be embodied in the incidents.38 
 
Actors should guide their performance by the action of the plot. In the above passage, 
Aristotle refers to “gestures, cries, and display of feelings” produced through inartistic 
means. This could refer to the sense of actors overacting their part, or in an overblown 
display of feelings. Such display could detract from the subtle rendering of tragedy as an 
artfully produced mimetic. 
In Rhetoric II 1386a34, the orator or tragic actor has to convince a rhetorical 
audience that a past or future set of circumstances is pitiable; the audience has to “see” it. 
Upon seeing, the evil has appeared for the audience; the evil is about to appear or will 
appear in the future. 
In Poetics, Aristotle’s ideal hero is the one most worthy of pity and most capable 
of encountering evil because he is noble. Aristotle demonstrates this in the visual phrase: 
And it is especially pitiable when noble people are in such extremities, as 
someone who is unworthy [of suffering] and the suffering is evident before the 
eyes.39 
 
When he discusses pity in the Rhetoric, Aristotle appears to be dealing with emotion at 
two levels: first, eleos connotes a cause and effect relationship, that dreaded sense of 
danger due to the threat of real events; therefore, fear is felt as a real thing. In the second 
sense, pity requires phantasia: through the imagination the spectator imagines and 
                                                                
38 Aristotle, Poet. XIV. 
39 Aristotle, Poet. IX; Rhet. III, 14003b32–35. 
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experiences the pity and fear he associates with the hero. The two words link closely. A 
puzzle is how fear may suffocate pity in Rhetoric; when, at the same time, fear is 
required for the spectator to arrive at katharsis (what I refer to later as aesthetic 
transformation) or the state of contemplation as Aristotle predicts. 
A possible solution may lie in the word itself. Eleos involves someone whose 
misfortunes are without cause: the hero does not deserve the status. Once again, phantasia 
is an important facilitator in fiction. The more flexible eleos in the second instance 
derives from an artistic mimetic representation. Eleos is aroused from the actor’s speech 
delivered on the stage. Therefore, the more artistically conveyed pity an actor can 
portray, the more the transfer of emotion. To say this in another way, the more the actor’s 
skill makes possible or brings-before-the-eyes an impending evil, the greater the 
emotional enjoyment for the spectator. 
Anger is in another sense a form of the “anticipated pleasure of retaliation,” not 
self-suffering and not the pathos of another.40 Aristotle fails to explain what separates the 
two representations of eleos, only that the first belongs to an experiential state associated 
with fear itself; the second could be a type of aesthetic contemplation on the-plight of the 
hero’s state.41 
Rhetoric defines fear: “Let fear be a sort of pain or agitation, coming from 
imagination of a future destruction or painful evil.”42 In Poetics, as noted, the person 
most worthy of pity is “noble”: In the Rhetoric, Aristotle adds the visual component 
                                                                
40 R. Kennedy trans. 2:1,2; S. Leighton, “Aristotle’s exclusion of anger from the experience of tragedy,” 
(Ancient Philosophy 23, 2003), 361–81. 
41 David W. E. Fenner, “Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Analysis” (Journal of Aesthetic Education, 
37:1, Spring, 2003), 40–55. 




which amplifies unjust suffering: “And it is especially pitable when noble people are in 
such extremities, as someone who is unworthy and the suffering is evident before the 
eyes.”43 However, Aristotle points out that those who are in the presence of fear do not 
pity: 
. . . [those who are afraid] who think that they have suffered all the terrible things, 
and have become cold toward the future ‘ . . those who are completely destroyed 
do not pity.44 
 
Returning to the second type of eleos, we can say that elos as contemplation is an 
emotion of a removed self in the present, focused on the suffering of others. That is, the 
spectator may experience or may have experienced a similar state but only in and through 
phantasia. The importance of the state of mind a spectator brings to his spectatorship 
makes a major difference to a spectator’s aesthetic experience.45 
Pity according to the above description turns on the mythic heroic figure who 
possesses hubris. Seeming to relate to a sympathetic and humane state of mind, this idea 
holds that as long as the evil visits the hero, an undeserved misfortune ensues. Pity was 
intended to be felt at an apparent (perceived) evil happening to someone who does not 
deserve it.46 And fear develops from the appearance or imagination (phantasia) of 
imminent evil47: the imagination experiences through phantasia, appearance. Curiously, 
phantasia is defined as “weak perception.”48 
Aristotle continues: “Imagination would be a motion generated by actual 
perception . . . since sight is the principal sense, imagination [phantasia] has derived even 
                                                                
43 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1385b32–241386b, 6–8. 
44 Ibid. 
45 I have emphasized this point previously and will restate the point in the conclusion. 
46 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 21285b13. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Aristotle, Rhet. I, 1370a28. 
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its name from light (phaos), because, without light it is not possible to see.” Aristotle’s 
advice is directed to those writing and performing (Poetics). Phantasia is similarly 
comparable as advice to orators in the Rhetoric. Poets must employ phantasia that they 
may bring-before-the-eyes mythical events. In Rhetoric Aristotle recommends phantaisa 
to orators so that they may produce “pitiable events.”49 
Halliwell’s insight is that poetry is capable of sustaining “pleasurable or painful 
feelings associated with particular traits of ‘character’ and life as a whole.”50 For 
Aristotle, poetry is ideally, “an imaginative enactment of possible structures of action 
[and suffering].”51 The emotions tragedy arouses closely link complex properties of the 
human experience exhibited in the play.52 Belfiore captures the spirit single to tragedy in 
the phrase: “. . . a unique ability to create visions in poetry; creators of images are also 
called creators of visions.”53 
For Rhetoric’s orator bringing-[pity] before-the-eyes is determined by real events 
“close at hand,” while the Poetic’s emotional transformation turns on mimetic 
representation of imagined events. Thus, the plausibility of emotion in each case depends 
for credibility on the poet’s and orator’s skill. The play’s environment should cause the 
spectator to experience an emotion as if the real event were occurring. Such would be the 
case it seems “. . . when pathos is apparent before-the- eyes.”54 
So far I have discussed the role of the actor and briefly the role of the playwright 
in bringing-pity-and-fear-before-the-eyes of the spectator. Together with the powerful 
                                                                
49 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1386a33–34); Watson, 113. 
50 Aristotle, Poet. [text, tr.] pp.589–599. 
51 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1450a16–17. 
52 Aristotle, Poet. XVII, 1455a21–22. 
53 Belfiore, 170–174. 
54 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1386b. 
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role of speech and tone in emotion, these techniques, when portrayed artistically, deepen 
the spectator experience. The discussion below continues to explore in Rhetoric and 
Poetics and the notion of fear in tandem with the spectator’s role in bringing a proper 
state of mind to the play. 
That Aristotle links fear and pity as states of mind in imagination seems to imply 
that pity connects with fear in the two meanings of eleos mentioned. If fear is too great, 
however, pity cannot exist.55 “Nor again those who are terribly afraid [can feel pity]—for 
those stricken by their own suffering do not feel pity.”56 What is Aristotle’s meaning? 
The puzzle requires examining the two extremes of fear, then working to understand the 
integral unity of the emotions as they tie together. 
In Poetics, by inference, the playwright and the actor’s role in creating extremes 
of fear include inartistic techniques and do not appeal to the eye and fail to produce the 
proper effect (i.e., the proper state of mind for the spectator, previously discussed in the 
section on pity): 
. . . that . . . to produce this [visual] effect by means of an appeal to the eye is 
inartistic and needs adventitious aid, while those who by such means produce an 
effect which is not fearful but merely monstrous have nothing in common with 
tragedy.57 
 
Fear’s elusiveness therefore turns on the state of being in the spectator. One should not be 
a spectator too full of contentment, “that they think they possess all the good things in 
life. . . [that they cannot imagine] the impossibility of evil befalling [them]. . .nor should 
a spectator be consumed by too much fear. . . panic-stricken people do not feel pity, 
                                                                
55 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1383a; Hawhee, 186. 
56 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1385b. 
57 Aristotle, Poet. XIV. 
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because they are taken up with what is happening to themselves. . .”58 
As mentioned—although all the conditions are set through the play’s elements—
fear is nonetheless conditioned by the spectator, not on the play—the state of mind the 
spectator brings to the play.59 Accordingly, Aristotle’s sense of not too much, not too 
little, but just right recalls the mean described in ethical theory. 
An additional attribute is important to Aristotle’s spectator suggested in a certain 
type of ethic discussed in the Poetics: “. . . one should come to tragedy [not only in this 
somewhere-in-middle state, but also]. . . believe[ing] in the goodness of at least some 
people. . . [and the quality of] remembering that similar misfortunes have happened to us 
or ours, or expecting them to happen in the future. . . only those who feel pity who are 
between these two extremes.”60 
Continuing the discussion of the spectator, Aristotle argues that fear and pity act 
freely as “complete action” (example below) in unified emotion enabling a complex 
reaction in the spectator. Because they are integrally connected, the ability to perceive 
another’s distress requires both. Spectators project on themselves that same possibility of 
distress: 
Thus whenever it is best [for the actor] to make them [the spectator] experience 
fear he should make them realize that they are of such sort that they can suffer, 
and tht other better than them have suffered; and to show other like them suffering 
or having suffered, and at the hands of those from whom they did not expect if 
and suffering things they did not expect and at a time when they were not thinking 
of the possibility.61 
 
                                                                
58 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1386a–b; John M. Cooper. “An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions,” Essays on 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, A.O. Rorty, ed. (Princeton, N.J.:1996), 238–57. 
59 Immanuel Kant echoes Aristotle: he also thought that an aesthetic judgment was not a property of 
objects, but ways in which we respond to objects; for example in Poetics, the tragic action is intended to 
bring about the aesthetic disposition or experience (contemplation). 
60 Aristotle, Poet. XIV. 
61 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 138a7–12. 
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Spectators not consumed by either extremes of fear hold another advantage. They would 
be more likely to be open to other artistic devises mentioned by Aristotle (i.e., “the design 
of chance” and of “unity of actions” associated with the best plot).62 
At this point, the mention of additional artistic devises, such as visual metaphors, 
further emphasis how fear and pity transmit before-the-eyes.63 The devises are “the 
marvelous,” “astonishment,” and “reversal” and the mythic devises. Aristotle includes in 
his description the importance of the timing of actions: 
Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only a complete action, but also of incidents 
arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very effect on the mind when they 
occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequences of one another; there is 
more of a marvelous in them then than if they happened of themselves or by mere 
chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvelous if there is an appearance of 
design as it were in them. . .64 
 
“Astonishment,” argues Aristotle “is the imitation not just of a complete action, but also 
of events that evoke fear and pity. These effects occur above all when things come about 
contrary to expectation but because of one another. This will be more astonishing than if 
they come about spontaneously or by chance.”65 An example mentioned by Aristotle is 
Oedipus’ astonished ignorance of the manner of Laius’ death.66 
Another creative devise is reversal, “a change of the opposite in the action being 
performed.”67 For example, in Oedipus someone comes to deliver good news and free 
him from his fear (about his mother). By disclosing Oedipus’s identity the messenger 
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63 Bringing-before-the-eyes, employed in both the Rhetoric and the Poetics, is a devise signifying “things 
engaged in an activity.” 
64 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1452a. 
65 Aristotle, Poet. VI, 151b. 




instead brings about the opposite result.68 Next, a short discussion highlights how 
aesthetic judgment is important to the spectator’s proper stance toward in tragic drama 
and how this stance relates to emotions of fear. 
Kant does not discuss the notion of a tragic hero; however, he holds with Aristotle 
that human nature inherently binds conflict with inclinations toward both good and evil 
tendencies. Moreover, Kant says, humans use “good will, freely exercised, to pursue 
good and not evil.”69 To extend the argument, if the engaged spectator finds himself in an 
agitated state of eleos, he is unable to enter the realm of objective contemplation. Kant’s 
“purposiveness” in aesthetic theory aids this understanding: aesthetic feeling begins as 
contemplative and reflective, sufficient unto itself. By extension, tragedy is beautiful 
because it possesses the “form of finality,” that is, it appears to have been designed with a 
purpose.70 
Yet, judgments of taste are both subjective and universal. They are subjective 
because they are responses of pleasure and do not essentially involve any claims about 
the properties of the object itself. On the other hand, aesthetic judgments are universal 
and not merely personal; in a crucial way, they must be disinterested to respond to the 
claims of the object (plot). The ideal spectator then is free from extremes; she is prepared 
to enter this realm—to suspend disbelief. The rhetorical inference is—as in Critique of 
Judgment—that Aristotle’s idea of tragedy and its universal subjects link creative 
purpose to the reflective spectator. This sense of universality in Kant echoes similarly in 
                                                                
68 In Poetics, Aristotle says, “Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a 
certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being 
found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; with incidents arousing pity and 
fear. A great admirer of Oedipus the King, Aristotle considered it the perfect tragedy.” 
69 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Judgment. Pluhar, Werner, S., 
trans. Originally, Prussia, 1790, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc.), 1987, 433. 





This section uses mimesis and the epideictic to explore the notion of how pity and 
fear can produce pleasure. Through the epideictic lens pity and fear become tropes of 
rhetorical strategy that employ excellence of artistic technique. Much has been written to 
explain why catharsis72 is needed to resolve pity and fear. Aristotle uses the term as a 
metaphor to describe the effects of tragedy on the spectator; we still need to explain how 
the spectator arrives at pleasure from pity and fear. Although the cathartic theory is 
widely accepted, I depart from the idea advanced by Malcolm Heath and others to 
explore a rhetorical interpretation of how pleasure could result from the mimetic 
representation brought about by aesthetic contemplation. My claim that aesthetic is an 
aspect of rhetoric offers a reasonable and emotionally satisfying alternative. 
Mimesis emphasizes the visual and material status of works of art. The meaning 
of mimesis is to embody or enact likeness from material form, such as the form of 
dramatic tragedy. In his discussion of perception and of metaphors Aristotle says that the 
visual action of placing objects (or emotion as object) before-the-mind’s-eye is a mimetic 
action. In Rhetoric and Poetics the language of art is fundamentally mimetic, not 
symbolic. Halliwell says of mimesis, 
. . . Aristotle’s idea of mimesis [places] the mimetic medium [at the center]: 
representational works do not offer us deceptive pseudo realities. . . [Plato] but the 
fictive. . . [plausible] reality in artistic medium that allow such reality to be 
recognized and responded to coherently. . . aesthetic understanding cannot be 
limited to matching a copy with a known original, nor can it be reduced to the 
merely factual and immediate registering that a certain kind of thing has been 
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Mimesis helps explain how the spectator suspends disbelief to enable fiction’s emotional 
impact and visual immediacy of a protagonist’s moving performance. 
The epideictic further explains the way a spectator’s emotional transformation 
takes place. Epideictic defines rhetorical strategies, the way or means audiences perceive 
pleasure. Artistic excellence is defined through techniques such as plausibility and the 
quality of an actor’s performance. 
Poetics explains, “. . . the structure of the best tragedy should be not simple but 
complex; in incidents arousing fear and pity for that is peculiar (italics mine) to this form 
of art . . . in language made pleasurable.”74 Aristotle presents a succinct definition of 
tragedy that emphasizes the pleasure to be gained in dramatic tragedy through emotion: 
Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is admirable, complete (composed of an 
introduction, a middle part and an ending), and possesses magnitude; in language 
made pleasurable, each of its species separated in different parts; performed by 
actors, not through narration; effecting through pity and fear the purification of 
such emotions.75 
 
I begin by exploring scholarly perspectives that tie literary pleasure to mimesis: artistic 
form, unity, techne, and cognitive pleasure. Next, I discuss the peculiar pleasure by 
comparing passages from Poetics and Rhetoric. Finally, I examine how the epideictic 
intertwines with aesthetic feeling. I show how aesthetic contemplation is a transformative 
process: the spectator’s relationship to the hero’s evolves through the tropes of pity and 
fear, ultimately leading to the experience of the emotional pleasure in empathic 
recognition of his fate. Near the end of the section, I include an excerpt from Sophocles’ 
                                                                
73 Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: ancient texts and modern problems: Princeton UP, 2002, 
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Oedipus at Colonus. The quote exemplifies a unifying principle in at least three elements 
important to Aristotle that lead to aesthetic pleasure. The discussion that follows 
highlights interpretations of how pleasure ties to emotion in views of modern Aristotelian 
scholars. 
According to Malcolm Heath, it is doubtful that Aristotle had a concept that 
compares with the modern sense of the aesthetic. Aristotle’s concept of pleasure relates to 
perception.76 Moreover, Heath claims that in Aristotle we cannot find a concept of art: 
It is true that he habitually groups together many of the things that we would 
classify as art—painting sculpture, music, dance, poetry. But the shared feature 
which for Aristotle makes this a coherent grouping is imitation or representation 
(mimesis, to which similarity is essential: these activities all, in Aristotle’s view 
involve making likenesses).77 
 
Eugene Garver dismisses altogether emotion and the pleasure associated with dramatic 
experience. He brings into relief the tension between rhetorical and aesthetic theory by 
exposing what he believes is Rhetoric’s political agenda. Rhetoric’s purpose is, “critically 
political.”78 The scholar says that some critics claim the work to be the epitome of 
“oppressive ideology.”79 Garver argues instead for a reading of Rhetoric that emphasizes 
political theory engaged in moral and ethical evaluation. His convincing argument 
subordinates aesthetics to the political realm: “relationships flow between the body 
politic and the good orator.”80 
Charles Martindale argues that if the Poetics persuades entirely as a political 
theory, “it would require considerable ingenuity. Homer gives unity of action to the Iliad 
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by telling the wrath of Achilles, not his whole life.”81 Martindale’s argument favors a 
Kantian reading; he suggests that Aristotle’s “conspicuous lack of political agenda in the 
Poetics”82 supports an aesthetic of free will, which is Kant’s counterclaim to Plato—Plato 
says that literature and art corrupt. He continues with Kant that free will requires persons 
to be free to choose corruption, “that a just society in which different opinions are 
promulgated is healthier than one where such differences are suppressed, even that virtue 
must have something to test itself against if it is not to be a ‘fugitive and cloistered.’”83 
Martha Nussbaum demonstrates that Rhetoric does exhibit some ties to moral and 
political considerations. She emphasizes, instead, that emotion and experiential 
perceptions are pleasurable and clearly apparent in both Poetics and Rhetoric. Poetics 
focuses on theoretical analysis: ordering plot, character, and tragic action artistically 
arranged bring pleasure to the viewer. Rhetoric III sets forth artistic devises and tropes 
that enhance artistic representation.84 Pleasure in the dramatic experience is thus aided by 
the particular form Poetics stipulates and by the figurative tropes that make arguments 
visual. 
Butcher’s influential study Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art mirrors to 
some extent the aesthetic ideal of Kant who previously attempted to reveal the existence 
of systematic aesthetic ideas in Aristotle in the Critique of Judgment. Butcher believes 
that “the cardinal points of Aristotle’s aesthetic theory can be sized up with some 
                                                                
81 “Banishing the Poets.” The Idea of Ancient, Literary Criticism, Charles Martindale, Rev.Too Yun Lee, 
Too Yun. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Arion: 8, 1993), 117. 
82 Ibid. In addition, Kant’s point is that there is a kind of knowledge, neither rational, political, or ethical, 
which makes way for a separate realm for the aesthetic argued in Critique of Judgment. 
83 Ibid., see note 81. 
84 Martha C. Nussbaum. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Beacon, First Things, 
(October 1996), 37–41; 378–94. 
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certainty.”85 The claim seems overblown. I suggest instead that it is possible to identify a 
theory of pleasure in Aristotle—especially pleasure associated with the mimetic arts—in 
particular how pity and fear produce in the spectator pleasure. 
The sometimes contentious tension between rhetoric and the aesthetics of emotion 
is made visible in the prominent debate between Jonathan Lear and Stephen Halliwell. 
Their exchange highlights two opinions concerning how pity and fear in dramatic tragedy 
may produce pleasure. 
Lear asserts that pity opens the way for the situated audience to disengage from 
the action that takes place on the stage and thereafter to observe the logic behind tragic 
events that happen in the polis.86 
Replying to this argument, Halliwell counters, “I do not understand Lear’s claim 
that pity ‘guarantees our ability to pull ourselves back from involvement in tragedy.’ Pity 
is not voluntary. . . it transforms the conduct of the spectator in life, because it has the 
potential to contribute to the tacit redefinition of an audience’s moral identity.”87 
Lear counterargues, “Pity in Halliwell’s vision is emotionally susceptible to 
imaginative possibilities and might contribute to tacit redefinition of an audience’s moral 
identity.”88 Lear takes the Platonic view that pity in the Poetics leads to apathy; it directs 
attention to conditions in the polis. 
Conversely, Halliwell claims that emotion moves the situated and contemporary 
                                                                
85 Butcher viii; Aristotle, Poet., 350 B.C.E., S. H. Butcher translation, The Internet Classics Archive; 
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86 J. Lear, “Katharsis,’Phronesis 33 (1988), 297–326; Stephen R. Leighton, “Aristotle and the Emotions,” 
Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, A.O. Rorty ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 206–37; 
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audiences to become ethically involved in tragic performance, and by extension, in real 
life, a view that counters Martindale’s reading. Hallliwell’s idea embraces the 
Aristotelian view that moral conceptions of pity as “good and evil” drive the action and 
emotion, including pleasure, in the audience. 
Malcolm Heath follows Halliwell by highlighting the affective orientation of 
Poetics and how it engages the rhetorical audience “cognitively and emotionally.”89 
Heath makes wonder cognitive by conflating it with the “desire to understand and the 
pleasure in learning” cited in Poetics IV. His claim is that pleasure is solely one of “a re-
establishment [kathistasthai] of catharsis to the natural.”90 What goes missing in Health is 
the transformative power of the mimetic component.91 
Next, I compare passages from Rhetoric and Poetics to support the claim that 
through mimesis—which includes cognitive learning and recognition—the spectator 
transitions from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge. This experience is 
pleasurable; moreover, learning accompanied by wonder (phantasia or imagination) 
evolves: concern for the hero who suffers reflects in the spectator’s emotional states of 
pity and fear. Aristotle suggests that pleasure in tragedy, unlike comedy, develops from 
the spectator’s increasing emotional involvement with people who are “good and 
noble”92 (e.g., kings and heroes), the pleasure mimesis delivers, and techniques of artistic 
portrayals. 
Poetics, and to a lesser degree Rhetoric, articulates the visual concerns of artistic 
form, unity, techne (addressed below), and the nature of pleasure to be derived from 
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works of mimesis. This argument can be stated as an enthymeme: if the actor’s portrayal 
of the emotions of pity and fear is plausible, then the spectator’s aesthetic wonder 
increases in the pleasure that comes from a growing understanding of the plight of the 
tragic hero. As mentioned, Aristotle refers to this pleasure as the peculiar pleasure that he 
associates with wonder, often paired with recognition of the hero’s tragic plight. In 
Poetics this process occurs in the spectator’s recognition of characters through tropes of 
tokens, artistic contrivances, memory, and reasoning (including false inferences). Finally, 
it arises out of recognizing the emotional power of the events themselves (as in Oedipus 
Rex). Aristotle defines this recognition as a change from ignorance to knowledge.93 
The chapter has examined the effect of pleasure in the artful display of pity and 
fear depicted rhetorically by actors. But how tragic drama could produce pleasure is still 
puzzling. 
Poetics IV is the first account of any aspect of pleasure. In the context in which 
Aristotle is emphasizing the basic cognitive features of poetry, he stresses that pleasure in 
visual and artistic representation is accessible even to the least cognitively sophisticated 
humans: “Understanding is extremely pleasant, not just for philosophers but for others 
too in the same way, despite their limited capacity for it.”94 It appears that Aristotle is 
forming in the above passage an understanding of how mimesis links to cognitive 
pleasure in order to explore more complex forms of mimesis such as artistic expression 
and artistic representation in tragic drama. 
Within Western traditions, the concept of mimesis has been central to theorizing 
the essence of artistic expression, describing characteristics that distinguish works of art 
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from other phenomena and the myriad of ways in which audiences experience and 
respond to works of art.95 Thus, viewing a dramatic tragedy requires the exercise of 
multifaceted learning capacities and contemplative perceptions for ascertaining different 
types of mimetic representations, such as focusing on a single character or event. This 
complex capability in humans produces an integrated experience of pleasure in fiction. 
So, Aristotle requires mimesis to produce the peculiar pleasure he most associates with 
tragedy. 
Mimesis is a particular avenue for gaining knowledge through fictive 
representations that produces pleasure. 
Is learning a plausible truth in the real world the same as learning from mimetic 
tragedy? Learning need not be true to reality: Aristotle says it may correspond to “what 
people say” or doxa.96 So it follows that it is possible that fictional truths—mythology for 
example—are not automatically truths about the real world. The pleasure of learning 
from tragedy is not necessarily learning from reality; rather fiction (mimesis), which 
engenders empathy. 
Cognitive pleasure is mentioned in Poetics IV when Aristotle says that human 
beings have a disposition to take pleasure in observing and in imitation. He specifies the 
natural capacity that comes from the pleasure of imitation. Using the visual arts as an 
example, he points out that someone looking at a painting must go through a process of 
reasoning and inference to finally reach a conclusion of the form “this is so-and-so.”97 
                                                                
95 In most cases, mimesis is defined as having two primary meanings: imitation (specifically, the imitation 
of nature as object, phenomena, or process) and that of artistic representation. Representation most 
accurately captures the more complex forms of mimesis. 
96 Aristotle, Poet., 1460b10f, 1460b35–1461a1. 
97 Aristotle, Poet., 1448b12–17; Rhet., 1371b4–10. 
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One must recognize a picture of a horse as a picture of a horse. Recognition involves a 
capacity for cognition and is pleasurable, since Aristotle professes that learning is 
universally pleasant to humans: all human beings by nature desire knowledge.98 
Considering what is involved in watching a tragedy, the spectator within the Attic 
social context would need more than rudimentary recognitions of the form “this is so-
and-so” as explained above. For example in Oedipus, the rhetorical audience needs to 
recognize the structure of the plot, the relationship among characters, the unfolding of 
events, and how these link from beginning to end. But the processes are not unusually 
demanding, so tragedy will be pleasurable for everyone. And tragedy should produce for 
the spectator, moral understanding of events in order to perceive, for instance, that the 
misfortune of the hero is not deserved.99 So, tragedy involves cognitive processes that are 
more complex than basic drama, yet nonetheless produce pleasure. Aristotle uses 
cognitive pleasure to highlight why we enjoy metaphor: “learning is easy . . . [and] 
naturally pleasant to all.”100 
Techne 
In Poetics IV, Aristotle investigates various pleasure(s) that come from 
multifaceted language and sound in tragic drama or techne. For example in the definition 
of tragedy, he describes its verbal language and performances as “made pleasurable” by 
rhythm and melody.101 Song is the most important of tragedy’s “pleasurable 
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99 Aristotle, Rhet., 1453a3–5. 
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enhancements.”102 He mentions staging too. Together music and staging are mentioned as 
sources of intense pleasure.103 Visual and aural performances add to the pleasures of 
tragedy. Plot, above all else, defines the primary pleasure mimesis accomplishes. 
One of Aristotle’s major contributions to rhetoric was his systematic and thorough 
treatment of invention: the art of finding the available arguments in a given case. I have 
shown that Aristotle’s conception of mimetic art, begins with the broad idea of techne—
craft, skill, method, or art—or “the capacity to act in accordance with reasoned 
procedures so as to produce designed results.”104 Halliwell posits that in this statement it 
is possible to abstract an aesthetic theory that articulates strategic techniques.105 Aristotle 
shows, for instance, that the job of the poet is to produce pleasure through specific 
emotions using specific artistic means. Aristotle says, “the poet should produce the 
[peculiar] pleasure which comes from pity and fear through imitation.”106 In the 
statement we understand the appropriate means of achieving the peculiar pleasure is 
thorough the emotions of pity and fear. Aristotle says the kind of events must be suited to 
a tragic plot. For example, a happy ending for good characters, a bad ending for the evil 
character would be a distortion and would condescend to “weak audiences.”107 When 
spectators recognize the poet’s subtlety—what is not obvious in the characters—the act 
provides cognitive pleasures because as Aristotle says, learning is universally pleasant to 
humans. 
The discussion has highlighted scholarly views and compared passages in 
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Rhetoric and Poetics that inform understanding of the interweaving of emotion, pleasure, 
and teche. It is useful to remember that Poetics is a reply to Plato’s Republic: nature, says 
Aristotle, not metaphysics contains truth. Art perfects imperfect nature through mimetic 
representation. In this sense the poet creates through verisimilitude an imaged world 
where the audience, situated and contemporary, experiences emotion vicariously. The 
poet is not a mere imitator but also creator of aesthetic experience. Since Aristotle 
believes the idea that the world of appearance is merely an ephemeral copy of the 
changeless ideas, he holds that change and the experience of change is the fundamental 
process of nature, which he takes as a creative force and the concept which directs 
Poetics. 
Epideictic 
Epideictic recognizes a systematized attribution of value to things, people, or 
concepts. In Attic drama, the good and the bad, virtuous and vice ridden, are prominent 
values. Rosenfield has shown in his rhetorical interpretation that the term is a conception 
of aesthetics in artistic composition and intention, inventiveness and scientific order; it 
designates excellence of technique in art and in performance. In a rhetorical construction, 
I apply epideictic to both aesthetic judgment and contemplation and to symbolic 
rhetorical judgment of the hero as dramatic tragedy shows. 
Jeffery Walker suggests that the epideictic shapes and cultivates “. . . basic codes 
of values and beliefs by which a society or culture lives . . . it [epideictic] shapes the 
ideologies and imaginaries . . . the deep commitments . . . constituting the very grounds 
of culture with which a society shapes itself.”108 
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Rosenfield explains that the epideictic comes “. . . from the Greek ‘show forth,’ [it 
is to] ‘make known’ . . . not as mere display, rather it means making manifest the 
‘fleeting appearances’ of excellence that otherwise would remain ‘unnoticed or 
invisible.’”109 The purpose of epideictic in this definition is simply and solely to display 
the luminosity of timeless excellence. In the epideictic, the spectator becomes a 
“witnesses to” emotion110 in the present moment. The interpretation emphasizes that 
effects of teche or technique combine with the moral to edify audiences. Moral virtue was 
attributed to art in the epideictic techne. Rhetorical techne through the epideictic are 
“paradigms of virtue”111 and open up the discovery of moral truths, such as empathic 
understanding, which progresses in the spectator, through the emotions of pity and fear. 
Critically, Rosenfield asserts that the fleeting nature of the appearance of 
excellence is in the present rather than a sustained reality.112 He suggests that art reveals 
the interplay between material display (theatre) and the selected meaning spectators 
impose on works. 
The epideictic provides another understanding of how teche and mimesis link to 
aesthetic pleasure through artistic excellence. As mentioned, the term aesthetics is a 
modern notion. Renato Barilli’s insight is useful in showing how teche is a rhetorically 
constructed strategy. The excellent performance by actors together with the plot 
transforms the spectator (an aesthetic contemplation): 
[R]hetoric is techne in the fullest sense: the activity it performs is not only 
cognitive but also transformative and practical as well. It does not limit itself to 
conveying neutral, sterilized facts (that would be docere), but its aim is to carry 
away the audience; [my italics] to produce an effect on them; to mold them; to 
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leave them different as a result of its impact.113 
 
Finally, humans are incapable of pity and fear if personal emotions predominate. 
Preoccupied with their own emotions, the situated audience fails to respond empathically 
to the actor’s portrayal of emotion. Ironically, the audience’s personal detachment 
together with creative imagination (phantasia) educes a state of connection with the 
suffering of the tragic hero. As mentioned in the section above, the second type of eleos, 
or contemplation, is an emotion of a removed self in the present focused on the suffering 
of others. That is, the Attic audience may have experienced a similar state but only in a 
state of phantasia that requires mimesis. Thus, pity and fear produced by the skilled poet 
and enacted by the skilled actor induces emotion in the heart and mind of the spectator. 
Indeed, the spectator’s willingness to submit to the actualization of emotion through 
phantasia corroborates with the audience’s expectation of tragic drama. 
I have proposed that catharsis is only one way for pity and fear to resolve in the 
spectator. But catharsis is not mentioned by Aristotle as a means of arriving at pleasure. 
Based on analysis of some of the scholars above and from passage in Rhetoric and 
Poetics, there are two ways to justify pleasure in tragedy other than catharsis. Even Plato 
in The Republic testifies to this fact: “. . . even the best of us enjoy it and let ourselves be 
carried away by our feelings; and are full of praises for the merits of the poet who can 
most powerfully affect us in this way.”114 In Book VII [section 11–14] Aristotle discusses 
“pure” pleasure and “incidental” pleasure. The former is universal, carries no pain, and 
compares favorably with the pleasure that arises out of contemplation. Spectators of 
tragic drama who experience this pleasure contemplate human emotions mimetically. 
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To restate, tragic pleasure or the peculiar pleasure “[is] . . . that which comes with 
pity and fear through imitation.”115 Aristotle is clear: pleasure is affected in tragic drama 
through imitation (or mimesis). Imitation of itself is pleasurable for actors and spectators; 
the pleasure probably extends to other types of poetry as well. Tragic pleasure or 
specifically the peculiar pleasure refers to the genre and mode or means of persuasion in 
tragedy. Together these make up the specific imitative aspects of tragedy. 
An elevated sense of pity and fear might have occurred when the probable events 
in the play take an unexpected turn. This is possible in the complex plot with the 
accompanying pleasure, wonder, and learning discussed above. The investigation of pity 
and fear in in the first section when combined with mimesis116 lead to a convincing 
concept: that the pleasure peculiar to tragedy is progressive; the emotional tension 
mounts by way of the epideictic, which leads to aesthetic contemplation. 
The discussion in this rhetorical examination extracted from Aristotle has 
endeavored to show that pity and fear require an engaged and open minded spectator: one 
not overcome nor consumed by the distress in the other person. The actor’s skill at 
bringing-pity-and-fear-before-the-eyes thus creates a triad of emotional exchanges: the 
poet’s play, the actors who convincingly perform pity and fear, and the spectator who 
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momentarily suspends temporal disbelief.117 In sum, Aristotle stresses that phantasia 
makes possible emotional states through fiction. Critical technical devises include 
language and sound and the elements of unified action in the plot. Tragic drama also 
largely depends on the state of mind of the spectator.118 
Oedipus Rex is the tragedy that most closely fits Aristotle’s guidelines. Oedipus is 
the model tragic hero. The play highlights Oedipus’ hamartia (mistake) and for this 
misdeed of unknowingly killing his father he suffers a peripeteia (reversal) of fortune, 
which includes the plague that comes upon Thebes. Together, these unfolding events are 
at the heart of tragedy. Although often translated as “tragic flaw,” hamartia according to 
Halliwell, does not indicate a deep or abiding personality failure, such as pride or lust; 
rather it means a mistake of perception or recognition, although other scholars debate the 
precise meaning, such as Butcher, Golden, and Heath. Most tragedies witness the 
protagonists change from better to worse circumstances such as in the tragedy, Oedipus. 
Sir Richard Jeff’s 1889 account of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus is included 
here to show how Aristotle’s ideal tragedy interweaves unfolding events from better to 
worse in mimetic verisimilitude: 
At the close of Oedipus the self-blinded Oedipus in his first agony of horror and 
despair, beseeches Creon (his brother in law) to send him away from Thebes. 
Oedipus begs that he no longer be allowed to pollute it by his presence: let him 
perish in the wilds of Cithaeron. Creon replies that he cannot assume the 
responsibility of acquiescing unless the oracles at Delphi be consulted. If Apollo 
agrees, Oedipus is to be sent away from Thebes. 
 
The long-awaited verdict, some twenty years, never materializes. The oracle was 
not consulted and Oedipus remained at Thebes. The lapse of time softened his 
anguish, the blind and discrowned sufferer learned to love the seclusion of the 
                                                                
117 Aristotle, Poet., 17.1455a21–22; Rhet. II, 1386a33–35. 
118 To say this differently, the situated audience’s capacity for the peculiar pleasure depends on a state of 
mind and the degree to which phantasia operates in the mind and heart of the spectator—the state of 
readiness to receive fear and pity in the visual portrayals, such as the description of the plight of Oedipus. 
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house in which he had once reigned so brilliantly. Pity for the hero deepens as a 
feeling grew up that Thebes was harboring a defilement. It was determined that 
Oedipus should be expelled. Bitter to him above all the rest was the behavior of 
his two sons who, having reached manhood, never objected to their father’s 
doom. Oedipus became the scapegoat for fear in Thebes. 
 
Self-inflicted blindness extracted upon his person as extreme and severe 
punishment and atonement notwithstanding, the heroic gesture perpetuates 
blindness in the citizens of Thebes. A tragic fate too much to bear for an ordinary 
human, Oedipus, now grown old in his destitute wanderings, heard of the secret 
mission performed by his daughter Antigone and the oracle concerning him. 
Oedipus’ fate, in fact, affects the future welfare of Thebes.119 
 
The Thebans conceived the desire of establishing Oedipus somewhere just beyond their 
border. In this way they thought that they would have him under their control, while at 
the same time they would avoid the humiliation of confessing themselves wrong and 
receiving him back to dwell among them. To secure the guardianship of the grave upon 
his death was their main object. The new oracle created opportunity for the sons to return 
aid to their banished father. Apollo had condemned any person who might still be 
attached to Oedipus; authorizing his recall, Thebes and the sons could not be defiled by 
the presence of a man whom the god had declared to be the determiner of future fate. 
The sons, Polyneices and Eteocles, humiliated by their sense of the curse on their 
family and themselves, had at first desired that Creon should become king. However, 
“. . . moved by some god argued by a sinful mind—compelled by the inexorable Fury of 
their house,” they renounced these intentions of wise self-denial and succumbed to 
egoism. In a reversal of hubris, they became fired with the passion for power and fell to 
battling with each other. Each managed a contingency of warrior loyalists; the 
Peloponnesus became Polyneices’ allies and made ready to wage war against Thebes. 
                                                                
119 Aristotle’s Poetics was composed at least 50 years after the death of Sophocles. Aristotle was a great 
admirer of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King; he considered it the perfect tragedy. His analysis of what tragedy 
should be aligns perfectly with Oedipus. 
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While the mighty warriors marshaled their forces, the voice of prophecy warned them 
that the mortal feud depended on the blind and aged beggar whom, years before, they had 
coldly thrust out from his own house. That side would prevail that Oedipus chose to join. 
Unified Elements 
The myth of Oedipus and the play depend for its unity on at least three elements 
valued by Aristotle. First, the mimetic form depends on the unity of plot and tragic 
action, the construction of the heroic character, and a pleasing performance. These are the 
first important elements in aesthetic pleasure: the peculiar pleasure distinctive in tragedy 
assuredly delights the situated viewer intellectually (reasoning and learning) through plot, 
characters, settings, and artistic devices and imagination (through phantasia). Each is a 
type of mimetic representation. Second is the aesthetics of an emotional nature: 
especially sight, Oedipus’ display of physical fear, his search for justice, his self-inflicted 
violence against his sight, and his lonely wanderings. Aesthetic feeling ultimately 
conveys sight to the audience. Spectators are healed of all suffering. The peculiar kind of 
pleasure, intellectual, imaginative, and emotional, captivates, and enchants the spectator. 
Aristotle does not explicitly resolve the paradox of the peculiar pleasure of 
tragedy, which comes from fear and pity, which are forms of distress. It is argued that the 
pleasures of the tragic text and performance—the cognitive pleasure that is common to 
forms of imitation—neither resolves through catharsis, nor do they provide a sufficient 
explanation of the characteristic pleasure. A discussion of Aristotle's account of leisure in 
Poetics VIII leads to the suggestions that since pity and fear are an ethically appropriate 
response to a good tragedy, the peculiar pleasure may be understood as the pleasure that 
the virtuous take in the exercise of their epideictic virtue. 
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Aristotle then insists on emotion’s importance, but in his illusive phrase, tragic 
pleasure turns on strategic effects to produce affect. Aristotle does not explain how 
particular effects are experienced by the spectator. That the poet ought to contrive 
pleasure not only through mimesis but also from pity and fear does not satisfactorily 
resolve how tragedy produces such pleasure. As mentioned, Halliwell indicates that 
“cognition and emotion” are integrated in tragic pleasure. He introduces oikeia, noted in 
the text above, as the peculiar pleasure by way of a genus of the generic mimetic 
pleasure, which leads to the emphasis on the cognitive aspects indicated in the Poetics.120 
Too’s solution in The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism is to surgically remove the 
aesthetic altogether: her antiseptic analysis avoids aesthetic pleasure altogether by placing 
the hedone of music or literature under the category of leisure.121 Health’s Aristotle and 
the Pleasure of Tragedy defines oikeia as the general pleasure associated with mimetic 
tragedy as general pleasure.122 
The question remains: how do we account for that part which is the peculiar 
pleasure? 
In several passages in the Poetics, Aristotle refers to entities that may or may not 
produce peculiar pleasure for the spectator: “The structure of the finest tragedy is not 
simple, rather is complex and imitating fearful and pitiable events, for this is the special 
feature of such mimesis.”123 The conjecture that seems most plausible is that Aristotle’s 
term peculiar relates to the word mimesis, or in Poetics, the imitation of the “fearful and 
                                                                
120 Halliwell, Aristotle Poetic, 76; 87–107; Fossheim, H. “Mimesis in Aristotle’s Ethics” Making Sense of 
Aristotle: Essays in Poetics, 73–86. 
121 Too, Yun Lee. The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 92–94. 
122 Heath, M. “Aristotle and the pleasures of tragedy.” Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics O. 
Andersen and J. Haarberg ed. (London, 2001), 7–23. 
123 Aristotle, Poet., 13.1452b. 
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pitiable” in tragedy124 in which pleasure is a defining aesthetic characteristic. 
Conclusion 
The first section has explored passages in the Poetics and the Rhetoric to compare 
meanings and display of pity and fear. The tragic plot’s two emotions are pity and the 
easily confused meanings of eleos, fear. I conclude with Kant that fear produced from the 
tragic action requires the spectator’s disinterested contemplative state. The psychological 
state results in a sensuous aesthetic experience that unfolds cognitively and 
experientially.125 Second, I have tried to show the connection between pity and fear and 
the peculiar pleasure. Although it is difficult to clarify the connection, the available texts 
suggest that peculiar pleasure can be divided into external effects and internal 
imagination. 
Phantasia, as explained, is an element essential to the Attic spectator because, as 
Aristotle shows, it enables visual imagination when the medium is mimetic. Yet, 
inartistic devises—the monstrous for example—fail to pass the plausibility test. 
Aristotle’s spectator is described as a “learner” (cogitos), in her “desire to know 
[learn] from inference [or fiction].” Though pity and fear are painful in real life, in 
dramatic tragedy the two emotions seem to interweave in the verisimilitude of intellectual 
and emotional pleasure. For example, in coming to terms with unfolding events and the 
fate of the tragic hero, the spectator recognizes universal and specific truths; she learns 
perceptually from emotional insight. Moreover learning discerns relationships between 
                                                                
124 Ibid. 
125 Kant’s discussion in Critique of Judgment distinguishes “purposiveness” as being composed of two 
sides of the same coin: “of nature” (knowledge about) and “in nature, a priori” (nature’s ontological being 
and our relationship to nature). Humans perceive and organize a sense of nature through recognizing the 
appearance of things. Kant also thought that Beauty and Sublimity were not really properties of objects, but 
ways in which we respond to objects. Introduction; Part A, First and Second Moment. 
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the particular events and certain universal elements embodied in them. 
The search to link conclusively the peculiar pleasure to pity and fear is only 
marginally convincing. The illusive peculiar pleasure in the analysis is not judgment 
about tragedy’s peculiar pleasure—although clearly present in Aristotle’s works—but the 
peculiar pleasure that is tragedy: what audiences discern emotionally through the plot, 
convincing visual effects (teche), and when the actor brings pity and fear before the eyes. 
The epideictic through mimesis invites the spectator (as Rosenfield suggested) to 
become a “witness” or “beholder.” Once the stage is set for the ideal tragedy and 
practiced actors or orators perform tragedy, the burden for discerning pleasure becomes 
the spectator’s—the element of pleasure endowed only by the spectator’s suprasensory in 
Kant’s transcendental aesthetics.126 The viewer determines, after all, whether pity and 
fear were portrayed in an emotionally moving way. Did the emotions produce sensory 
satisfaction and aesthetic pleasure? 
Prelli has said, “. . . rhetorics of display have become the dominant 
communication practices of our time.”127 Pity and fear compared in Rhetoric and Poetics 
show specifically how actors and orators employ gestures and movements to rhetorically 
perform and communicate pity and fear. Although Aristotle’s idea of pleasure remains 
elusive and subjective, the chapter has offered a rhetorical construct that suggests an 
aesthetic solution; a plausible explanation for the way the spectator might have received 
pleasure through pity and fear. Through mimesis, the spectator engages with strategic 
                                                                
126 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 1790. Kant’s much-neglected claim is that, besides himself, “no 
psychologist has so much as even thought that the imagination [phantasia] might be a necessary constituent 
of perception,” should be construed so that even our consciousness of sensation itself (techne, i.e., visual, 
tactile, etc.) is impossible without imagination. Part A, First and Second Moment. 
127 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, ed., 2. 
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techniques of rhetorical display. At the same time, whether spectators take pleasure in a 
performance of pity and fear depends on the achievement of artistic devises and the state 
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Vanitas art is painting that uses symbolic representation. The word comes from 
the Latin, which means vanity1: it is a genre of Dutch still lifes in 17th century inventories. 
With a skull as a centerpiece, vanitas art is moralistic genre painting. The enjoyment 
aroused by the sensuous depiction of the subject through form, however, is in a certain 
conflict with the moralistic message. In vanitas painting, the metaphor all is vanities is 
the content of the painting.2 Form is the technique of displaying an assortment of 
unrelated material objects. The painting’s metaphor is meant to be read through form: 
when audiences view the painting with its luxuriant form,3 they should consider the 
meaninglessness of earthly life and the transient nature of all earthly goods and pleasures. 
Designing a painting that was meant to be read by viewers continues the tradition of 
pictura poesis embraced by 15th and 16th century artists.4 Pictura poesis demonstrates 
how human beings communicate both verbally and nonverbally. For example, in Herman 
Steenwyck’s painting above (Vanities) I show how these two types of communication are 
possible and how content and form intersect. 
The rhetoric of vanitas is investigated in this chapter through the heuristic of 
verisimilitude. Verisimilitude allows for an understanding of vanitas as a discourse of 
  
                                                          
1 Ecclesiastes 1:2;12:8 is from the Bible. The Vulgate renders the verse as Vanitas vanitatum omnia 
vanitas. 
All biblical citations are taken from The Authorized Version of the English Bible 1611, 6 vols. William 
Aldis Wright, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1909). 
2 The phrase is the opening lines in Book of Ecclesiastes, Vanitas et Omnia Vanita, which accounts for the 
use of the word vanitas to describe these still lifes in 17th century inventories. These still lifes are also 
referred to as death’s head because a human skull is a common centerpiece. 
3 The term form refers to the art work’s style of representation; the indigenous artistic style was understood 
as Dutch realism. Content refers to the art work’s meaning through metaphor, especially how what is being 
depicted links to commonplace meaning. 
4 “As is painting so is poetry,” in Horaces’ Arts Poetica. Rensselaer W. Lee, Ut Pictura Poesis: The 
humanistic theory of painting. (New York: Norton, 1967). 
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intermingled content and form5 because the goal of the chapter is to examine how reading 
metaphor through form evolves from both ancient rhetorical theory—especially ekphrasis 
and epideictic—and the 17th century liturgical6 and aesthetic strategy designed to raise the 
status of painting to more than mere craft. Rhetoric situates understanding of the visual 
form and the invisible metaphor at the heart of the Dutch 17th century world.7 
An example of vanitas painting is the art of 17th century Dutch painter Harmen 
Steenwyck. Still Life: An Allegory of the Vanities of Human Life (hereafter Vanities) 
reveals a religious and cultural conceit8 in a visual puzzle of carefully selected layers of 
forms. The exemplary technique in Steenwyck’s Vanities edifies or moves the viewer 
toward meditation. The enigma is how the sight of books and a skull—set on a chipped 
wood table and pictured against a void background—could move the viewer. The 
argument borrowed by Steenwyck and other period artists was that painting can create an 
emotional response in the beholder just as powerfully as speech can; therefore, painting 
should be grounded in rhetoric. The idea had already been put forward by Alberti in De 
Pictura (1435).9 Dutch artists also borrowed the classical ideal of bring things before the 
eyes10 gleaned from Rhetoric to strengthen the status of vanitas art. 
I examine vanitas content and form through the rhetorical terms, ekphrasis and 
                                                          
5 The term emphasizes that art is fiction: the difference between appearance and inner truth, illusion, and 
reality. For instance, the skull reminds the viewer of the appearance of a once life-like face. Verisimilitude 
is closely related to mimesis. Vanitas painting draws on the theoretical status of mimesis: an artistic 
representation of the visible world should use the virtue of good technique to deepen aesthetic appreciation 
of art. 
6 Religious worship derived from the Reformed Church. 
7 The divide between content and form—in rhetoric and in vanitas painting—is indeterminable because any 
attempt to create boundaries turns out to be artificial. 
8 An extended metaphor, popular during the Renaissance: a conceit typically takes one subject and explores 
the metaphoric possibilities in the qualities associated with a subject. 
9 James A.W. Heffernan, “Alberti on Apelles: Word and Image in De Pictura,” Journal of the Classical 
Tradition, v.2, no. 3, (Winter, 1996), 345–359. 
10 From Aristotle’s Rhetoric III, 1410b. Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse. George A. 
Kennedy, trans., (New York: Oxford Press, 1991). 
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epideictic. The terms function as plausible viewing practices employed by period situated 
audiences. Ekphrasis and epideictic are considered not only as viewing practices, but also 
as types of visual syntaxes that amplify metaphoric meaning and visual description in 
layers of elegant form. 
The ekphrasic relationship becomes clear when vanitas is placed within the 
context of the Reformed Church together with the tradition of the ekphrasic trope 
metaphor that originated from Rhetoric. These paintings are as much a part of the history 
of metaphor as a rhetorical device as they are a part of any system of visual symbols. 
The key point here for contemporary audiences is to read the genre not as 
allegory that connotes a narrative, but rather as the association of one thing to another. 
Objects themselves—rather than narrative and human action—speak directly to the 
viewer; they are the iconic voices of the painting. Metaphor in vanitas painting was 
meant to prompt in the viewer’s moral behavior. Epideictic11 shows how visual text 
communicates through its appeal to the eye as discussed by Lawrence Prelli; epideictic 
praises what is virtuous or noble and “fit for display.”12 Epidexis means “to shine or show 
forth.”13 
Form in the foreground of vanitas painting is the unmistakable rhetoric of formal 
display of excellence.14 
The viewing practices expand understanding of how audiences may have read 
                                                          
11 Epideictic is ceremonial oratory, or praise-and-blame rhetoric. It is one of the three branches of rhetoric 
outlined in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
12 Rhetorics of Display, Lawrence, J. Prelli, ed. (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press), 3. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Roman Jakobson says, “It is necessary to learn the conventional language of painting in order to ‘see’ a 
picture, just as it is impossible to understand what is spoken without knowing the language, in 
“Contributions of Roman Jakobson” in Annual Review of Anthropology, (Vol. 16: 223–260, October 1987), 
223–260. 
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vanitas painting through content and form, both symbolically and aesthetically. The 
analyses stress that the process of reading aesthetic form is as important as reading 
metaphoric meaning and “disguised symbolism.”15 
My interest is less in presenting a unifying pictorial system of representation and 
cultural interpretation (art historical views) than in showing how contemporary audiences 
might better understand how 17th century Dutch viewers may have experienced the genre 
through rhetoric. I am not documenting historically how audiences of the time actually 
responded, rather how they might have responded. 
Distinctions between allegory and metaphor are challenging where painting is 
concerned because the typical form of the Baroque is allegory; the trope would have been 
familiar to 17th century Dutch audiences. I am suggesting, however, that vanitas painting 
is not allegorical and not merely a set of disguised symbols as they often have been 
described. Instead, this genre of still lifes is composed of metaphoric transferences that 
together create the memento mori16 message. Nonetheless, an allegorical sensibility is 
present as a mode of perception that makes the reader aware that the part is always 
dependent on the whole. 
Six sections explore the chapter’s two-part goal: understanding that the vanitas’ 
metaphor-content was read through form, and the enigma of how content and form could 
be concealed in visual images. First, the chapter begins with an outline of terms. The 
second section offers a brief historical background of political, religious, and economic 
                                                          
15 Erwin Panofsky coined the phrase “disguised symbolism,” which he applied to vanities. The chapter 
disputes this claim. Studies in Iconography: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (Oxford 
University Press, 1930); (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 5–9. 
16 Memento Mori iconographical tradition is linked to the still life genre of vanitas. Moreover, memento 
mori is interwoven with the notion of poetry as a speaking picture (pictura poesis) and alludes to the 
instructive power of metaphoric imagery. 
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conditions and discusses how the cultural context impacted the vanitas genre. The third 
section presents a case study that explores one piece of vanitas art, Still Life: An Allegory 
of the Vanities of Human Life, by period artist Harmen Steenwyck. I show how the artist 
brings the authority of rhetoric into his painting.17 The fourth section addresses how the 
rhetorical device, ekphrasis, creates the link between form and content and how the term 
is foundational to reading vanitas painting.18 A fifth section analyzes the link between 
ancient epideictic and vanitas’ form. Finally, the conclusion interweaves vanitas’ liturgy 
of encoded metaphoric meaning, symbolic forms, and aesthetic experience synthesized in 
four key findings. 
The goal and case study are important to communication scholarship because of the 
way form and content in vanitas painting entwine in the tradition of ancient rhetoric and in 
the Dutch 17th century rhetorical theory employed by Dutch artists to raise the status of 
painting. The field of communication has largely ignored vanitas art: the moral authority 
of verbal rhetoric continues to permeate current rhetorical scholarship even in light of the 
ubiquity of the visual image in the 21th century. However, vanitas painting and ancient 
rhetorical tropes newly theorized, interpreted, and applied in a novel way are subjects 
relevant to the subfield of visual rhetoric. Visual thinking pervades current human activity 
from graphic representation in everyday life to the abstract and theoretical in modern art. 
Vanitas painting is a reminder that the tension between visual and verbal representation 
present in 17th century painting continues in the present day. 
                                                          
17 Rhetoric provides a complete theory–from the process of creating description up to and including 
producing visual effects for the viewer. 
18 Many scholars make use of James Heffernan’s general conception of ekphrasis as “the verbal 
representation of visual representation.” James Heffernan, Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis 
from Homer to Ashbery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3. 
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Vanitas painting is an ideal site to explore—through ekphrasis and epideictic— 
the preeminently deceptive qualities of art that express the vanity of the visible world 
itself and the intricate interplay between content and form—how the visual form reveals 
the invisible metaphor in rhetoric of invention and style through verisimilitude.19 
Terms 
In this section I will briefly define the key terms that emerge in the chapter and 
describe the context in which I use the terms. 
Content is what is communicated through language. Aristotle phrased this as 
logos or the logical content of a speech. It is the verbal message and carries cultural 
meaning. Generally, content deals with three 17th century concerns: earthly existence, 
transient life and death, and resurrection.20 Specifically, content in vanitas art is the 
metaphor all is vanity. 
Ekphrasis is vivid description. Anciently, the term referred to a description of any 
thing, person, or experience. For example, Horace’s Ut pictura poesis defines one 
medium of art as it relates to another medium by defining and describing its 
characteristics. Metaphor is a prominent ekphrasic trope. In vanitas, the content of the 
painting is the ekphrasic metaphor all is vanity or vanitas et omnia vanitas from the Book 
of Ecclesiastes. As used in this chapter, ekphrasis is cultural viewing practice that 
explains how it is possible for Dutch audiences to produce small sermons of moral and 
emotional import from content (read through form). 
                                                          
19 Thijs Weststeijn, The Visible World (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 19. 
20 Ingvar Bergstrom, Dutch Still-Life Painting in the Seventeenth Century, trans Christian Hedstrom & 
Gerald Taylor (New York: Thomas Yoseloff Inc, 1956), quoted in Kristine Koozin’s Vanitas of Still Lifes. 
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Epideictic, according to Aristotle, is one of the three major branches of rhetoric.21 
It is speech or writing that praises or blames: Cicero demands it from the orator. 
Epideictic includes civic virtue or doxa (opinion). According to Lawrence Rosenfield, 
doxa also means appearance or the skill of virtuosity, including artistic excellence.22 An 
example of epideictic is the artistic skill evident in vanitas’ depicted forms, composition 
and intention, artistic inventiveness, and scientific order23: the forms in Dutch realism 
were meant to complement the moral message.24 As used in this chapter, epideictic is a 
theoretical criticism that rests on the assertion of the priority of sight as a sensory 
experience through form and more expressly through color and symbol. 
Form is how the message is communicated. In vanitas painting, form is both the 
object in the painting and the painterly technique. Aristotle’s term is lexis (the style and 
delivery of a speech). In the chapter form it is the material thing, sometimes referred to as 
image. The appeal of the form is obvious: meticulously executed form is an appeal to the 
eye. Vanitas form is mimesis (discussed below). In vanitas, art form is the signifier; the 
viewer reads the signified content through the signifier. 
Identification, in vanitas painting, is the process whereby an audience—situated 
in early 17th century Holland—feels an emotional connection with the art object on an 
aesthetic, moral, personal, and experiential level. The term describes the rhetorical 
conditions that create powerful moments of symbolic identification with works of art, 
such as in vanitas painting. For example, wealth and religion are types of identifications 
                                                          
21 The other two branches are deliberative and judicial. KathrynTempest. “Prologue,” in Cicero: politics 
and persuasion in ancient Rome. (London: Continuum, 2011), 1–7. 
22 Doxa is that which manifests itself and is apprehended by members of a community; it is that “aspect of 
the whole of reality, which the individual recognizes and share with others,” in Rhetorics of Display, 
Lawrence J. Prelli, ed. “Introduction” (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press), 65. 
23 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 3, 154. 





in the milieu25 pictured in the illusive art. 
Metaphor26 describes one thing in terms of another. For example, in the case of 
vanitas art, all is vanity is a metaphor quoted in Ecclesiastics comprehended by 17th 
century Calvinist audiences to grasp earthly things through the lens of the transitory state 
of human nature. Historical interpretation of vanitas has clung to the conception that 
image or form is subordinate to metaphor.27 This chapter disputes that notion to claim 
that metaphor or content and form communicate messages in both cultural and visual 
ways, but that form is equal in importance to metaphor in vanitas painting. 
Memento mori originate in the 14th century.28 The memento mori theme—
remember you will die29—is the reminder of death, of the brevity of earthly existence and 
the vanity of things material.30 The tradition of memento mori is universal because of the 
inevitability that all living things must eventually die. 
Mimesis, from Latin, imago as discussed in Poetics, is when an image has a 
similar appearance to some object or person. More important, the nature of mimesis is as 
an artistic depiction or representation. An example in the ancient world is when works of 
art correspond to the physical world understood as a model for beauty, truth, and the 
                                                          
25 Greg Clark says, “[Burke’s] . . . key term of identification teaches the lesson that rhetorical power 
operates well beyond the boundaries of conventional public discourse and includes a full range of symbols 
mined by audiences” in Rhetorics of Display, 5. 
26 Oxford English Dictionary, 1961 ed. 
27 Umberto Eco says, “. . . metaphor, like art, is sovereign.. . . for too long it has been thought that in order 
to understand metaphors it is necessary to know the code. We can assert that metaphor permits us to 
understand the code better. ” “Metaphor, Dictionary, and Encyclopedia” New Literary History, (Vol. 15, 
No. 2, Interrelation of Interpretation and Creation, Winter, 1984), 255–271. 
28 Found in the paintings of religious scenes, saints, and portraits. In theory, memento mori comes from 
biblical and classical texts, such as Job, Psalms, and Proverbs, but is commonly linked to the Reformation. 
29 Memento mori, “remember that you will die,” is a theme explored in vanitas still life art works created 
from the 15th through the 17th centuries in northern Europe. The theme appears prominently by the latter 
16th and early 17th centuries in the milieu of the Dutch Protestant Reformation and its aftermath. 
30 The theme was explored in numerous still lifes created from the 15th through the 17th centuries in 
northern Europe. 
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good. In the chapter, vanitas painting interweaves the forms of the visual world and the 
pedantic metaphor that represents the invisible world. 
Symbol vanitas painting communicates its message by means of symbolic 
representation: a skull is a symbol and a reminder of the certainty of death. A symbol 
associates two things, but its meaning is both literal and figurative. A symbol is used 
more widely than a metaphor. The symbols in vanitas were rarely read at face value: the 
genre made possible multiple readings of symbolic connotations.31 
Verisimilitude represents the process of artistic creation through mimesis outlined 
in Poetics and as a visual type of discerning in the ancient epideictic. Evident in the 
expression in Poetics, brings-before-the-eyes, verisimilitude captures the idea that when 
audiences bring an image into consciousness through sight, they perceive form, quite 
independent of cultural meaning. The term represents a plausible reality such as the way 
art is fiction. In vanitas painting viewers create truth-likenesses: a painting is like a visual 
poem. The artist paints forms in the highly readable style of Dutch realism. Actual truth 
becomes less important than the art that conveys the form and produces the metaphor. 
Rather than seeing a work of art as another thing, we see the mimetic visual 
representation in terms of the represented world. Verisimilitude provides a critical 
framework for understanding rhetorical and aesthetic viewing practices. 
Historical Background 
This section introduces some historical background for vanitas painting in the 
Netherlands in the early 17th century. The milieu is important because symbols of 
                                                          
31 Symbol is a mode in which the signifier does not resemble the signified; rather, it is fundamentally 
arbitrary and/or purely conventional: the relationship must be learned.The purpose of a vanitas symbol such 
as a skull is to communicate meaning such as the memento mori theme. 
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religion, economics, politics, and class are visibly displayed and read in the paintings by 
situated audiences. To highlight how vanitas were read as symbol and metaphor also 
reflects the age’s fascination with scientific accuracy and objects of wealth: the vast 
majority of vanitas paintings display symbols of the arts and sciences (e.g., books, maps, 
and musical instruments), wealth and power (e.g, expensive material and jewelry, gold 
objects), and earthly pleasures (goblets); symbols of death or transience are represented 
by a skull. Dutch artists added to the prestige of their painting by representing these 
objects through the period’s epideictic line of argument, especially the popular trope, ut 
pictura poesis.32 
Historical context partly describes Dutch audiences’ religious identification with 
vanitas painting. Rudolf Herman Fuchs suggests that this density of morbid symbols 
would have appealed to the intelligentsia at Leiden University, center for the study of 
Calvinism.33 For example, Calvinist dogma warned parishioners about the perils of 
vanity: the excessive belief in one’s own abilities or attractiveness and the human 
tendency to succumb to illusion and sin. Vanitas painting was thus cast both by the artist 
and the viewer as a religious deceit. The example highlights the plausibility of how the 
ambiguous conversation between intermingled content (metaphor) and form (both the 
object and the painterly technique) ensued in vanitas painting. 
Religion mirrors economic undercurrents: the abstruseness between religious 
values and worldly pursuits display the imprecision in two conflicted values. The 
unstable political climate between Spain and the Netherlands also made a difference in 
                                                          
32 A period artist, Van Hoogestaten, said, “The brush would succeed better than my pen in depicting the 
specific beauty” of scientific specimens quoted in the National Gallery display of Hoogstratens perspective 
box. 
33 Rudolf Herman Fuchs, Dutch Paining (Thames & Hudson, 1978), 36. 
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the proliferation of vanitas still lifes. 
In the political period of Spanish/ Catholic control of Europe, the Netherlands 
valiantly fought Spanish control. The Union of Utrecht (1579) is a landmark in the costly 
violent conflict between the various states of the Netherlands and Spanish/Catholic 
powers. While the war led to the emergence of a Dutch Republic in Northern Lowlands, 
it had nevertheless left many dead. The awareness of death did not disappear with the end 
of the Twelve Year Truce; in the 1620s the Republic suffered two outbreaks of bubonic 
plague. These events may account for the proliferation in Leiden of vanitas paintings, 
whose recurring motif, the skull, was a constant reminder of mortality. 
Because of its political independence and relative religious tolerance, the new 
republic became a destination for many refugees of the period,34 many of whom rose to 
the burgher status. The scale of the vast accumulation of wealth in Holland was 
concentrated in the Dutch burgher class.35 Banking and trade dominated the global 
economy.36 The lucrative but risky traffic in spices, coffee, chocolate, rum, and slaves 
was financed by Dutch banking firms such as the Dutch East Indies trading company in 
1602.37 Well into the early 17th century, the Netherlanders built up a solid trading 
                                                          
34 The philosophers Descartes and Spinoza made the Netherlands their home. Spinoza fled Spanish 
persecution of the Jews. Descartes found freedom from the Catholic censor, but also access to public 
dissection of human corpses, which was banned in Catholic land, “René Descartes,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/accessed, accessed, March, 2011. 
35 Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Richs: An interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Ages. 
36 Abraham Mignon was among the prosperous whose wealth increased because of the trade and popularity 
of flowers. Cut flowers were luxury items up until the end of the 17th century. We know that the ordinary 
citizen who was somewhat prosperous did not have any flower bouquets at home, but they were interested 
in the fashionable commodity. In order to satisfy the demand for flowers, flower still lifes became 
extremely popular in the 1630s and 1640s. Such paintings were cheaper than real bouquets and kept longer 
at www.rijksmuseum.edu, accessed March 15, 2012. 
37 The company eventually owned its own standing army of 10,000 men and was effectively the governing 
authority in many of the regions whose resources it brought to the European market. The governors of the 
company were the richest individuals in the world outside of royalty. Many in this new business class 
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empire, taking control of trading routes in the North Sea and Baltic from the Germans 
while continually fighting the English for domination of southern trade routes. 
For the most part Holland was Calvinist. However, because an array of religious 
tradition was represented in the Netherlands at this time, the question of religious 
tolerance was itself a central political issue. In Holland, French theologian, Jean Calvin’s 
(1509–1564) interpretation of Christianity appealed to the small, dynamic nation of 
commerce in its golden age: the Dutch preferred the freedom and secular sympathies of 
Calvinism rather than strict orthodox Christianity.38 Notably, Calvin’s teaching preached 
the preordination of the select and salvation by grace. The doctrine included an intense 
distrust of worldly goods and pleasures; however, it paradoxically sanctioned commercial 
expansion. Simon Schama explains that the Dutch were a trading nation with a “love of 
gain; an island of plenty in a sea of want.”39 Calvinism was a driving force in Dutch 
commercial expansion including the art trade.40 Still life painting grew in popularity 
partly as a result of the Protestant Reformation, which forbade Catholic icons. 
The iconoclast movement of Calvinist religious practice effectively banned 
Catholic institutions from financing the icons of Catholic fine art. Many artists turned 
their attention to painting dead fruit and flowers in the new still lifes genre of which 
                                                          
(burghers) lived in a dense urban setting where land was perhaps the scarcest and a highly valued 
commodity. 
38 Johannes a Lasco Library foundation, Great Church Emden, Kirchstraße 22D 26721 Emden. 
http://www.reformiert-online.net/t/eng/imp/index.jsp, accessed March 30, 2012. . 
39 In The Embarrassment of Riches, 1–10, Schama says that the Dutch East India Company was busy with 
gaining control over the spice trade in the East from the Portuguese. While peasants in France, England, 
Spain, and the rest of Western Europe lived in squalid conditions with barely enough food to eat, everyone 
in the Netherlands, from the nobility to the lowliest worker, lived in comfortable (for the time) conditions 
and always had enough food. In fact, the Netherlands had the highest standard of living in Europe, perhaps 
even the world, during their golden age. 
40 Vries,J. de, and Woude, A. Vander (1997). The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure, and 
Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
434–35. 
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vanitas painting is one form. Vanitas art thus specifically reflects the symbolic turn away 
from icons of Catholicism. Still life painting reflects the simple appeal of everyday 
material objects. Artists had to adapt to survive in the new Protestant climate, finding 
patronage from the Dutch merchant classes. The character of different towns is even 
reflected in the town’s choice of symbolic objects. The university town of Leiden, where 
Harmen Steenwyck studied art under his uncle David Bailly, preferred skulls and books, 
whereas the Hague, a market center, favored fish with its traditional Christian 
associations; many others used flowers, another Dutch product. 
The Dutch Republic attracted scientists and other thinkers from all parts of 
Europe because of the country’s intellectual tolerance.41 Some still lifes offer examples of 
scientific observation, such as magnificent collections of scientific instruments. Vanitas 
puts in perspective the milieu’s fascination with science, particularly vision and sight. As 
the chapter discusses, the allure for Dutch artists of exactly depicting instruments and 
ideas of value reveals an age steeped in scientific discovery. 
Case Study of Herman Steenwyck’s Vanities 
Herman Steenwyck’s Still Life (pictured above) uses simplistic symbols and 
motifs to lead the viewer toward reflection on the relationship between fleeting 
enjoyment of material vanities in this world as they compare with spiritual things of the 
next. Material and metaphysical values intermingle both as metaphor and through the 
elegant forms in the painting. The artist presents the dilemma of beauty in objects set 
against a blank backdrop of sober existential nothingness; indeed, the viewer is led to 
                                                          
41 Christian Huygens (1629–1695) was a famous astronomer, physicist, and mathematician. 
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ponder the moral reason that forbade earthly pleasures.42 Objects (forms) of desire in the 
visible world contrast with the ideological virtue of eschewing vanities. 
I argue, however, that vanitas painting should not be confined to its surface level 
of sermonizing metaphor, nor symbolic allegory43 as Panofsky has claimed. Steenwyck’s 
title references the vain things of the world. The forms are symbolic; however, symbol 
does not require an equivalent allegory. The genre is more akin to metaphor and the 
history of metaphor—the association of one thing to another without a supportive story—
rather than allegory, as I have claimed previously. The visual syntax of the painting was 
created so that the metaphor or content could be read through form. 
The emptiness of earthly goods represents only a small part of the sophistication 
of the paintings. The shrewd rhetorical-artistic display of form itself complements the 
larger function of these paintings as luxury objects displayed among other luxury objects 
in fashionable burgher homes. Vanitas paintings address the contradictory impulses 
within the early 17th century Dutch Baroque culture between Calvinist rhetoric and the 
impulse of visible display of worldly wealth that reduces the contradiction. 
By the mid-16th century in the Dutch lowlands, the strident opposition between 
spirit and body, the metaphysical and the earthly that had previously informed the art of 
Bosch became decidedly less deadly. In the early part of the century, the Dutch had 
embraced a more Humanist perspective: bad behavior had become more a folly than sin. 
The visual analysis in the section demonstrates how Steenwyck’s painting is 
                                                          
42 Just as Plato warned of the senses’ unreliability, 17th century vanitas signified the uncertainty of the 
senses—life as dream and illusion—death, however ambiguous—is certain. 
43 Ewin Panofsky coined the phrase, “disguised symbolism,” yet the paintings are not narrative, rather more 
akin to the history of metaphor. 
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infused with the rational framework of terms and concepts of classical rhetoric.44 These 
are discussed from an epideictic perspective and well-articulated by period critics, Carel 
Van Mander and Franciscus Junius, whom I discuss in the section below. 
Delft-born Steenwyck specialized in vanitas painting. Eloquence45 is on display in 
Steenwyck’s Vanities. The discussion highlights the painting’s composition, forms, 
technique and color, and content. The key for the Dutch and for current audiences is to 
read Steenwyck’s Vanities, indeed, all vanitas painting, as the association of one thing to 
another—content to form—without a supportive story—more like an abstract painting. 
The viewer of 17th century vanitas painting has a more demanding role than 
merely reading a prescribed narrative. Steenwyck’s Vanities emphasizes the Calvinist 
dictum of personal communication with God. Therefore, since worship in the Reformed 
Church calls for private religious experience,46 the viewer takes an active part in a type of 
meditation through the sensory forms. Accessing the invisible world through the forms of 
the visible world enables this meditative respite for the viewer. Rather than being 
presented with a set narrative, there is the possibility of creation.47 In the complex 
association of metaphor and interwoven forms, the paradox between content and form is 
finally given over to the viewer to resolve on a personal level. 
Vanitas art thus provides an example of the greater interpretative role required of 
the viewer of 17th century art when audiences read both content and form. Reading form 
                                                          
44 Franciscus Junius (1641) reconstructed the views of classical authors that applied the ideas on oratory of 
Cicero and Quintilian to visual arts, by changing the word “orator” to painter, Art in Theory, 18–19. 
45 In Kenneth Burke’s Counter-Statement, the author says eloquence is not showiness. It is, rather, the 
result of that desire in the artist to make a work perfect by adapting in it every minute detail. Aesthetic truth 
is not synonymous with scientific truth: “. . . the procedure of science involves the elimination of taste, 
employing as a substitute the corrective norm of the pragmatic test, the empirical experiment . . . is entirely 
intellectual,” (University of Chicago Press, [1931] 1968), 41. 
46 The diptych is a visible form of meditation displayed in the home. 
47 The involvement is metaphysical, not narrative. 
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as text assumes an active reader of art fully capable of linking rhetorical associations 
framed in the iconic artistic style.48 The process is made easier by the static nature of 
vanitas painting, which eliminates the dimensions of movement and time generally found 
in the more popular history painting. Vanitas painting is more abstract than narrative. 
Steenwyck’s painting is illuminated with a rhetorical lens: good painting was 
compared to good writing. The artist borrowed from the Dutch tradition, which—like the 
Italian tradition—shows the application of rhetoric to art theory. Prominent in this lineage 
is Samuel Van Hoogstraten’s work, Inleyding, which mentions “degrees of art” (the 
genera pinged) and their corresponding functions: to teach, to delight, and to move.49 
From its stated aim of raising the status of painting among the liberal arts “in praise of the 
art of painting,” it is clear that the text is invested in the epideictic tradition, “in praise of 
the art of painting.”50 The text would almost certainly have been known by Steenwyck 
and other Dutch painters working in the same period.51 The rhetorical concepts of 
imitatio, the rhetorical theory of ekphrasis, and the rhetorical trope, metaphor, are used in 
a specific sense in art theory too. Specifically, these terms serve as lenses later in the 
chapter to examine vanitas painting generally. Informed by the literary tradition, rhetoric 
was meant to boost the status of art. It provides a complete theory—from the process of 
creating description—up to and including the production of visual effects for the 
viewer.52 
                                                          
48 The most important statement about the relationship between the metaphor and the visual arts (which 
Calvinist audiences understood) was from St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (A.1 Art.9), “Whether 
Holy Scripture should Use Metaphors.” This reference is discussed in detail in the section, “Ekphrasis.” 
49 Weststeign, The Visible World, 77. 
50 On the importance of epideictic rhetoric, which was dominant in the early modern period, see Vickers 
1989, 53–54; 61. 
51 Koozin, Metaphoric Realism, 3, 21. Also, de Heem and P. Claesz mentioned in The Visible World. 
52 Seventeenth century Dutch artists and critics working in the same period include Van Hoogstraten, Van 
Mander, Junius, and de Lairesse, in Weststeijn, 41, 77. 
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Composition 
Vanities features a skull, books, a shell, musical instruments, and other finery 
pictured against a void background. The skull is a form that symbolizes53 death or the 
content of vanitas. The elegant silk, shell, and costly lute are sumptuous forms of 
transient riches. Secular forms of worship and worldly wealth mingle with symbols of 
death.54 Human confrontation with death occurs with the most prominent symbolic form 
of death, the skull. Death takes on a personal meaning: for the 17th century Dutch citizen, 
death was close-at-hand in an epoch when few families escaped the dread of disease and 
early death.55 In Vanities, gleaming forms interweave with symbols of death and the 
ominous Calvinist motto, memento mori: remember we die,56 implied in the painting. 
Vanities is composed of a triangular design that emphasizes a diagonal 
arrangement of objects on a chipped wooden table. The composition of the objects 
amplifies symbolic meaning. Steenwyck’s method of diagonals constructs the 
arrangement. The objects that represent the vanities of human life fill the lower half of 
the work, which is split by a diagonal acting as repoussoir and creating an asymmetrical 
composition.57 The objects are carefully chosen to communicate the vanitas metaphor 
summarized in Matthew 6:18–21: 
Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy. . . 
store up for yourselves treasures in heaven. . . For where your treasure is, there 
                                                          
53 Erwin Panofsky’s phrase “disguised symbolism” raises questions about the paradox in vanitas prompting 
art historians to research the meaning of content and form in vanitas painting. 
54 Steenwyck’s Vanities hangs in the Lakenhal Museum in Leyden. 
55 Richard Meyer says, “viewing emblems of death establish patterns of communication [even dynamic 
interaction] with those who view them . . . they allow us to achieve a better understanding of ourselves.” 
Introduction to Cemeteries and Gravemarkers,” in Prelli, 204. 
56 May, William F, “The Sacral Power of Death in Contemporary Experience,” Perspectives on Death, 
(Liston O Mills, New York: Abingdon, 1969), 68–96. 
57 Koozin suggests that Steenwyck’s standard formula for all of his still lifes is rather simple in scheme and 
method. They include a limited number of forms or objects, often repeated from painting to painting. The 
objects are meticulously placed in a diagonal/triangular arrangement on a wooded or stone table with one 
edge explored, 45. 
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your heart will be also. 
Delicately displayed painted objects—a water pitcher, a recorder, books, oil lamp, and so 
on—are neatly arranged on the edge of a table. The books symbolize human knowledge, 
the musical instruments (a recorder, part of a shawm, a lute) symbolize the pleasures of 
the senses. The Japanese sword and the shell, both collectors' rarities, symbolize wealth. 
The chronometer and expiring lamp allude to the transience and frailty of human life. All 
are dominated by the skull, the symbol of death.58 The items entice the viewer with the 
humble realism of everyday objects. As the viewer is brought into the tranquility, there is 
little to suggest that the viewing ends serenely. Nothing is natural or realistic about the 
arrangement. Luminous forms of elegance mingle easily with the image of death. The 
incredible realism of Steenwyck’s Vanities is due to the artist’s astonishing skill. The 
realistic technique is meant to enhance the truth of the metaphor and the memento 
message. Methods of representing forms and symbols are not only prescribed through 
rhetoric, but hinge on metaphoric content; the reverse is also the case. 
A beam of light establishes the theatrical tone and the performativity of the work. 
Symbolically, the light suggests the link between this life and the life hereafter. The beam 
functions to illuminate the skull, an example of the artist’s rhetorical strategy. It also acts 
as a counterbalance to the triangular arrangement of objects in the lower section of the 
painting. An aura of metaphysical glow lights everyday objects suited for individual 
viewing; at the same time, light and color present them as idealized objects of the 
universal virtuous mind.59 The absence of form in the upper half of the painting could 
                                                          




symbolize spiritual existence. The empty background space and the lack of perspective 
could symbolize the lack of life’s meaning. 
The peculiar forms in Steenwyck’s Vanities symbolize the realism and the 
hyperrealism of the age.60 The scientific realism, inherited from earlier Netherlandish 
painting, demonstrates the artist’s concern for depicting objects accurately and his 
interest in scientific discovery. 
Form serves a cultural purpose. Symbolically, the forms in this painting, as in all 
vanitas painting, represent the pleasures of the world, but at the same time, the particular 
forms signal for the viewer renunciation of vanity and the pleasures in the visible world. 
Forms are also symbols of Dutch expressions of a deeper spiritual and moral meaning. 
The exacting detail represented in the shell and a jug symbolizes the brevity of life. The 
skull represented death and decay. Steenwyck’s painting is dominated by the skull, which 
symbolizes belief in a spiritual life after death.61 The skull displays a double meaning: an 
intrusion into a world of human activity and an attribute of a scholar or philosopher. The 
owner may have read the skull not only was a reminder of the vanity of knowledge, but 
also of the knowledge of vanity. The skull’s once fleshly face presses against sumptuous 
silk. The visual metaphor is not only personal, but provokes a sign and signifier precisely 
of that characteristic that metaphor uses as its structuring principle. 
Objects that surround the skull are signs meant to symbolize the three parts of life: 
the vita voluptuosa, or life of delight in eating, drinking, smoking and love, represented 
by the musical instruments; the vita contemplative, or the contemplative life of study, 
                                                          
60 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 2–3; See Seymor Slive, 296–7. Schama notes that the diffusion of natural 
specimens and the burgeoning interest in natural illustration throughout Europe resulted in the nearly 
simultaneous creation of still life and vanitas paintings around 1600. 
61 The diptych is an example of hyperrealism. The genre is an antecedent to vanitas. 
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often paired with death motifs represented by the books; and finally the vita active, or the 
life of action, described by objects of battle, represented by the armor.62 
The wisp of smoke in the lamp and the reflections in the glass are signs that 
symbolically point to fleeting existence. Books symbolize human knowledge. Musical 
instruments (a recorder, part of a shawm, a lute) symbolize the pleasures of the senses. 
The Japanese sword and the shell, both collectors’ rarities, symbolize wealth. The 
chronometer and expiring lamp allude to the transience and frailty of human life63 and the 
artist’s interest in science. The memento mori message is ultimately that all these things 
come to nothing: all is vanity. 
Chronicling the pleasures of collected specimens is a Steenwyck specialty.64 His 
work served as a model for painters who sought realism and novelty. Shells, insects, and 
exotic fruits and flowers were collected and traded; new plants such as the tulip were 
celebrated in still life painting. Collecting swords, shells, and books symbolize the art of 
war and the pursuit of knowledge. 
Technique and Color 
Steenwyck’s Vanities is recognizable through techniques such as particular iconic 
forms, composition, brushwork, and textures and in colors selected to complement 
representative symbolic forms. The use of small brushes on an oak panel shows the 
artist’s expertise and is typical of Steenwyck’s technique.65 The panel is primed and 
sanded to form a glass smooth ground. By building up the picture with thin glazes of oil 
                                                          
62 For a history of the moral debate between the vita contemplative and vita active and their relationship to 
the vanitas theme see Pieter Aertaen’s “Inverted Paintings of Christ in the House of Martha and Mary,” 
Oud Holland 97, 25–39. 
63 http://www.artyfactory.com/art appreciation/still lifes.htm, accessed 3.20.12. 
64 Koozin, Metaphoric Realism, 71. 
65 See note 44. 
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paint the artist manages to realistically convey the wide range of textures that the 
individual objects possess, such as the iridescence of the shell, the translucence of bone, 
the softness of leather, the smoothness of silk, the reflections of metal, the coldness of 
stoneware, the roughness of rope, and a variety of wood surfaces that range from a gloss 
varnish to a dull matt.66 
The selection of forms and textures for the objects are unified by the limited 
palette of tertiary colors selected to produce a rhetorical effect. Subdued colors diffuse 
the effect of a composition of arranged objects too complex and textures too refined to 
support bolder colors. The artist adds a sense of drama by highlighting each object with 
exaggerated tone.67 The color scheme is frequently monochrome with the still life set 
against a plain flat background. This method was a popular formula for still life painters 
from this time as evident in painters such as de Heem, P. Claesz, and others.68 
Content 
In Steenwyck’s style of painting, forms become encrusted with cultural, symbolic, 
and metaphoric meaning: in a word, content. Reading Steenwyck’s art shows how 
particular forms are meant to remind the viewer of the vanitas metaphor. Metaphor is 
understood as the associations of one thing to another without a supportive story. For 
example, Koozin says Steenwyck expresses a positive view: how the metaphor is meant 
to reverse in the viewer’s mind from vanity itself to the “miraculous works of the 
Creator.”69 However, the visual form of the empty background propagates the message of 
                                                          
66 See note. 114. 
67 Koozin, Metaphoric Realism, 71. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 71. 
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the emptiness of the visible world itself and imminent death. The title itself, An Allegory 
of the Vanities of Human Life, turns on the interpretation of form to symbol to metaphor. 
As mentioned, the allegorical is merely a reference to the vain things of the world. The 
message conveying the transient nature of the vanities of earthly life conversely 
communicates the theme of worldly accomplishments in writing, learning, and the arts. 
Each object in the picture has a different symbolic meaning that contributes to the overall 
rhetoric of the painting; thus form, symbol, and metaphor interweave to create an overall 
rhetorical affect for the viewer. 
Consequently, vanitas painting is as rhetorical for audiences in this social context 
as listening to a sermon. In the painting, however, the interconnection between form and 
content seems so intertwined that it may be difficult to decipher an embedded artistic 
code, if a code exists at all. The visual analysis in the case study is not the definitive 
reading, but rather one way of viewing the art and of reading Steenwyck’s particular 
forms, symbolism, and the content in his painting.70 The reading is also a template 
germane to vanitas painting in general. 
The next two major sections circumscribe the viewing practices for vanitas 
painting: ekphrasis and content, and epideictic and form. In the first section, I explain 
how ut pictura poesis, from the 15th and 16th centuries, dictated that painting was to be 
viewed as a type of reading. Specifically, vanitas painting is a continuation of this idea. 
Then, I show how the artistic method of intermingling content with form in vanitas 
painting is a rhetorical strategy exemplified in the metaphor brings-before-the-eyes.71 At 
the end of the section, I discuss two period art critics—Palomino y Velasco and Gerard 
                                                          
70 See note 41. 
71 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1411. 
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de Larissaire—who employ metaphor in their art criticism. 
The next section focuses on epideictic. In terms of vanitas, epideictic is praise of 
the art and excellence of painting. The two lenses emphasize rhetoric as a discursive 
framework for viewing vanitas painting. The rhetorical objective of the theories can be 
interpreted as didactic methods. Rhetoric in the 17th century situates understanding of the 
visual (form) and the invisible (metaphor) that was at the heart of the Dutch world. 
Ekphrasis and Content 
The aim of this section is to briefly explain ekphrasis’ origins relative to its 
function as a viewing lens for content in vanitas painting. Beginning from its ancient 
roots ekphrasis occupies an odd place between the visual and the linguistic: the apparent 
conflict between form and content, or in other words, image and word, is central to the 
concept. 
As mentioned, ekphrasis is vivid description. An example is Homer’s rich 
account of Achilles shield in Iliad, Book 18,72 which was meant to be read. Reading a 
shield seems appropriate to a rhetorical device, but a second definition of ekphrasis from 
the Oxford English Dictionary is germane to vanitas painting. Peter Wagner clarifies, 
“Ekphrasis has a Janus face: as a form of mimesis, it stages a paradoxical performance, 
promising to give voice to the allegedly silent image even while attempting to overcome 
the power of the image by transforming and inscribing it.”73 When vanitas is considered 
                                                          
72 Icons-Text-Iconotexts: Essays on Ekphrasis and Intermediary, Peter Wagner, ed , (New York: de 
Gruyter, 1996). 
73 The Shield of Achilles is the earliest and best known example of ekphrasis. It describes the shield made 
by Hephaistos and given to Achilles by his mother Thetis. (BK 18, Illiad.) Low-relief sculpture embossed 
in metal on the surface of the shield is described in elaborate detail. Subjects include constellations, 
pastures, dancing, and great cities. Visual notation is so extensive that critics have commented that no 
actual shield in the real world would be able to contain the disparate elements mentioned. Alfred Corn, 
American Poets: http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/19939, accessed May 12, 2012. 
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in close reading, the observation fits perfectly the paradox of the genre. The analysis 
shows how ekphrasis investigates how it is possible for Dutch audiences to read content 
and to produce moral sermons in intimate painting from the vanitas metaphor all is 
vanity. 
Pictura Poesis 
The ekphrasic tradition of pictura poesis74 is when one medium of art (painting) 
interacts with another medium (scripture) to define and describe its content and form. A 
picture is like a speaking poem. For example, the dialectic in vanitas unfolds when the 
content metaphor from scripture—all is vanity—engages with the symbolic forms of 
ephemerality in painting to form the memento mori message, all will die. An emotional 
response in the viewer results from the inevitability of death and the unknown. 
Pictura poesis is a skilled way of describing art and other aesthetic objects. The 
trope served as the testing ground for rhetorical theories of orality and, epideictic 
(exemplary) mimesis,75 and as the incubator for systematic aesthetics. Good writing was 
compared to good painting.76 The forms of painting were regarded as language and were 
therefore thought to function best under the rules of language. Academic reference to 
                                                          
74 Horace develops the metaphor of painting as a means of criticizing arbitrary combinations of 
incompatible components in a poem. The third letter of Book II of the Epistles, line 361, includes the 
phrase ut pictura poesis: a comparison between the two arts. Often cited as the foundational text 
establishing a connection between visual and verbal art, Horace describes no particular painting; rather, he 
refers abstractly to various aspects of the art of painting purely as a metaphor to get at the good or bad 
qualities a poem may exhibit. 
75 In the Renaissance, Erasmus of Rotterdam reiterated this foundational dichotomy for rhetorical analysis 
by titling his most famous textbook On the Abundance of Verbal Expression and Ideas (De copier 
verborum ac rerum). This division is one that has been codified within rhetorical pedagogy, reinforced, for 
example, by students being required in the Renaissance, according to Juan Luis Vives, to keep notebooks 
divided into form and content. (Renaissance Quarterly, Vol.58, No.1, Spring 2005), See note 24. 
76 The aesthetic idea would not become a recognized philosophical discipline until Alexander Baumbarten, 
considered the “father” of aesthetics and the first to employ the term in a distinctly philosophical context. 
The philosopher and logician would have a significant influence on Kant’s aesthetics. 
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pictura poesis from the Renaissance and into the Baroque period link painting with 
literature. Throughout this period, poetry and painting were juxtaposed as a means of 
defending the prestige of the visual art. Designing a painting to be read—such as vanitas 
painting—continues the ideal of pictura poesis.77 
Painting was assigned the same rhetorical, theoretical, didactic, and aesthetic78 
objective as poetry. Pictura poesis is within the long tradition of ekphrastic poetry—in 
which painting and literature instruct, persuade, and move the viewer through 
imaginative description, demonstrating that the power of language is by no means struck 
dumb by pictures or other nonverbal artifacts. Examples include poetry and painting that 
feature death. 
From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and into the 17th century, death was a 
common theme in poetry and painting, and the idea of humbling oneself in the hour of 
death was thought to be necessary to salvation.79 Francesco Petrach’s The Triumph of 
Death is a poem (1470) that depicts the horrors of death in apocalyptic detail. Another 
example is a painting by Pieter Brueghel the Elder from 1562 in which armies of 
skeletons ravage the masses producing an image of hell on earth. In Brueghel as in 
Bosch, the dreadful medieval visions of death come to fruition in the early part of the 
Neatherlandish 17th century with the coming of the bubonic plague in 1620. 
In the late 14th century spiritual writings recommend a visual medium to aid 
meditation in the contemplation on the memento mori theme. In Imitation of Christ, 
written in 1418–1427, Chapter 23 concerns “thoughts on Death.” The reader is advised, 
Very soon your life here will end; consider, then what may be in store for you 
                                                          
77 This idea was also espoused by 15th and 16th century artists. 
78 Vanitas painting was meant to move the viewer toward morally edifying behavior. 
79 Cohen, Metamorphosis, 17–18. 
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elsewhere. . . in every deed and every thought, act as though you were to die this 
vry [sic]day. . . death is the end of everyone and the life of many quickly passes 
awy [sic]like a shadow.80 
In the 16th century, Baroque interpretation of the notion of poetry as a speaking picture 
draws on the didactic power of mimesis and metaphoric imagery. Sir Philip Sidney’s 
Apologie for defence of Poesie in IV Poesy (1595), for instance, references Aristotle’s 
idea of learning and delight mentioned in Rhetoric III: 
. . . therefore [posey] is an arte of imitation. . . that is to say, a representing, 
counterfetting, or figuring foorth: to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture; 
with this end, to teach and delight.81 
Sidney’s poetry makes use of mimesis, pictura poesis, and metaphor to amplify his 
description of poetry. The tropes ornament painting and poetry with the colors of 
rhetoric: beauty, truth, and the good. 
By the 17th century, the ekphrasic idea of poetry as a speaking picture combined 
with didactic imagery common to the Calvinist Reformed Church to produce vanitas 
painting: the righteous are admonished through metaphor82 juxtaposed against forms of 
desire to remember that life is short and the hour of death is near. 
Metaphor 
In the Dutch 17th century, texts that feature metaphor are common from Aristotle 
to St. Thomas Aquinas, Sir Philip Sidney, Bishop Sprat, and Rene Descartes to Francis 
Bacon.83 These texts also concern related subjects such as rhetorical theory, logic, and 
                                                          
80 Thomas a Kempis (1380–1471), The Imitation of Christ, (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co, 1940), 39–
42. 
81 From Olney’s 1595 edition, reprinted in O.B. Hardison, English Literary criticism: The Renaissance 
(1963). The Defence of Poesie was translated into Dutch. Koozin observes that Sidney made two trips to 
Leyden and was in close contact with Leyden scholars, notes7, 5. 
82 Rhetoric argues that metaphor is a type of transference, “. . . the application of the name of a thing to 
something else. . .” Aristotle admires Homer who mastered composition in vivid images. 
83 Since Aristotle and into the 17th century, most of what had been written about painting was taken from 
texts on language, Koozin, The Vanitas Still Lifes, v–x. Like Plato, Aristotle thinks there is a special 
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education. These distinguished antecedents are reason enough to the link vanitas painting 
to the history of metaphor, rather than allegorical painting. 
The most important precursor for metaphoric content in vanitas painting is 
Rhetoric and the idea in the text that the soul never thinks without image in the mind. 
Rhetoric and Poetics introduce the enigmatic metaphor, brings things before the eyes.84 
The metaphor makes the point that writers should ornament their words so the listener 
can see things.85 There is an element of surprise that is part of the strength of the phrase; 
the hearer associates (sees) in the mind one thing in term of another. “To evoke emotion 
is to visualize. . . [to create] delight and surprise. . . [therefore] his acquisition of the new 
idea impresses him all the more.”86 
The result of adding vivifying metaphors to text is that: “. . . liveliness is added 
[to text] by using the proportional metaphor and that the best of these should be 
‘graphic.’”87 Poetics emphasizes visual effect and emotional affect, “poetic language, 
especially metaphor.”88 
Metaphors were also commonplace in religious sermons in the Reformed Church 
                                                          
interactive and reciprocal communication between the body, the mind (or cognition in general), and the 
emotions. Poet., 1448a. 
84 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 11404b; and “seeing things” in Book XVII of Poetics: the poet should attempt to 
visualize the scenes before composing the text, specifically, to “. . . visualize the scene before him.” In 
Rhetoric III, Aristotle admires Homer who mastered composition in vivid images. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Aristotle is drawing on the association between learning and pleasure in Poet. 4, 1448b2ff. Much of what 
was written about painting up to the 17th century was taken from Poetics. 
87 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1404b; 1411. A powerful metaphor is affective because, as Aristotle shows, it evokes 
a personified human emotion and activity that the hearer can visualize. Rhetoric describes what metaphor 
does for the reader, “Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else 
can . . . the best of these should be graphic.” By “graphic,” Aristotle means that writers, by extension 
painters, should cause the viewer to see things. Therefore metaphor brings about emotion when it is full of 
graphic description, as in “with his vigor in full bloom,” and “bringing [objects and emotions] before the 
eyes.” 
88 Aristotle, Poet. XXI, Chapter 21, 1457b1–30: “. . . metaphor [consists] in giving the thing a name that 
belongs to something else, the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or 
from species to species, or on the grounds of analogy. . .” See also Rhet. III, 1404b. 
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and were meant to be affective. For example, the ephemeral metaphor, all is vanity, is 
biblically symbolic but transmits viscerally: concerns for the vain things of this world are 
bound up with the void of the world of the dead in forms of desire. The metaphor in 
vanitas paintings is clear: transitory fixation on material things corrupts, and corruption is 
absolute in Calvin’s view of the world. This religious doctrine derives from the 
Augustine and the concept of original sin.89 Only through the grace of God is one 
saved.90 Danger lies in overly attending to the vain things of the world. 
Vanitas painting calls on Calvinist audiences to instinctively grasp things worldly 
through the transitory state of human nature. Instinctively, the viewer understands the 
message of the brevity of life and humankind’s vanity in desiring things of the world. The 
authority of metaphor’s rhetorical sharpness strengthens vanitas painting as Steenwyck 
has shown. The irony is that the viewer must read the painting’s metaphor through 
elegant forms of desire. In vanitas art, the ritual of reading painting as metaphor through 
form is quasi-religious but decidedly secular. 
Some themes in Calvinist sermons, however, taught that an accumulation of 
wealth through industry would ensure God’s pleasure and personal salvation.91 Wealth 
was considered as a sign of God’s elect. After all, Abraham and Job were rich because 
                                                          
89 As a consequence of the fall of Adam, all those born into the world are enslaved to sin. Unable to choose 
to follow God, humans cannot refrain from choosing sin. 
90 Robert Williams, “Sin and Evil,” Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks in 
Peter C. Hodgson, and Robert H King (Fortress Press), 201–202. 
91 Milton’s Paradise Regained could be read as the Calvinistic theory of predestination. The poem teaches 
us that man should learn what is indispensable for his salvation with help of light from above, which he has 
not completely lost yet (IV, 352). Being aware of the visual sources enriches the descriptive passages in the 
poem. Examples (as in the vanitas) correspond to and become the actual metaphors and the imageries 
within the text which are thick with moral symbolism. The preachers always warned their audience of the 
danger of wealth, since it could easily instigate indulgent luxurious life. The strongest warnings were found 
in 1 Timothy 6:10: Temperance against the seductively enticing lure of objects has become an 
indispensable virtue. Wealth then has double symbolism: the sign of God’s favor and the temptation to 
moral depravity. Still life painting, especially vanitas, and Paradise Regained teach that wealth is favorable 
but full of potential sinfulness. 
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they were God’s chosen people. Indeed, Simon Schama has shown that Neatherlandish 
parishioners measured personal salvation through material wealth and possessions. 
Wealth was considered a sign of God’s elect.92 As the likely owners of objects of wealth, 
including paintings, the Dutch were accustomed to seeing beyond the mere appearance of 
vanity: allusions to pride and death in Calvinist sermons and pictured in painting 
customary appealed to the Dutch pious.93 
The paradox in the vanitas metaphor, all is vanity, mimics metaphor’s stated 
purpose in Poetics: “To evoke emotion is to visualize. . . [to create] delight and 
surprise. . . [therefore] his acquisition of the new idea impresses him all the more.”94 
A familiar metaphor found in Genesis conflates moral authority with the creation 
of wealth in an acidic observation quoted by Calvin that measures piety in Dutch 
character: 
There was a danger that Abram might become too well pleased with his own good 
fortune. Therefore, God seasons the sweetness of wealth with vinegar. Although 
useful and tempting, wealth, as the prayer book warns, should not arouse pleasure 
in the mind or body.95 
Calvin’s warning is phrased in the language of metaphor borrowed from St. Thomas 
Aquinas who wrote in the 13th century. Artists in the 17th century milieu borrowed the 
rhetorical effect in Aquinas’ language to enhance the affective nature of vanitas painting. 
Aquinas put forth, in the form of a scholastic argument, the use of metaphor in the 
scriptures as well as advancing the most important statement about the relationship 
between metaphors and visual content in art.96 Because the construction of Aquinas’ 
                                                          
92 Schama, iv. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Aristotle draws the association between learning and pleasure in Poet. 4,1448b2ff. 
95 In Commentary on Genesis (13: V, VII). 
96 Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. written in 1265 
Q.1. 
 142
thought and style creates an affect in Calvinist sermons, the influence of Aquinas is 
likewise present in the content metaphor of vanitas art, which appeared in the same 
period. For example, a critical statement comes from a passage in Summa Theologica, 
“Whether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors?”97 In the treatise, Aquinas recommends 
that it is indeed befitting Holy Scripture to offer divine and spiritual truths by 
“comparisons with material things.”98 The philosopher reasons that it is humankind’s 
nature to obtain “intellectual truths through sensible objects,”99 because humans receive 
knowledge through their senses.100 
In Theologicas101 Aquinas suggests that for the simple minded, spiritual truths are 
discovered in material things: 
It is also befitting Holy Writ. . . that spiritual truths be expounded by means of 
figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are 
unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it.102 
From Aristotle, Aquinas postulates that abstract ideas of the spirit are understood and 
learned best through study and the senses: thus, metaphor is a linguistic and visual tool as 
important to acquiring knowledge as the aural.103 These scholars of secular thought and 
religious liturgy recommend the use of rhetoric and the metaphor to describe, warn, and 
to delight the senses.104 
In a positive turn, the Reformed church justifies their blessings to vanitas painting 
                                                          
97 Ibid., Art in Theory, 9. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 In the late Middle Ages and Renaissance, the passage encourages the growth of metaphor in the visual 
arts. The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Robert E. Bjork, ed., (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Aquinas’ doctrine was adopted in the 16th and 17th centuries such as those found in precursors of vanitas 
painting (e.g., books of emblems and diptychs). 
104 Koozin, Metaphoric Realism, 3. 
 143
on the basis of symbolic and moral import: metaphor conveys metaphysical principles in 
material form. The country’s economic investment in the booming tulip trade (flowers 
were sometimes used in vanitas painting) is not inconsequential to this justification. 
Religion that sanctions the memento mori theme and metaphor in vanitas painting 
ease Dutch consciences where acquiring knowledge and wealth are concerned. The 
artistic strategy of using rhetoric, specifically metaphoric messages in art, was meant to 
appeal to the eyes of wealthy Calvinist burghers and to enhance the prestige of vanitas 
art. The enactment of the vanitas message—of communication with God caught in 
worldliness—is not simply a rhetorical misfortune: Calvinist audiences instinctively 
grasp earthly things through the lens of the transitory state of human nature.105 
Regardless of the ideals of devotion—intellectual, material, and social (vanitas 
were marked as forms of meditation by the Reformed Church)—artists chose to display 
the incongruences between religion and commodity by accentuating what would 
otherwise theoretically obviate their work. Consequently what initially was the most 
troublesome feature of vanitas painting—mixing religion with secular interests—became 
one of its strongest selling points. The purses of the wealthy patrons of art notarize the 
status of the genre. The culture of conspicuous display of wealth in still lifes owes much 
to the artistic wit and virtuosity of artists such as Steenwyck. 
To rehearse, metaphor is an ekphrasic trope recommended by Aristotle that adds 
to language “. . . liveliness. . .and that the best of these should be ‘graphic.’”106 Rhetoric 
                                                          
105 See note 90 above, regarding the paradox of wealth. 
106 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1404b; 1411. Rhetoric describes what metaphor does for the reader: “Metaphor, 
moreover, gives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can . . . the best of these should be 
graphic. By “graphic,” Aristotle means that writers, by extension painters, should cause the viewer to see 
things. Therefore metaphor brings about emotion when it is full of graphic description, as in “with his vigor 
in full bloom,” and “bringing [objects and emotions] before the eyes.” 
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and Poetics emphasize that visual effect and emotional affect are produced by “. . . poetic 
language, especially metaphor.” Seventeenth-century art critic, Carl Van Mander creates 
a variation on the formulation: vir bonus pingendi pergendi peritus explains the affective 
power of painting to “sweetly move” the viewer’s eyes, heart, and feelings in terms of the 
painter’s capacity to make an impression of “piety and honour.”107 Although images of 
death may not “sweetly move” the viewer, metaphor read through the elegant form in 
vanitas painting created sweet effects on the eye of the 17th century Dutch viewer. 
As I have shown, the technique of applying rhetoric, specifically metaphor to 
artistic criticism, borrows from the authority of ancient literary tradition. Discussed next 
are the analyses of two period art critics who employ rhetoric to bolster their critiques; 
metaphor functions as the framework for their critiques. Antonio Palomino y Velasco 
uses science as metaphor, and Gerard de Laissaire links the pictorial mode to images in 
the notion of metaphoric ornament. 
Velasco’s inventive comparison of painting to metaphor represents a new kind of 
analysis derived from poetic disposition. In Theory of Painting Book II, Chapter 1, mid-
17th century ideas unite science, art, and moral conduct to metaphor.108 
Instead of the usual breakdown into idea, design, color, chiaroscuro, expression 
and so forth, the critic offers an elaborate exposition of different types of metaphor said 
to animate the work of art: the metaphoric, moral, and iconic.109 Velasco’s idea of 
                                                          
107 Dutch theoretical precedence for art critiques are found in Karl van Mander (Haarlem 1603), Franciscus 
Junis (Leiden, 1689), and Samuel van Hoogstraten (1627), who is concerned with techniques of description 
and illusion, The Visible World, 77. 
108 Art in Theory 1648–1815, “Antonio Palomino y Velasco,” 318. Velasco received a humanistic education 
in his native Cordoba intended to prepare him for a career in the Church. However, he was encouraged by a 
friendship with the painter Valdes Leal (1622–90) to change his plans and to study art. 
109 The extracts here (the total works combined to over 500 pages) have been edited and translated by 
Nicholas Walker, (El Museo Pictorico, y escala optica, Madrid: Da Sancha, 1715, vol 2), 82–83, 86–87; 
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metaphor is primarily rhetorical and conceptual. His ekphrasic descriptions in critiques 
IV, VI, IX, and X emphasize how metaphor should not call attention to the artwork’s so-
called internal natural truths:110 
IV. The Metaphoric Argument: The metaphoric argument is that which reveals the 
idea [concepto] of the artist through the use of ingenious metaphor. For the 
metaphor is the mother of all intellectual subtlety . . . to enrich the mind along the 
paths of erudition. Those that directly concern the painter are five in number: 
natural, moral, facial, instrumental, or iconological. 
VI. The Moral Metaphor: The metaphor of custom reveals the idea of the artist by 
means of some sign which, through custom . . . has assumed the right to a certain 
signification (e.g., hues of the ceremonial vestments decreed by the Church for 
just such an occasion) . . . such things depend upon the free interpretation, 
customs, and usages of men [who] belong in this class of moral metaphor.111 
The moral argument turns on a secular reading but borrows from religious rites such as 
the mention of “ceremonial vestments decreed by the Church.” Moreover, “men 
belonging to this class” should be appointed to interpret customs, ones who understand 
forms of “secular morality.”112 Next, are the iconological arguments that link form to 
vigilance and vanity: 
IX. The Iconological Argument is used by the painter to represent abstract matter: 
The Virtues, the Vices, the Sciences, the Arts, Day and Night serve to represent 
these things which are not themselves real physical entities as if there were indeed 
such; for the expression of such things many other metaphors are also employed: 
like the crane for Vigilance, the ostrich for Gluttony, the sword for Justice, the 
olive for Mercy. 
Velasco connects metaphor and form to the ekphrasic argument borrowed from ancient 
poetry: 
the fury of war in the form a raging and wrathful youth, his eyes darting fire, his 
                                                          
vol., 1, 56–64. The critic’s work was popular throughout Europe and translated into French, English, and 
German, 317–25. 
110 Ibid., 317, 321–3. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., 322. 
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mouth foaming bloody, his body covered in wounds . . . the youth is chained to 
the triumphal chariot of Alexander.113 
X. The Emblem . . . is used by the painter if he is a humanist: 
. . . . [emblem] is a metaphor signifying some moral matter by means of 
iconological, ideal or fantastical. . . representation like a motto, or a precise, 
penetrating and ingenious poem.114 
The critic says this kind of “erudite allusion” is much favored in the “. . . apartments of 
Lords and Princes for the decoration of vaults, domes and friezes. . .”115 
This ingenious comparison of painting to metaphor represents an entirely new 
critique: 
. . . properly understanding the full significance that attaches to this single 
metaphoric task of the painting of art where no demonstration of true learning is 
excessive. . . [I]t encompasses the whole of history, sacred and profane . . . natural 
philosophy, the holy theology and the mysteries of faith . . . themselves elaborate 
symbols and sacred metaphors. It also encompasses rhetoric in the expression of 
the effects . . . customs and practices, poetry, [etc.]. . .116 
As a critic familiar with Renaissance and early Baroque poetry, Velasco’s evaluation 
borrows the notion of the conceit, or the willingness to abide metaphoric deceit 
characteristic of vanitas painting.117 The artist holds the view that the rhetorical and 
visual arts should depict moral examples to aid salvation but also, at the same time, his 
examples show that visual arts should entice the senses. 
One critic who thinks still lifes can do little else but entertain the weak minded is 
Gerard de Laissaire118 (who nevertheless brings attention to Dutch art). How should 
                                                          
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 325. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 In the 17th century, Dr. Johnson is synonymous with the notion of metaphysical conceit, a characteristic 
figure and once derogatory in John Donne (see fn.2). The conceit, according to H. M. Abrams, originally 
meant image but came to be the name for figures of image and speech that establish “elaborate” parallels 
between two apparently dissimilar things or situations. M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, Glossary. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957). 
118 Ibid., 298. 
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moral lessons occur through “. . . inanimate Things; such as dead flowers, fruits, musical 
instruments, dead Fish, etc.?”119 
De Laissaire sees vanitas as thought painting, though he laments that vanitas, 
indeed all still lifes, do not contain meaning: “Thought painters [vanitas] are guilty of not 
adding sufficient thoughts to their pictures.”120 
Following his discussion of Histories, de Lairesse reluctantly takes up the task of 
examining still lifes in these acidic remarks: 
. . . we shall now, for the sake of weak Capacities, proceed to Still-lifes. What 
constitutes a good Still-life piece. . .‘tis Weakness to think that faded Flowers 
should please, much less in a Picture: Or who would hang a Piece of ordinary, 
unripe or rotten Fruit in his best Room. . . 
Such Rubbish I did formerly admire; but as they only shew the Deformities of 
Nature I have no Appetite to view them any more. . . it is not likely that wealthy 
People should be delighted with old-fashion’d Plate and Furniture, when they can 
have every Thing more beautiful and elegant. . .121 
The critic rather affirms history painting as the highest genre. 
De Lairesse is interesting because his disdain of everyday and urban subjects 
betrays ambivalence toward emblematic pictures and particular symbols that display 
metaphoric meaning, such as emblems of death concealed in everyday forms. Through 
the very vehemence of his opposition to the genre, the critic strengthens artistic attention 
toward Dutch still lifes painting. 
In summary, I have discussed ekphrasis as a type of composition intended to 
bring the subject—the content metaphor all is vanity—clearly before the eyes.122 Pictura 
poesis and metaphor were discussed in relationship to vanitas painting. The ekphrasic 
                                                          
119 Art in Theory, 109. 
120 Ibid., 299. Although de Lairesse was French, he worked in Amsterdam. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1410b, “bringing before the eyes.” 
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tropes represent the content of vanitas painting in the dialectic between content and form. 
Other Dutch painters in the 17th century, such as Jan Steen, use the metaphorical contrast 
between the lifeless canvases versus the living form to compare the distinction between 
appearance and inner truth, or illusion and reality.123 Although form and content coexist 
as different realities, the division is difficult to decipher. There is good reason that forms 
of the real world cohere to metaphoric content. For example, illuminated material 
surfaces bring to mind metaphysical reality. These two characteristics of vanitas painting 
are two types of verisimilitude—“mirrors of nature”124—that hinge the art of Dutch 
realism. 
As I have explained, 17th century Dutch artistic, religious, and secular 
perspectives emphasized contemplation of the forms of the visible world to open access 
to the invisible world. To say this differently, forms are themselves metaphors for the 
other worldly. Painters are not, however, to seek to penetrate the true nature that lies 
behind the world of appearances. The details of one thing—the forms of the worldly—
make their comparison to the invisible world all the more acute. 
Velasco and de Laissaire advocate for painting by demonstrating that painting is 
not a mere craft, but an intellectual pursuit that borrows from classical rhetoric.125 They 
specifically argue on behalf of Dutch painting, that it should garner the attention and 
investment of cultivated persons of means—the burghers, or middle class—for whom 
                                                          
123 Ibid. For example, in 1665, Jan Steen painted a scene entitled “The Life Of Man,” which depicts a 
tavern scene, which is typical of Steen's work. Many people gather indulging in pleasures of the flesh such 
as drinking, dancing, and flirting. In the corner, barely seen, lies a boy watching the crowd, lying next to a 
skull and blowing bubbles out of a pipe. This particular painting does not discourage the viewer to reject 
pleasures in life, instead it is a moral painting reminding the viewer of the truth: that life is short and that 
these pleasures will not last, The Athenaeum, accessed Mar, 2012. 
124 Weststeijn, The Visible World, 83. 
125 Art in Theory, 9. 
 149
wealth and leisure define what it means to acquire culture that mingles with religious 
dogma. 
The next section emphasizes how form in painting interconnects visually and 
rhetorically through epideictic. 
Epideictic and Form 
Dutch realism in vanitas designates values through metaphor and form. Art 
historical interpretation of vanitas has clung to the conception that form is subordinate to 
metaphor. However, my critique disputes the notion to assert, instead, that form is as 
critical to vanitas art as metaphor is. 
The subject of this section is form.126 Form is steeped in the classical rhetorical 
perspective that dictates that painting, like oratory, should elicit emotion. To demonstrate 
this perspective, this section specifically shows how epideictic is a theoretical criticism 
that rests on the assertion of the priority of sight as a sensory experience through form 
expressly through color and symbolic value. 
Viewers draw visual information about the world of the senses from an encounter 
with vanitas form. Just as the orator uses stylish linguistic ornamentation, the artist 
ornaments and illuminates vanitas art through form. Form operates rhetorically as a type 
of visual syntax created so that the meaning in metaphor can be read and understood 
through the form itself.127 Form on canvas is the superficial form of sensuous pleasure 
meant to animate metaphor. 
                                                          
126 The term form refers to the art work’s material form and indigenous style; content refers to art’s content, 
how what is being depicted attaches to commonplace meaning. 
127 As was discussed above, the ekphrasic metaphor in vanitas painting communicates not only through 
didactic meaning, but is read through enticing visual form. 
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Form is what entices the eye in vanitas painting: the prime organ constantly 
receives information about the world. Sight is an essential conveyor of emotion. Form in 
vanitas art is visual display that makes emotional claims on the viewer—however 
ambivalent—including desire and repulsion. Form opens for the viewer access to the 
invisible world. Symbolically, form represents renunciation of the visible world in order 
to embrace the invisible world128; form operates as well, in the pleasing allure of objects 
of desire in the worldly world. 
Epideictic captures the idea of how excellence of form and technique in 
illuminated surface and color is an artistic tool in painting as the analysis of Steenwyck’s 
Vanitas has shown, and the trope is also the unmistakable display of rhetorical virtuosity 
in formal display. 
I show how through epideictic, the forms of vanitas operate rhetorically: both 
persuasively and strategically. I begin with the ancient understanding of epideictic as the 
idea of rhetorical display. Then, I show again through epideictic how vanitas is the 
display of form illuminated through the technique of color. Next, is a short description of 
how vanitas art conveys symbolic meaning and creates aesthetic emotion meant to move 
the emotions of the 17th century Dutch viewer. 
Lawrence Rosenfield’s interpretation of epideictic shows the critical interweaving 
of epideictic and form. At its best, epideictic calls for collective acknowledgment of 
virtue’s presence: “. . . epideictic makes known; it means to shine or show forth in order 
                                                          
128 Aristotle emphasizes the visual and material status of works of art: in a word, mimesis embodies or 
enacts likeness from an art’s material form. The metaphoric transference from one thing to another creates 
a memento mori message. Thus, form and content illuminate for the Dutch, an interpretive reading of 
painting. Rather than painting that predicts a moral outcome, the viewer completes the image similar to the 
process of meditation in Dutch diptychs (National Gallery, “Prayers and Portraits: Unfolding the 
Netherlandish Diptych,” Nov.12, 2006–Feb 4, 2007), Site visit. 
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to persuade audiences to gaze at the moral aura glowing from within a work of art.”129 
The epideictic brings to light art’s “[formal] characteristics and illuminative liveliness,” 
according to Rosenfield.130 “Epideixis does not mean mere display”; rather, the term is 
akin to making manifest the fleeting “appearance” of excellence in human experience 
(including art making) that otherwise would remain “unnoticed or invisible.”131 
Beginning in the 15th century, epideiktikos was moral virtue synonymous with 
displays of excellence in artistic merit. Audiences were thought to experience emotion in 
proper proportion to the quality of artistic representation. 
In the 17th century, the art critic Franciscus Junius (1589–1677) endeavored to 
invest painting with a status among the liberal arts by means of the rhetorical principle of 
epideictic. Janius praises the “art of painting,”132 showing that the rules of painting 
should be enhanced by imitatio or mimesis: “The instruction to be gained from rules is 
long and arduous. . . ” claims Junius, “. . . while the instruction to be gained from 
examples is short and powerful.”133 It is clear that the author is dealing with epideictic 
praise when he speaks of “the art of painting.”134 
Ancient rhetorical theory indicates that virtuosity through epideictic intertwines 
artistic form with the moral virtue of exemplary technique: a strategic method that 
continues into the Dutch milieu of the 17th century. The belief was that moral virtues are 
visually presentable, but are not contained in the objects of form; they are simply 
                                                          
129 Ibid., 3, 154. 
130 “The Practical Celebration of Epideictic” Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of 
Rhetoric, Eugene E. White, ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), 135. 
131 Ibid., 3. 
132 B. Vickers, In Defense of Rhetoric (Oxford 1989), 53–54; 61 deals with the importance of epideictic 
rhetoric that was dominant in the early modern period. 
133 Nativel, 59; 442 concludes that in Junius’ theory, “precepts are subordinate to practice;” Weststeijn, 
371. 
134 See note 19. 
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interpreted or read through form by viewers.135 The artist’s duty is to create an artistic 
link between form and content: to clarify between realism and hyperrealism, between real 
and the unreal, between the material visible world and the metaphysical invisible 
world.136 To accomplish this goal, the painter, like the poet, illuminates artistic form to 
fill the viewer with delight, as Aristotle instructs, and to exhort virtue through emotion. In 
classical rhetoric, the aesthetic is rhetoric: the affective experience through the epideictic 
lens intensifies the interrelationship among the artist (speaker), his artwork, and the 
viewer. 
The Baroque tradition of painting borrows the notion from ancient classical 
rhetoric to create a visual code or a type of visual syntax in vanitas: technical virtuosity 
creates emotion that interweaves with the theological message. Particular artistic facts in 
vanitas painting must not contradict the artistic code; the artistic and moral values in 
vanitas are designated predominantly by the code of Dutch realism. 
Moral virtue in vanitas painting eschews vanity in the world and is the virtue 
through epideictic of how painting must be fit for display or the artistic virtue of 
excellence in execution of detail and illumination of form. The epideictic guides the 
technical execution of the code of artistic values in Dutch realism’s exacting 
representations of codified color, composition, intention, and inventiveness of scientific 
order, which display in the paintings of Pieter Claesz, Johann Gruber, and Steenwyck.137 
The technique of color is a conceit of artistic virtuosity. 
                                                          
135 See note 103. 
136 An example in the 16th century is poet John Donne’s metaphysical descriptions quoted in John P. Doyle, 
“Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link,” (Review of Metaphysics, vol.50, 1997). 
137 According to Descartes, painters should not look down on the slavish copying of the visible world and 
should not direct their endeavors to conveying the ideal forms that lie behind or beyond the world of 
appearances. 
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Vanitas’ indigenous form may be partly invisible because the metaphor in 17th 
century vanitas still lifes has historically taken precedence over form. Thus, it is plausible 
to see how for the Dutch viewer the forms of vanitas could be naturalized, culturally.138 
The prescribed technique of color, however muted, was a principle epideictic tool meant 
to create emotion. Color bolsters the rhetorical, moral, and emotional authority of vanitas 
painting in the 17th century. Indeed, in ancient rhetorical theory, some of the metaphoric 
techniques for evoking a moral lesson seem to invite an epideictic application to painting, 
such as the Cicero’s recommendation to embellish speech with “colors of rhetoric.”139 It 
is not surprising then that 17th century art theory140 and practice accords painting the 
same function as it does to oratory: that of persuading and coloring audiences’ moral 
outlook. 
Although art is verisimilitude,141 the reality of emotion elicited through color—in 
contrast to the fiction of art—is the painter’s most powerful tool in his effort to invite the 
viewer into the painting in order to read its enticing form. The first Dutch art critic, Carel 
Van Mander, in the epic Grondt explains the affective power of color: “to . . . sweetly 
move the viewer’s eyes, heart and feelings in terms of the painter’s capacity to make an 
impression of ‘piety and honour.’” Moreover, “colour heartens and startles people [. . .] 
                                                          
138 Roman Jakobson asks, can the question be raised about a higher degree of verisimilitude of this or that 
poetic trope? Can one say that a metaphor is conventional or figurative? The methods of projecting three-
dimensional space onto a flat surface are established by convention; the use of color, the abstracting, the 
simplification, of the object depicted, and the choice of reproducible features is all based on convention. It 
is necessary to learn the conventional language of painting in order to “see” a picture, just as it is 
impossible to understand what is spoken without knowing the language. This conventional, traditional 
aspect of painting to a great extent conditions the very act of our visual perception. As tradition 
accumulates, the painted image becomes an ideogram, a formula, to which the object portrayed is linked by 
contiguity. Recognition becomes instantaneous. We no longer see a picture. See note 12. 
139 Weststeijn, The Visible World, 45. 
140 Ibid.; espoused by critics such as Constantijm Huygens and Samuel Van Hoogstraten. 
141 Verisimilitude captures the idea that when viewers bring an image into consciousness (creation) the 
form interconnects with content to create cultural meaning. 
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makes them sad and cheers them up and helps to cure melancholy.”142 
In Steenwyck’s Vanitas, silk, the finest of all materials, is colored purple, the 
most expensive color dye. Color was deliberately selected to create a rhetorical effect to 
produce affect and an illusionistic force.143 Functioning as part of the visual syntax, color 
was meant to be read through form to heighten viewing emotion. Form through color 
likely creates more emotional appeal than the didactic message conveyed by the 
metaphor. The making and enjoyment of painting through artistic and rhetoric 
technique—particularly color, as I have shown—thus demonstrate how a strong affective 
component and technical virtuosity was required for a painting to achieve artistic 
distinction.144 
Netherlandish period critic, Jan Steppe, corroborates this view. He is “. . . not so 
much concern[ed] for the deeper moral [philosophical] value [of painting] . . . but rather 
its [painting’s] technical virtuosity.” For Steppe, “beauty and architectonic unity” is now 
“replaced by splendor and richness.”145 The perspective reveals, where painting is 
concerned, that sight has arisen to a new stature—equal to thought—in the milieu. 
Sight is primitive; more than language, sight in vanitas is a basic receptor of the 
                                                          
142 Carel van Mander’s The Schilder-boeck is part of the Basic Library of the dbnl (Dutch Canon) and 
considered one of the 1000 most important works in Dutch literature beginning with the Middle Ages to the 
21st century. The book is a compilation of three books: the first was a translation from Giorgio Vasari's list 
of artist biographies called the Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, the second 
was Lives of the Illustrious Netherlandish and German Painters, and the third was a translation of Ovid’s 
stories Metamorphoses followed by an explanation of figures. Van Mander’s work was translated by 
Constant van Wall, (NY: New York University Press, 1936), 153–157; see also, Van Mander, Grondt I, 30, 
fn. 3vm, Visible World, 411. 
143 Pieter Breughel, knew how to copy in color very comically and skillfully, Seymour Slive, Dutch 
Painting, 1600–1800, (Yale University Press, 1995). 
144 With the sophists of ancient Greece, rhetoricians have shared a profound respect for how style has 
affective properties. 
145 Ethan Matt Kavaler. “Renaissance Gothic in the Netherlands: the Uses of Ornament,” (The Art Bulletin 
82: 2, Jun, 2000), 226–251. Critics in Netherlandish art have been slow to grant legitimacy to this [the 
ornamental] aesthetic. An exception is what Kavaler thinks is a curious antithesis that betrays an essentially 
“modernist distrust of ornament.” 
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values that guide Dutch painting: emotion, virtue, and truth. Sight intersects with thought; 
yet, the metaphor, all is vanity, is not enough to move the viewer. The strategic choice of 
the color in vanitas painting is ornamentation meant to move the viewer.146 Artistic 
techniques and codes, emotion, and color are considered rhetorical practices critical to 
epideictic excellence in vanitas painting, as the discussion has shown. 
The viewing practice of epideictic shows that form as virtuosity through 
rhetoric—form makes emotional claims on the viewer—is neither insubstantial nor 
incidental in vanitas painting. Next, I continue the topic of epideictic, with a discussion 
of the relationship between symbol and vanitas art. 
It is difficult to see how form is not a lexis of external sign systems, symbols, and 
intentions, overlapping logos and lexis, res and verba.147 Form, however, is the material 
visual res (thing). When symbol is ascribed to form in vanitas painting, it functions as the 
signifier: it points to form; therefore, symbol adds meaning.148 For example, purple silk is 
not inherently rhetoric. Silk becomes rhetorical when viewers of vanitas painting use it to 
symbolize silk as a form of vanity. 
Erwin Panofsky originated the term—“disguised symbolism,”149—in relation to 
objects in Netherlandish painting. The influence of Panofsky has guided art historians to 
                                                          
146 Rhetoric emphasizes the visual aspect of artistic teche, or excellence, which produces emotion. 
147 “Silva Rhetoricae,. Rhetoric.byu.edu, accessed April, 2011; The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from 
Classical Times to the Present, Second Edition. Patricia Bizzell and Brice Herzberg, (Bedford, St. Martins, 
2001), 567–88. 
148 Sonja Foss claims that to qualify as visual rhetoric, “. . . an image must go beyond serving as a sign. . . 
and be symbolic with that image only indirectly connected to its referent. The shape and color of the stop 
sign, for example, have no natural relationship to the act of stopping a car. . . a stop sign, then counts as 
visual rhetoric because it involves the use of arbitrary symbols to communicate.” Sonja K.Foss, “Theory of 
Visual Rhetoric.” Handbook of Visual Communication:Theory, Methods, and Media.. Ken Smith; Sandra 
Moriaty; Gretchen Barbatsis; Keith Kenney, eds. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2005), 
144. 
149 Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972), 5–9. 
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research the meaning of the term. But these paintings are as much a part of the history of 
epideictic (and of ekphrasis) and metaphor as rhetorical devices as they are a part of any 
system of visual symbols. 
Symbolism is, nonetheless, present in every form of still lifes, and it is never more 
significant than in vanitas painting. In the painting, realism mingles with escapism in the 
clash of forms and symbols. Forms are symbols that display the ephemerality of life and 
of the inevitability of death. Some of the commonplace forms that function as symbols 
are the watch or hourglass, which hints at the passage of time; the overturned glass, 
which connotes the emptiness of life; a violin, a vice of too much merriment; a book, 
which equates pride with knowledge, an artificial virtue; a sputtering candle or smoking 
oil lamp, which reminds the viewer that life is eventually snuffed out; rotten fruit, which 
symbolizes decay, like aging and the brevity of life; and a peeled lemon, which is 
attractive to look at but bitter to taste. The forms of vanitas signal to the reader a 
symbolic relationship to the metaphor, all is vanity; however, vanitas forms are, of 
themselves, unrelated. 
From the perspective of epideictic rhetoric traced from the Greek, epideiktikos, 
ancient art reveals a prescribed symbolic code: the display of moral virtue that stems 
from the virtue of excellent execution in every observable detail of painting.150 In the 17th 
century, the code in vanitas merged with the fervor over the emerging Scientific Age. 
The code insists on exacting observation through visual perception and sight: passion that 
elicits visual enjoyment in the 17th century Dutch viewer. The indigenous aesthetic of 
Dutch art aligns with an epideictic line of reasoning that insists on exacting realism in the 
                                                          
150 Ibid. 
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technical execution of meticulous detail in painting. This sensibility equates with the 
fascination in the Dutch Golden Age with scientific investigation, innovation, and 
documentation. 
Documenting scientific processes and epistemological facts mark the 
distinctiveness of the early 17th century Netherlandish aesthetic. Dutch realism is 
preoccupied with the task of visually labeling inanimate objects, flowers, shells, and 
skulls to create in art a hyperrealistic effect. Formal realism in vanitas paintings is 
testimony to this obsession with exacting technique that accurately describes every 
observable detail of the visible world. An artwork survives its maker, and vanitas thus 
ensures its own transcendence. The result is a genre that challenges the process of decay 
by methodically copying and thus maintaining nature’s beauty, eternally freezing a 
flower in bloom. The artistic aesthetic in accuracy of depiction and representation and the 
Albertian metaphor of the window on the world151 show that form in vanitas painting 
may be as fundamental as method itself. 
At the heart of the 17th century Dutch world is the notion that the form of the 
visual and the metaphor of the invisible intermingle. Vanitas mirrors this understanding 
in its interpretation of the indivisibility between things of an earthly nature and the 
metaphysical in contrast to painting that predicts a moral outcome through narrative.152 
Form in vanitas should be understood not as narrative, but should be read as an 
association of one thing to another: forms of enticements require the viewer to interpret 
                                                          
151 Leone Battista Alberti. On Painting, Edited and Translated by Rocco Sinisgalli, (NYC, Cambridge 
University Press, May 2011, 1956). Alberti formulated principles of perspective in the 15th century. The 
geometric method renders pictorial space truthful (scientific); it is “seeing through,” as if through a window 
(Alberti’s metaphor). Perspective constructs a method for viewing the world. 
152 An example is the narrative painting of Renaissance artists. 
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form as symbol. The paintings are more abstract than narrative: a style of representing 
form indigenous to the Neatherlandish aesthetic. 
Epideictic offers a reason metaphoric content is overwhelmed by opulent form. 
Although riches are meant to signify transient things that fall to dust, when the eye of the 
viewer engages with the forms of vanitas, the mind disengages from the metaphor: the 
eye lingers over lustrous forms. The lure of forms is a powerful force and a rhetorical 
strategy for engaging the viewer. Epideictic expands understanding of the physical 
aspects of the genre and how emotion—associated with form’s technique of color—
accomplishes this focus on aesthetics through form. Vanitas examined through form bids 
the viewer enjoy sensuous depictions of material form: a book, silk, a lute, and a shell, all 
of which arouse the sensory faculty of sight in aesthetic ways, distinct from the written 
word. 
In sum, ekphrasis shows how metaphor or content (thought) coheres with form in 
the interweaving of terms and practices of classical rhetoric interpreted through 17th 
century Dutch sensibilities. The epideictic is the rhetoric of aesthetic virtuosity. 
Moreover, metaphor and form do not reduce at some level to literal speech or formal 
analysis outside historical context as contemporary rhetoric is apt to do. Instead, vanitas, 
as a genre of Dutch realism, must be examined in the context of the early 17th century. 
Conclusion 
Aristotle proclaimed that thought is impossible in the absence of an image, which 
is another way of saying that mental activity is guided by perceptual experience. In the 
Baroque style of meditative reading, vanitas shows how religious piety and spiritual 
truths are revealed in the delicate infusion of light illuminating from exquisitely detailed 
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forms in mimetic representation. The mimetic idea in the Dutch Baroque governed the 
creation of works of art that correspond to the physical world. Vanitas art was therefore 
modeled on the eternal virtues of beauty, truth, and the good. At the same time, the form 
and imagery themselves satisfy a second function of these paintings as expensive luxury 
display collectibles in fashionable burgher homes. 
Vanitas art is created principally to satisfy not only the Dutch desires for luxury 
items, but also the milieu’s cultural premium placed on verisimilitude. Verisimilitude 
allows for an understanding of vanitas as a discourse of intermingled content (metaphor) 
and form (material objects); it captures the sensibility of the genre as an illusory space 
between life and death, form and meaning, both empty and sensuous. Klaus Kruger terms 
the void background, a “veil of the invisible.”153 The phrase beautifully encapsulates how 
the image simultaneously reveals and conceals its referent. 
This chapter has demonstrated how vanitas’ content—the metaphor all is vanity154 
or the didactic message—was read through form. The chapter examined how reading 
metaphor through form evolved from ancient rhetoric, especially ekphrasis and epideictic 
and rhetorical strategy designed to raise the status of painting to more than mere craft. I 
demonstrated that the rhetoric of vanitas painting is not divided from aesthetic criticism; 
rather, the indigenous artistic method is integral to reading symbolic meaning, not linked 
to allegorical meaning. 
The artistic method used to produce vanitas painting includes the rhetorical 
                                                          
153 Bret L. Rothstein, Sight and Spirituality in Early Netherlandish Painting, 82; Kruger, Das Bild als 
Schleier des Unsichtbaren, C.f. Wolf, Schleir und Spiegel. 
154 The phrase is the opening lines in the Book of Ecclesiastes, Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas, which 
accounts for the use of the word vanitas to describe these still lifes in 17th century inventories. These still 
lifes, are also referred to as death’s head because a human skull is a common centerpiece. 
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strategy of bringing content and form before the eyes;155 and the classical ideal that 
joined form and content through rhetorical concepts. For example, I interwove with 
content and form the ancient terms ekphrasis and epideictic to situate understanding of 
the invisible (metaphor) and the visual (form) at the heart of the 17th century Dutch 
world. Forms display the artistic ambition of depicting all things visible to access the 
invisible. 
The conclusion synthesizes four key findings from the analyses in the chapter to 
summarize how the overall goal of the chapter has been accomplished. 1) Steenwyck’s 
Vanitas painting compels intellectually and philosophically and as commodity through its 
illuminated forms of desire that align with the memento mori message. 2) Vanitas art is 
the most thought-provoking art. It is intellectually demanding because of the visual 
syntax created so that the metaphor or content could be read through form. 3) The 
epideictic lens reveals a scientific milieu deeply invested in the primacy of sight, which 
allows the artist’s detailed and superb technique displayed in Dutch realism to support the 
strategy of bringing things before the viewer’s eyes. 4) In order to validate this genre, 
painters in the 17th century Dutch milieu consciously appealed to wealthy merchants of 
Calvinist persuasion (generally) who understood spiritual meaning through illusion. 
First, the case study of artist Harmen Steenwyck’s Vanitas showed how the 
painting’s complex and ambiguous form corresponds both to the demands of religious 
experience and the desires of a wealthy, worldly clientele. Vanitas religious and 
philosophical truths coexist in the forms of the visible world. For example, the shell and 
skull convey overt and repressed desire that yearns for a relationship to objects as a way 
                                                          
155 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1410b; Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse, George A. Kennedy, 
trans., (New York: Oxford Press, 1991). 
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of demystifying, or opposing the power of the word. The analysis demonstrated that 
Steenwyck’s engagement with the material treatment of form is a consequence of 
composition, technique, and color that treat the form. Steenwyck sought, through 
rhetorical devices, to elevate the art of painting above craft, enriching it with intellectual 
and religious significance, and imbuing it with rhetorical meaning. 
Forms without narrative link vanitas to its metaphor, all is vanity. Meaning is 
concealed in forms of a skull, books, and silk among other objects pictured on a chipped 
table set against a void background. By so resolutely vivifying metaphor, Steenwyck does 
more than simply make it present or lend it a mystical import. He paradoxically describes 
it as greater than mere imitation or naturalistic representation embodied in the muteness 
of the images of life and death. Vanitas is a mimetic representation that puts the patron in 
mind of reading religious imagery through everyday objects—a meditative engagement 
with forms of the painting and their metaphoric content sanctioned by the Reformed 
Church because of the enlightenment it encouraged. By reading Vanitas, the patron 
produced—and purchased—a personal reading and meditation. 
Second, I showed from the ekphrasic perspective how vanitas painting is 
considered the most thought-provoking art. Reading vanitas painting with the memento 
mori message is as intellectually demanding as viewing a history painting, which was 
often considered more prestigious in the milieu. The viewer focuses on the unique type of 
visual syntax created so that the metaphor could be read through form. The demand is 
more than a simple recognition of narrative; rather, the visual syntax required the 17th 
century Dutch viewer in the Reformed Church to participate in the rhetorical tripartite 
that intermingles the roles of viewer, content, and form to create a meditation. The key is 
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for contemporary viewers to understand vanitas not as allegorical narrative, but more like 
abstract painting in which the viewer completes the message. Form and content 
ultimately are given over to the viewer’s gaze. 
Another aspect of the finding from ekphrasis is that messages are present in 
vanitas pieces and that memento mori and the content metaphor are part of the history of 
metaphor as a rhetorical device as much as any system of visual symbols. The section 
explored the prevalence of metaphor in the Aristotelian and Calvinist traditions that 
inform vanitas art, as well as how metaphor was employed by period art critics. 
Ekphrasis shows how the forms of vanitas are not merely instrumental, but fundamental 
to the composition of the painting’s thought content, specifically, to achieve the rhetorical 
objective: to teach and to persuade. The paradox is that the viewer must juxtapose the 
objects (forms) of desire in the visible world with the ideological virtue of eschewing 
vanities. The memento mori message—remember, all die—establishes a distance to the 
genre’s own origin that it never reaches. Instead, it fixes the ephemeral in the form. To 
decipher an object’s symbolic meaning is to perceive form itself through sight. 
Third, the epideictic lens revealed a milieu deeply invested in the primacy of 
sight. Sight is critical in discerning through the material form moral virtue. Epideictic 
was the visual display of moral virtue in the excellent technique of the artist. The term 
asserts through vanitas the central nature of visual experience, the material object, and 
the strategy of displaying composition, color, and brushwork—elegant form ornamented 
in meticulous details—as Steenwyck’s Vanitas has shown. The centrality of sight 
contributed to the remarkable grace in the genre’s visual display, a strategy for bringing 
things before the viewer’s eyes. 
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Epideictic explains why vanitas painting is an overwhelming feast for the eyes. 
The choice of what to see articulates a patron’s desire and identity. For example, the 
forms of display in vanitas painting—the sword, the books, expensive silk—are 
emotional expressions of desire painted in visual form. Amid such a profusion of things 
to see, viewers would necessarily have to develop a measure of visual skill including the 
understanding that paintings were meant to be read and understood as a relationship of 
one thing to another. Epideictic links vanitas to the aesthetic rhetorical objective of 
technique intended to delight the senses. The painting seems actively to subvert the 
persuasiveness of realism: the play of illusion inevitably displays the materiality of the 
painting. 
Where Catholic painting opens effortlessly into sacred scenes and celestial spaces, 
Netherlandish vanitas has exactly no route toward the transcendental that the eye may 
take. Access is broken; the right-angle detour of the form through content is the 
expression of an ensnarement of the world, which nothing can overcome. Although 
Albertian painting is built on the window to the world and conveys the viewer to infinity, 
vanitas knows nothing of this escape into other worlds: its purview cannot get beyond the 
nearest objects. The pressing nearness of one object to another harbors a force of gravity 
and inertia nothing can escape. The transcendental can be sensed only in the inability to 
reach it. Moreover, the agonistic representation of the gravity of the word of God and the 
inertia of the warning in the idea of vanitas ensnared by the desire for things embodies a 
certain type of failure. On the other hand, the spectrums show the overwhelming appeal 
of enticements to pleasure. Ironically, vanitas painting exhibits an obvious weakness: the 
paintings appealed to a certain class and were expensive collectable commodities. As 
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such, the paintings assumed the status of vanitas objects themselves. 
The viewing practices of ekphrasis and epideictic help locate the principle place 
of metaphor, illusion, and sight in the Dutch Baroque world. I have shown how the 
viewing practices functioned as dialectical types of visual syntaxes so that the metaphor 
could be read through form. 
Fourth, in order to validate the practice of making this genre, painters in the 17th 
century milieu consciously and reflexively appealed to particular audiences who 
purchased the genre. Through its peculiar content and form, meaning and illusion, vanitas 
painting is a genre commodity culturally linked to a class of wealthy merchants. Patrons 
share an identity of understanding the vanity and impermanence of the visible world 
represented through alluring forms. The prestige is in owning the peculiar art that enables 
the pious, wealthy viewer to contemplate the eternal invisible world through sumptuous 
form. If carefully guided, the memento mori message and forms could put the viewer on 
the path to God. The fissure between vanitas form and content are mirrors that reflect 
both the acceptance and the renunciation of material things in the 17th century Dutch 
world. 
As devotional painting, the genre not only reflects the social and religious 
environment, aesthetic technique, and sensibility in early 17th century Holland; it helped 
fuel the early art market. Bourgeois artistic and financial interests in painting direct 
attention to social status as well as material wealth. Since the heart of the art market 
before the Protestant Reformation lay in overtly religious imagery, vanitas painting offers 
the viewer a circuitous route to devotion. The struggle between the constancy of world 
rejection and the performance of that message as a costly work of art caught in the toils 
 165
of worldliness is not simply a rhetorical misfortunate. 
I have made the case that the ideological underpinning of vanitas art reflects and 
contemplates the visible world primarily from the perspective of the ancient rhetoric. The 
point is less to view vanitas as a pictorial system of visual codes and symbols than it is to 
examine how vanitas paintings function as instruments of rhetorical fissure that 
differentiate meaning (content) from appearance (form), but ultimately how vanitas relies 
on an intermingled blend. The terms show how the terms of classical rhetoric inform the 
origins of an art that was meant to instruct, to be read and enjoyed. 
What happened around 1600 was that prosaic objects displayed in paintings 
subversively emphasize and deemphasize orders of desire. Whatever else they might be, 
encounters with vanitas paintings animate moral presumptions about what constitutes the 
worthwhile and worthless, the praiseworthy and blameworthy, the significant and 
insignificant. Epideictic display is beauty in the luminosity of virtuous representation 
juxtaposed in the ekphrasic didactic of moral values and death. 
Vanitas painting seeks meaning in the odd assortment of objects. The quiet 
intimacy of meaning is the disquieting meditation that life is death. Vanitas painting is 
the evolution of death to beauty. The metaphor beauty is death is a distraction and a 
dislocation of aesthetic evaluation. Beauty and death suspend time—the rhetoric and 
verisimilitude embedded in the peculiar art. 
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Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see them, 
depend on the Arts that influenced us. To look at a thing is very different 
from seeing a thing. One does not see anything until one sees its beauty. 
Oscar Wilde 
The goal of this dissertation was to extend the scope of visual rhetoric by reviving 
classical rhetorical concepts to better account for the role of aesthetics in visual rhetoric, 
specifically in the rhetoric of works of art. The goal is important because it calls attention 
to aesthetics as a fundamental aspect of rhetoric; indeed, Poetics shows that rhetoric 
circumscribed aesthetics. This perspective challenged the conventional assumption that 
rhetoric and aesthetics were different phenomena.1 Though they do seem oppositional, 
they designate two kinds of discourse and concomitant sets of assumptions about works 
of art. The dilemma of how art’s cultural meanings and artistic properties interweave is 
partly resolved, as Sidney Zink observed, by recognizing that the perspectives are 
themselves particular qualities of art; they require different types of analyses.2 
The dissertation extrapolates from specific classical theories and concepts, 
especially those of Aristotle, as a way to understand viewing practices from the history; 
                                                          
1 Kant proposes a new relationship between rhetoric and aesthetics. He draws a contrast between rhetoric 
and poetry. The task of the rhetorician and the task of the poet stand in inverse relationship to one another. 
In Kant’s estimation rhetoric and poetry are not just opposed but are also crossed in their purposes. Critique 
of Judgment, “Analytic of the Sublime,” Immanuel Kant, Werner S. Pluhar, trans.(1986, 184; 1995), 207. 
2 “The Poetic Organism,” (The Journal of Philosophy, XL11: 1945), 119–120. 
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history is nonetheless important as context for the examinations. The major claim is that 
audiences used rhetoric and aesthetics as unique perspectives to view and to read works 
of art.3 Specifically, the rhetorical lens of ekphrasis was used to explore cultural meaning 
in works of art. Epideictic was used as an aesthetic lens; it examined emotion and artistic 
technique. In the dissertation, two case studies explored actors’ portrayal of pity and fear 
in tragedian drama and, in another case, cultural meaning (content) and aesthetic 
properties (form) in Dutch vanitas painting. The five sections in this conclusion—
principal theme, strategies, vocabulary, seminal literature, and findings and 
contribution—explain how these particular works of art communicate rhetorically. 
Investigating the way audiences may have practiced the rhetorics of viewing 
demonstrate how viewing is itself a communicative artifact, as Sonja Foss clarifies in 
“Theory of Visual Rhetoric,”4 “. . . human behavior operates within the domain of visual 
rhetoric. . . . in all the visual ways humans try to communicate.”5 Cara Finnegan says 
visual rhetoric is “a mode of inquiry defined as a critical and theoretical orientation that 
makes issues of appearance and visuality relevant to rhetorical theory. Visual rhetoric is 
sensory expression of cultural meaning, as opposed to aesthetic considerations.”6 
I departed from Finnegan to argue with Foss and Lawrence Rosenfield that 
sensory expression of cultural meaning is aesthetic meaning. As mimetic representation 
examined in Poetics and Rhetoric, aesthetic meaning embraces emotional and material 
expression in works of art in aesthetic ways while still advancing symbolic meaning and 
                                                          
3 Aristotle did not use the word “aesthetics”; rather, I am interpreting his theory of emotion as aesthetics 
taken from the word feeling. 
4 Sonja K. Foss, “Theory of Visual Rhetoric,” Handbook of Visual Communication: Theory, Methods, and 
Media, Ken Smith; Sandra Moriatry; Keith Barbatsis, (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 
2005), 4. 
5 Ibid., 141–152. 
6 “Visual Studies and Visual Rhetoric” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90(2), 243–247. 
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cultural interpretation. Rather than dichotomy, the dissertation offered dialectic. Few 
studies have probed these issues together. The perspective expressed the dissertation’s 
originality and how it contributed to the subfield of visual rhetoric. 
I showed in the dissertation how works of art epitomized for viewers a 
conundrum. This is partly due to cultural and religious peculiarities and partly due to 
indigenous aspects of representation in certain milieus. Examining the conundrum is one 
of the reasons why the dissertation is important and why it matters to visual rhetoric. I 
have demonstrated throughout how audiences scrutinized works of art—what they 
thought they saw and what they thought they knew—to examine cultural perspectives and 
artistic intentions and to explore how artists achieved effects and how affects were 
produced. Moreover, I showed how situated audiences ascertained truth values in works 
of art. I referred to this idea of truth value as verisimilitude, from which the dissertation 
takes its name, Rhetoric of Verisimilitude. 
Verisimilitude has its roots in Platonic and Aristotelian dramatic theory of 
mimesis, or artist representation.7 Aristotle observed that works of art through mimesis 
reveal their quintessence through verisimilitude.8 As a type of rhetorical theory, 
verisimilitude, together with mimesis, raises questions: how is one medium mediated 
through another medium; what is the difference between looking at art and seeing art; 
what are audiences looking at when they see art; how does strategy operate in works of 
                                                          
7 The classical notion of verisimilitude focused on the role of the reader and the reader’s engagement in a 
fictional work of art. The work of art had to facilitate the reader’s willingness to suspend disbelief, a phrase 
originated by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in the Romantic age. Through verisimilitude then, the reader was 
able to glean truth even through fiction because it would reflect realistic aspects of human life. See note 45. 
8 As fiction, art both instructs and offers pleasure according to Poetics. Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism, gen ed. Vincent B. Leitch (W.E. Norton & Company Inc., New York), 90–117; Aristotle. 
Poetics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927; Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor” American Journal of 
Philology 118 (1997), 517. 
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art to produce rhetorical affect and effect. 
An early example of my experience with verisimilitude occurred when I visited 
my city’s children’s library when I was in the third grade. I was smitten by a book of 
paintings by the artist Diego Rivera. Rivera’s art seemed ready-made for a child’s eye. I 
checked out the book; my-eight-year old fingers tried to copy the figures. Although I 
could not have known it then, I later realized the chunky blocks of primary colors and 
thick outlines were Rivera’s visual strategy for achieving a Cubist effect. From that day 
on, I began to understand that works of art—painting and the fine arts—could touch me 
and teach me about life in ways that I had never imagined.9 
Even now I am drawn to the idea of what creates verisimilitude in works of art: in 
the dissertation, what makes works of art of a particular milieu resonate with its audience 
enabling them to think and feel a certain way. For me, the most interesting works of art 
display thought, look back at us, and evoke strong feelings. Lawrence Prelli captured this 
thought: “When art displays, it engages with [my italics] those who become audience to 
it.”10 Through verisimilitude, works of art—although they may not necessarily be 
realistic—may be plausible. “As often as language teaches us to see,” Michael Ann Holly 
wrote, “art instructs us in telling.”11 
Section 1: Theme 
Emotion was the principal theme that reoccurred as I examined the two works of 
art, tragic drama and vanitas painting. I showed how emotion beguiled and bewildered 
                                                          
9 Most of us cannot be good at everything; recognizing that has made me work at the things I can do well. 
Studying rhetoric, the fine arts, and philosophy has made me want to think strategically and write better. 
10 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 3–4. 
11 Past Looking: Historical Imagination and the Rhetoric of the Image (Ithaca:Cornell University 
Press,1996), 11. 
177 
the viewer. This is because artistic effects produce emotion. Particular emotions—pity 
and fear, desire and pleasure—are highlighted in each work of art. 
“Comparing Pity and Fear in Rhetoric and Poetics,” (Chapter 2) discussed how 
actors in a Greek tragic play should endeavor to bring pity and fear before the eyes of the 
viewer. The discourse in Poetics instructed the playwright on how to write a tragic play. 
Aristotle reminded the poet what to consider: what is pity, what is fear and how should 
actors portray these emotions. Moreover, Aristotle defined a theory of emotion. Although 
he does not develop this theory at any length (a few lines in Poetics), his theory carried 
significant weight in defining tragic drama: 
Tragedy, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also complete in itself; in 
language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts 
of the work; in a dramatic, not a narrative form. . . with incidents arousing pity 
and fear.12 
One function of tragic plays is that it is an outlet for viewer feelings, especially pity and 
fear. Chapter 2 demonstrated how tragic plays and pity and fear created a rhetorical space 
for a story to be told and emotions to be communicated. The heroes’ tragedy created a 
peculiar sympathy between actor and viewer. Aristotle suggested that to have compassion 
for a character is no different from having compassion for another human being. The 
actor’s performance should convey pity and fear for what will yet befall the hero. If the 
actor is successful, the actor’s pain becomes the viewer’s pain. 
For example, Oedipus is not truly noble, but who are we? Will the viewer dare to 
find out? The portrayals and sad end of the play arouse in the viewer pity and fear; 
paradoxically, it arouses pleasure as the play resolves. The universality of human 
suffering shows how pity or pathos is more an aesthetic emotion produced through 
                                                          
12 Aristotle, Poet. VI. 
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rhetorical affects rather than culturally produced even in fiction. 
In Chapter 3, I showed how intricate and intimate art works from the Dutch 17th 
century seduce the viewer emotionally through the use of varied textures, invisible 
brushstrokes, hatch marks, and rich layers of glistening paint. “Rhetoric of Vanitas” 
explains this strategy of how aesthetic forms and symbolic content engender in the 
viewer feelings of religious piety, at the same time, desire for wealth. 
The chapter presented a similar emotional theme as that of Chapter 2. Embedded 
in vanitas painting is pity for the souls of the dead and the fear of the precariousness and 
brevity of earthly life. A metaphor of religious devotion from Ecclesiastes warns, Vanity, 
vanity, all is vanity.13 The message—God should be placed above things worldly—is 
pictured in an odd assortment of forms signifying wealth and knowledge. 
The ephemeral metaphor is symbolic but, as I explain, transmits viscerally: 
concerns for the vain things of this world are bound up—in forms of desire—with the 
painting’s background void signifying the world of the dead. The metaphor becomes 
clear: it is intended to produce fear: transitory fixation on material things corrupts and 
corruption is absolute in Calvin’s view of the world. On the other hand, iconic forms—
books, silk, a shell—presented not only beauty and riches but also inspired spiritual 
contemplation: rather like a meditation14 on the impermanence of the state of humankind 
in the face of the unavoidable and ever-present threat of death. The viewer understands 
the message of the brevity of life and humankind’s vanity in desiring things of the world. 
Rhetorically, however, vanitas painting is probably less an exhortation to virtue than to 
                                                          
13 Authorized Version of the English Bible 1611. 6 vols. Wright, William Aldis, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1909), in Koozin, 8, note 1. 
14 Diptychs were common forms of meditation for the Dutch in the later part of the 16th century. 
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pleasure. Irrespective of the enticement, I posited the lesson of vanitas painting that its 
viewing cannot be rushed; the peculiar art required contemplation. 
Powerful metaphors aided visualization in vanitas painting. Indeed, Aristotle says 
writers should ornament [my italics] their words and images so the listener can see 
things.15 
There is an element of surprise which is part of the strength of the phrase; the 
hearer associates (sees) one thing in his mind with another…To evoke emotion is 
to visualize…[to create] delight and surprise...[therefore] his acquisition of the 
new idea impresses him all the more.16 The result produces…liveliness…by using 
the proportional metaphor and that the best of these should be graphic.17 
I presented the quote from Poetics to emphasize how visual effect creates emotional 
affect, “. . . to evoke emotion is to visualize. . . [to create] delight and surprise.”18 The 
case study in the chapter concerns Dutch painter, Harmen Steenwyck. The painter used 
the metaphoric signifier, all is vanity, to indicate forms of the painting: a candle, a shell, 
books of learning, etc. The painting’s understated tones sharpened the authority and 
emotional appeal of his painting. It was thought in 17th century Holland that producing a 
painting worthy of praise was based on the rules of rhetoric, the liberal arts, and good 
writing. Prelli echoed this idea: “Works of art display rhetorically and rhetorics enact 
display.”19 
                                                          
15 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1404b. 
16 Aristotle is drawing on the association between learning and pleasure in Poet. 4,1448b2ff. Much of what 
was written about painting up to the 17th century was taken from Poetics. 
17 Aristotle, Rhet. III, 1404b; 1411. A powerful metaphor is affective because, as Aristotle shows, it evokes 
a personified human emotion and activity that the hearer can visualize. 
Rhetoric describes what metaphor does for the reader: “Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm 
and distinction as nothing else can . . . the best of these should be graphic. By “graphic,” Aristotle means 
that writers, by extension painters, should cause the viewer to see things. Therefore metaphor brings about 
emotion when it is full of graphic description, as in “with his vigor in full bloom,” and “bringing [objects 
and emotions] before the eyes.” 
18 Aristotle, Poet. XXI, 21, 1457b 1–30: “. . . metaphor [consists] in giving the thing a name belongs to 
something else, the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from 
species to species, or on the grounds of analogy. . .”; Rhet. III 1404b. 
19 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 3–4. 
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Tragedian drama and vanitas painting demonstrated that emotion is at the 
intersection of two worlds: the objective world of reality—how human behavior collides 
with events beyond reach—and the subjective world of desire, and choice. For example, 
the fateful world of reality is existential. Objective reality in nature and in institutions 
demonstrate the insignificance and powerlessness of humans against such powers. 
Humans are at the mercy of the forces of nature that would reduce them to dust. In the 
tragic play and in vanitas painting, reality presents a human condition where humans are 
hardly in control. Instead, humans are tiny specs in a vast design of uncertain duration 
living in an unpredictable world. Each work of art expressed the human desire for 
pleasure against the backdrop of inevitable human suffering. Audiences—then and 
now—view works of art as the collision between the capricious indifferent world and 
subjective desires. In the Attic and in the Dutch 17th century the interweaving of the two 
worlds through mimesis is always in play. Just as emotions produced through effects in 
the works of art reminded viewers of the buffetings inherent in life, modern works of art 
continue the tradition of reminding viewers that humans are pummeled between two 
worlds. 
Although tragic plays are narrative and vanitas painting is theoretically not 
narrative, the analyses of the works of art showed how we are our stories. Presented 
through theory, visual effects and affects, the works of art in the dissertation presented 
journeys into the wider world of cultures and behaviors through the rhetoric of cultural 
and religious customs and through fraught emotions. The works of art showed how we, 
all of us, are beset by emotions and swayed by visual effect. Next, I discuss particular 
visual strategies in the chapters. 
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Section 2: Visual Strategies 
In each case study I showed how the poet and artist increase the symbolic, artistic, 
and emotional impact of works of art by using particular strategies. The chapters are not 
making historical claims about actual audiences, rather rhetorical claims about the 
strategies of Attic actors performing tragedian drama and plausible responses of 17th 
century audiences who might have viewed displays of vanitas paintings. These are 
rhetorics of display, as Prelli says. I examined pity and fear in Chapter 2, including the 
ekphrasiac metaphor and briefly discussed the two lenses ekphrasis and epideictic as 
methods of examining visual discourse. 
Through ekphrasis I examined a cultural symbolic perspective; through epideictic 
I explored an aesthetic perspective. The perspectives were each represented as rhetorical 
strategies that interwove across the chapters. Rather than antithetical, the viewing 
practices offer different assumptions and approaches. 
Metaphor is the trope of appearance in Chapter 2 captured in the metaphorical 
phrase bringing-before-the-eyes.20 The primary ekphrasiac device used throughout the 
dissertation is the metaphor, identified in both Rhetoric and Poetics. As an effective 
strategy for producing plausible affects, Aristotle relies on the metaphor. In Rhetoric, 
Aristotle says metaphor most brings about learning and is thoroughly employed in 
memorable insights Aristotle admired, especially by Homer, who produced vivid imagery 
in well-chosen metaphoric phrases. For example, when [Homer] calls old age stubble, he 
creates understanding and knowledge21 by using “vivid metaphor.”22 Aristotle added that 
                                                          




the metaphor creates not only learning, but also makes learning pleasant. 
The claim in Chapter 2 is that when Attic actors depict pity and fear on the 
dramatic stage, they are engaging with strategic techniques of rhetorical display, 
especially metaphor. Comparing how pity and fear were rendered in Rhetoric and 
Poetics, I showed specifically how actors should use gestures and movement as rhetoric 
to perform the emotions of pity and fear. How the metaphor operates was the critical 
aspect of the chapter. Poetics IX says that the end of the tragedy is bringing pity and fear 
before the eyes.23 This metaphor commutes and engenders empathic understanding. 
When the hero is unjustly reviled, the viewer feels pity for his plight, compassion the 
Attic viewer could then carry into everyday life. The metaphor draws attention to how 
sensory expressions and emotions of pity and fear are performed and mediated by actors 
and communicated to the Attic viewer.24 
Poetics discusses epideictic effects of gestures, speech, song, music, stage design, 
and dance.25 Because Poetics emphasizes both affect and effect, it is apparent that 
Aristotle’s interest in literary art led him to ask what those devices are and how dramatic 
art should achieve them. For example, the word, theatre connotes special effects.26 The 
special effects in classical drama shed light on the nature of the Theatre of Dionysus in 
the 5th century BCE.27 
                                                          
23 Aristotle, Poet. IX. 
24 Rather than being suspicious of Greek drama, as Plato was, Aristotle embraced the arts because of the 
way that they arouse the passions. 
25 Scholars consistently emphasize the elusive and protean meanings of the concept of theatricality. 
Postlewait and Tracy’s critique attempts to produce a general theory of theatricality insisting that the term 
be used in analyzing cultural performances in specific times and places. Theatricality. Postlewait and Tracy 
(Boston: Cambridge University Press), 2003. 
26 The ancient ancestor of theatre is theatron. The term is defined as to see, to watch, and to observe, 
especially in dramatic representation, Webster’s Dictionary. 
27 Specifically, the building opened up to reveal an interior scene. The device was called by the Greeks the 
ekkylema (roll-out) because a wheeled platform on which an interior scene would be set rolled out from the 
building through the main door into the audiences’ view. It is believed that Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (458 
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When he talked about events, Aristotle used the baffling visual phrase, “close at 
hand.”28 The phrase might have related to drawing on certain cultural myths or on the 
importance of actors displaying the proper proportion of pity and fear29 so that period 
audiences felt emotions close at hand. Another visual strategy related to actors portraying 
emotions. An actor should appear convincing in his portrayal.30 Poetics says actors 
should not speak too effusively nor understate the point. Pity and fear should be 
performed in golden mean fashion, not too much emotion, not too little. Pity and fear 
should transmit from the Attic actor to the viewer in the same way words transfer 
meaning in a metaphor.31 Specifically, pity drew the viewer toward the hero who is 
propelled by his undeserved fate. In contrast, fear made the viewer recoil from what 
threatened him. When actors performed pity and fear, a situated audience was given a 
reliable way to judge the quality of the hero’s character. 
In Chapter 3, I showed how the ekphrasic metaphor is considered affective, a 
commonplace in religious sermons of the Reformed Church of the 17th century in 
Holland. In reference to vanitas painting, I showed how the invention of symbolic 
meaning and iconic artistic techniques were peculiar to vanitas painting of the milieu. 
Ekphrasis and epideictic expanded the means whereby period audiences might have 
viewed the visual text, how cultural symbolic judgment and aesthetic judgment presented 
                                                          
BCE) required such a revelation; therefore, the ekkyklema probably came into use during the first half of 
the 5th century BCE. This makes it one of the earliest special effects on record.27 Greek theatron was 
discussed in Poetics as a place where actors presented an imagined event before a live audience. 
28 Aristotle, Rhet., 1386b. 
29 Lawrence J. Flynn, “Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy: Culture Memory and Performance in 
Isocrates and Aristotle,” (Quarterly Journal of Speech 87, 2001), 168; Martha C Nussbaum, “Tragedy and 
Self-Sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on Fear and Pity,” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10 1992), 
107–59; Gerald Watson, ‘Phantasia in Aristotle (Classical Quarterly 32, 1982), 100–113. De Anima 3.3. 
30 Aristotle, Poet. XIV. 
31 Taken from the Greek metaphora, “transfer”; metaphero is to carry over, “to transfer.” 
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two perspectives of rhetorical analyses. I indicated how vanitas painting is a type of 
visual syntax created so that the metaphor could be read through form. Reading 
painting’s metaphor (content) through material form is quasi-religious, but the message 
displayed in the form itself is decidedly secular. The ephemeral metaphor was biblically 
symbolic but transmitted viscerally: concerns for the vain things of this world are bound 
up with the void of the world of the dead and pictured in elegant forms of desire. 
Allegory—although a commonplace for 17th century audiences and a reference for 
contemporary audiences—is not used in the chapter. This is because of my claim that 
vanitas painting was read as metaphor and not allegory that requires a supportive story. 
The epideictic emphasized how visual effects were pictured as conspicuous 
appeals to the eye demonstrated in the use of indigenous visual techniques.32 In vanitas 
painting, epideictic signifies aesthetic excellence and cultural meaning: the most stunning 
visual effect in vanitas painting is conveyed by an immediate and universal symbol of 
mortality, not necessarily beautiful. The desirable wealth of the world intermingles with a 
symbol of transient life, a skull. The painting invites the viewer to solve an intimate 
rhetorical puzzle pictured in sumptuously painted forms such as those displayed in 
Herman Steenwyck’s Vanities painting. The rhetorical puzzle is how delight is possible 
in an odd assortment of unrelated, often morbid objects. One probable answer lay in 
enticing and elegant techniques—subtle muted tones, simplicity of composition—painted 
visual effects representing forms of desire and the fragility of human existence. 
                                                          
32 Lawrence Rosenfield’s reading of Aristotle shows that the purpose of epideictic is simply and solely to 
display the luminosity of timeless excellence. It makes known and shows forth an idea or image or 
techniques of excellence in order to persuade us to gaze at the presumed moral aura glowing from within 
works of art. The interpretation emphasizes that effects of technique combine with moral affects to edify 
audiences. Rosenfield asserts that the fleeting nature of the appearance of excellence is in the present 
moment rather than a sustained reality. 
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Visual affect is created by an unusual assortment of forms—not only the skull, but 
a candle, purple silk, books of science, a rare shell—that intrude abruptly before the eyes. 
Period audiences came to recognize these forms and the prescribed techniques of 
presentation as the vanitas effect of display. Much of vanitas’ appeal lies in this 
rhetorical strategy—layers of texture, muted tones, and brushstrokes that create a glow 
and hyperrealistic effect—generating the painting’s overall dramatic form. Perspective 
loses its vanishing point in the darkness of the void; the peculiar art does not glow in 
veneration, but instead it looks out on its audience in all of its subjectivities. What exactly 
are audiences observing in the representation of an odd assortment of unrelated objects 
set on a chipped wood table pictured against a void backdrop? The genre does not allow 
for a simple analysis. Uncanny in its immediacy, vanitas painting is at once beautiful and 
otherworldly. It challenges the reliability of the audiences’ optical capacities: precisely 
the thing that mimesis provokes. 
Section 3: Vocabulary 
This selection of key terms that follows undergirds the dissertation’s purpose, 
goals, and research questions. The terms cohere across chapters standing in relationship 
to other terms. I discuss aesthetics, ekphrasis and epideictic, mimesis, and verisimilitude. 
Aesthetics, as a specific term, was not considered by Aristotle. However, he 
thought works of art involved imitation (mimesis) of events and actions. As mentioned, 
tragedy is an imitation “not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery.”33 
Therefore, tragedy may be a form of education because it provides moral insight. 
Concepts such as sight, perception, cognition, visualization, imagination, emotion, and 
                                                          
33 Aristotle, Poet. VI. 
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form are foundational to Poetics and Rhetoric and to the chapters and can be interpreted 
collectively as visual and emotional theories of aesthetics. 
Aesthetics summons in viewers empathy for the hero in a moving performance of 
dramatic tragedy. Aesthetics is the sumptuous material surface of a vanitas painting. In 
the expressive ways humans experience and respond to art, aesthetics is an emotional and 
sensuous aspect of rhetoric that elevates the viewer to a new level of conscious and 
unconscious awareness. Aesthetics and emotion present the paradox of fiction in which 
the viewer responds with intense emotions to art, in the same moment of knowing that the 
art is fiction. 
Ekphrasis is the theory and rhetorical viewing practice defined as vivid 
description, especially metaphor. The tradition of the ekphrasic trope evolved from 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics. Richard Moran says, “It is no exaggeration to say that 
the primary virtue of metaphor for Aristotle is the ability [my italics] to set something 
vividly before the eyes of the audience.”34 Moran’s point emphasizes that the visual 
capacity of bringing-before-the-eyes35 is a perceptive activity that makes inanimate things 
appear alive. I. A. Richards has called bringing pity and fear before the eyes the most 
enigmatic metaphor36 introduced first in Poetics. 
In Chapter 3, ekphrasis defines the content of vanitas painting and performs two 
purposes: 1) it describes context or identity of a particular historical culture, and 2) it 
concerns the symbolic content of vanitas painting such as the way a skull symbolizes 
death. 
                                                          
34 Sara Newman, Aristotle and Style (Lewiston, NY, Edwin Mellon Press, 2005), 232; Rhet. 1410b. 
35 Aristotle, Rhet., 1410b; Poet. IX. 
36 I.A. Richards, Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory. 
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The epideictic shapes and cultivates “. . . basic codes of values and beliefs by 
which a society or culture lives. It shapes the ideologies and imaginaries . . . the deep 
commitments . . . constituting the very grounds of culture with which a society shapes 
itself.”37 According to Jeffery Walker. Epideictic praises what is virtuous or noble and 
“fit for display.”38 Rosenfield explains epideictic is, “to shine or show forth.”39 
In the dissertation, epideictic is the lens of rhetoric’s aesthetic judgment. The term 
describes aesthetic virtues in Chapters 2 and 3 such as excellence in an actor’s technical 
performance and in artistic form of technique and skill evident in vanitas painting. 
Epideictic is a theoretical criticism that rests on the assertion of the priority of 
sight: a sensory experience through form expressed through color and artistic technique 
that depicts symbolic content. 
Mimesis is central to the dissertation’s notion of artistic expression—the 
characteristics that distinguish a work of art from other human phenomena. Strictly 
speaking, it is not a copy or imitation, rather an artistic representation. The meaning of 
mimesis is to embody or enact likeness from material form, such as the form of dramatic 
tragedy. Aristotle says that the visual action of placing objects (or emotion as object) 
before the mind’s eye is a mimetic action. 
In Rhetoric and Poetics the language of art is fundamentally mimetic, not 
symbolic. Mimesis links intimately to aesthetics in that each term relates to emotion. 
Stephen Halliwell says of mimesis, 
. . . Aristotle’s idea of mimesis [places] the mimetic medium [at the center of] . . . 
aesthetic understanding. . . [Mimesis] cannot be limited to matching a copy with a 
known original, nor can it be reduced to the merely factual and immediate 
                                                          
37 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, “Introduction,” 3, 4; 154. 
38 Ibid., 3. 
39 Ibid. 
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registering that a certain kind of thing has been represented.40 
Mimesis helps explain how the viewer suspends disbelief to enable fiction’s emotional 
impact and visual immediacy, for example in a protagonist’s emotionally moving 
performance.41 
The “imitation of an action” is mimetic according to “the law of probability or 
necessity,”42 explained in Chapter 2. Tragedy deals with the necessary and ever-present 
problem of human suffering. Yet through mimesis, pity and fear may be so convincing 
and emotionally satisfying, the viewer feels healed of suffering. This is the peculiar 
pleasure43 associated with dramatic tragedy. 
Mimesis in Dutch vanitas painting has two meanings: Harmen Steenwyck’s 
Vanitas demonstrates mimetic representation in its particular treatment of the subject. 
Second, mimesis is a moral conceit cloaked in aesthetic pleasure; it invites the viewer 
into a sardonic understanding of the relationship between vanity and worldly objects. In 
sum, mimesis emphasizes the visual representation and materiality of works of art just as 
the aesthetic emphasizes the viewers’ response. 
Verisimilitude is a theory of plausibility and appearance. Each chapter 
emphasizes both of these aspects and relies on bringing-before-the-eyes. Rhetoric of 
Verisimilitude (the name of the dissertation) is more theoretical than practical because 
                                                          
40 The aesthetics of mimesis: ancient texts and moderns problems (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2002), 91. 
41 Poetics is Aristotle’s treatise on mimesis. He stated that human beings are mimetic beings: they create 
texts (art) that reflect and represent reality. Malcolm Heath, Poetics, Penguin Classics (London: New York, 
N.Y, 1996). 
42 Aristotle, Poet. IX. 
43 Amelie Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 255. 
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verisimilitude appeals to imagination and the plausibility44 of how art is a type of fiction. 
I have used the term in the classical sense that focuses on the role of the situated viewer 
or reader of art and how that period viewer mediates—symbolically or aesthetically—
works of art. More than a copy of nature and reality, verisimilitude is a type of truth 
likeness. In the chapters, verisimilitude re-presents a plausible reality in visual form and 
cultural content in ancient tragic drama and vanitas painting. The audience pictures the 
events through verisimilitude if disbelief is suspended.45 
The term defines the framework and overall theme of the dissertation: works of 
art caught at the intersection between material display and selective meaning imposed by 
situated audiences.46 
Section 4: Seminal Texts 
In this section, I justify the claim that works of art are appropriate vehicles for 
rhetorical and aesthetic investigation by showing how seminal texts guided my research. 
Works of art are often overlooked in the subfield of visual rhetoric or simply appropriated 
as vehicles for social change. Some current literatures approach the study of works of art 
purely from an epistemological perspective; the study of how emotion and aesthetic 
feeling contribute to the rhetoric of works of art is dismissed out of hand. The three texts 
I reviewed in Chapter 1 supported the view that rhetoric embraces aesthetics as it pertains 
                                                          
44 Martin Heidegger wrote “the possible ranks higher than the actual.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. by Joan Stambaugh, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2010), introduction. 
45 The term suspension of disbelief was initially suggested in 1817 by Samuel Coleridge in Biographia 
Literaria. An example of suspension of disbelief is Robert Welkos’ “From ‘King Kong’ to ‘Indecent 
Proposal’” quoted in The Los Angeles Times, 15 April, 1993. Audiences were asked to accept a premise 
that can make or break a film. 
46 “. . . the Greeks and the Elizabethans, in one cultural form; Hellenes and Christians, in a common 
activity,” as Raymond Williams puts it. Williams, 1966, 16. 
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to the special matters of hearing, seeing, and emotion, subjects addressed by Aristotle. 
The three seminal texts that guided the dissertation are Poetics and Rhetoric by 
Aristotle and Rhetorics of Display, edited by Lawrence Prelli. The texts’ discussion of 
mimesis, epideictic, and ekphrasis helped to narrow the scope of verisimilitude. 
Selected portions of Poetics and Rhetoric emphasized the visual theory of 
bringing-before-the-eyes and the discussions of mimesis and metaphor. As mentioned, 
Poetics is Aristotle’s theory of dramatic tragedy. I showed how this discontinuous 
tradition of drama played an important role in aesthetics, helped to define tragic drama in 
Western civilization, and was used to evoke power in cultural identity.47 Poetics is the 
first systematic essay in literary and emotional (aesthetic) theory. The text remains the 
definitive blueprint for playwrights and actors: instructing them on how a tragedy should 
be performed, how to create a unified plot, how the characters should be revealed by 
action, and how the action should turn on a well-constructed plot aided by visual effects. 
As mentioned above, Chapter 2 examined how expressions of pity and fear compare in 
both Rhetoric and Poetics by specifically investigating the notion of how bringing pity 
and fear before the eyes of the viewer occurred: how pity and fear is a performance of 
rhetorical affect actors used to produce those affects. The tragedian play is based 
primarily on the foundation of the plot. 
The claim in Rhetorics of Display is that the interdependent concepts of rhetoric 
and display as appearance have consequences. I framed key ideas for Chapter 3 from 
terms and ideas presented in the text. From Lawrence Prelli, for example, I developed the 
idea that images are ubiquitous; they surround us, “compete for our attention, and make 
                                                          
47 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 1–2. 
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claims upon us.”48 This idea was central to my theory of viewer perspectives. In what 
follows, I briefly mention four ideas from Prelli that guided Chapter 3: how epideictic 
and ekphrasis are viewing practices, insights regarding epideictic viewing and ekphrasic 
viewing, the idea of revealing and concealing, and the rhetoric of appearance as identity. 
Prelli and Rosenfield’s discussion of epideictic and ekphrasis opened the 
approach of how vanitas painting might have communicated to Dutch audiences as 
content (metaphor) and form. The method of how the terms filtered appearance from 
metaphor became the basis for how I wanted to present artistic and metaphoric properties. 
The authors’ views made concrete the idea of these terms as lenses audiences might have 
used for viewing and perceiving vanitas painting. The discussion by Rosenfield inspired 
the idea of viewing practices featured prominently in Chapter 3: how viewing perception 
framed form and content and how form was read through content. Viewing from the 
perspective of form and content evidenced the interplay between material display and the 
selected religious meaning imposed on works, ideas at the heart of the dissertation. 
Epideictic illustrated the notion of how perception for situated audiences begins 
with the awareness of having perception. Rosenfield’s epideictic as “artistic creation”49 
captured this idea. The iteration aided my understanding of how viewing works of art is a 
type of visual discerning, “. . . from the Greek ‘show forth,’ ‘make known or manifest’. . . 
Not mere display, but rather making manifest the ‘fleeting appearances’ of excellence 
that otherwise would remain ‘unnoticed or invisible.’”50 When viewers of a milieu 
“witness” art,51 they became complicit with the artifact, its effects, and with the artist. I 
                                                          
48 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 3–4. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 3–4; 153. 
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made the claim that it is plausible that an emotional transformation or aesthetic feeling 
occurred when period audiences witnessed or contemplated art because of the lure of 
art’s material display.52 
An example of epideictic through contemplation is how the term intertwined art’s 
materiality to moral virtue. The audience’s readiness to witness vanitas—to enter into 
moral seeing—hinged on the way the artist attended to techne and artistic judgment, 
considered by the viewer, “paradigms of [rhetorical] virtue.”53 
The chapter made the point that artists in 17th century Holland trained in classical 
rhetoric. For instance, Thijs Weststeijn explained that the Dutch painters Harmen 
Steenwyck and Rembrandt emerged as “rhetorical painters”; they were almost certainly 
trained in Latin rhetoric, including the techniques of mimesis, enargeia, affectus, and 
ornatus.54 Affectus and enargeia are among the “virtuous techniques” in Dutch 17th 
century art.55 Paintings were intended to lead a viewer to mirror the virtue displayed in 
excellent techne. Examples of affectus techne are chiaroscuro—the artistry of shading, 
texturing, coloring, and visual composition made familiar through Rembrandt—and 
color. Objects of desire, such as rare silk, were painted purple, the color favored by 
royalty. Fruit and flowers qualified as virtuous objects because of an artist’s exactness in 
execution. Ascribing virtue to form through epideictic resembles Aristotle’s description 
of verisimilitude56 and in the phrases, “fleeting appearance,” and “processes of artistic 
creation,”57 mentioned by Rosenfield. 
                                                          
52 Ibid., 25. 
53 Ibid., 297; the term is a commonplace in the visual culture of the 15th and 16th centuries. 
54 Weststeijn, 17, 182 ff. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Also, the Platonic and Aristotelian dramatic theory of mimesis. 
57 Prelli, 3. 
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Epideictic contemplation may, thus, have had the consequence of producing 
virtue in audiences who contemplated the excellence of form—iconic color, line, texture, 
and composition. Rosenfield’s idea of the epideictic encounter58 informed the analysis. 
Although the vanitas is commonly known for its distinctive metaphor, the epideictic and 
the encounter articulated the critical nature of artistic method and the idea of emotional 
desire in vanitas painting. The following insight by Prelli interwove these ideas, 
whether constituted through textual inscription, visual portrayal, material 
structure, enacted performances or some combination, rhetorical study of displays 
proceeds from the central idea that whatever they make manifest or appear is the 
culmination of selective processes that constrain [my italics] the range of possible 
meanings available to those who encounter them.59 
“Constrained meanings” in the chapter evolved from Prelli’s idea that whatever is 
revealed also concealed.60 The act of revealing and concealing constitutes for Prelli the 
rhetorics of display. For example, a Dutch viewer’s focus on content may have concealed 
many details of form. The question is whether the viewer located or even dwelled on the 
differences. A corollary is that vanitas painting transmitted so hypervisually—in forms of 
elegant silks, shells, books, and other finery—that the verbal message could have been 
obscured. Regardless, the point was that the culture and religion revealed the identity of 
the Dutch viewer and how that viewer observed works of art. For all intent and purposes, 
identity constrains meaning. 
The idea of how identity is revealed by means of ekphrasis and epideictic became 
clear in the chapter, “Rhetorical Display of Civic Religion.” Gregory Clark and S. 
Michael Halloran argue from Burke, “The unconscious element of persuasion which 
                                                          
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 2. 
60 Ibid. 
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identification describes has its source in the poetic motive.”61 The authors created an 
epideictic framework for identity that can be applied to art: 
Epideictic rhetoric does not argue the ideas or ideals that bind people into 
community so much as it displays them to a witnessing public. . . [Epideictic 
provides an audience] . . . the opportunity of beholding a common reality . . . 
joining with our community in giving thought to what we witness. . . [thereby 
experiencing together] the luminosity of the values and aspirations they share.62 
Through vanitas painting’s forms and the practice of reading metaphor (content) through 
form, the present-day viewer of the genre could perceive religious values of Calvinist 
audiences. Prelli captured this idea: 
Whatever manifestation displays also anticipates a responding audience whose 
expectations might be satisfied or frustrated, their values and interests affirmed, 
neglected, or challenged. The identity and behavior of particular situated 
audiences demonstrate that. . . whatever is revealed through display [of art] 
simultaneously conceals alternative possibilities . . . this is display’s rhetorical 
dimension.63 
Prelli’s short discussion of ekphrasis affirmed emphatically the rhetorical power of 
identity: “The traditional arts of rhetorical display—poetry and oratory—exhibited a 
decidedly visual consciousness parallel to that of the visual arts…Orators and poets… 
crafted examples of virtue or vice…word pictures…conducive to imaginative seeing 
through ekphrasis or detailed descriptions.”64 
The two rhetorical tropes, ekphrasis and epideictic, and the analyses in the Prelli’s 
text informed the notion of cocreation: how the audience practiced and engaged in 
viewing a painting and how painting looked back at the audience. 
Prelli, Rosenfield, Clark, and Halloran’s discussion of epideictic that includes 
ekphrasis and identity remind the reader that epideictic has been throughout Western 
                                                          
61 Ibid., 140. 
62 Ibid., 141. 
63 Prelli, Rhetorics of Display, 2. 
64 Ibid. 
195 
history a form of rhetoric that reenacts visual paradigms of virtue. Epideictic and 
ekphrasis helped to explain audiences’ impassioned and reasoned ways of viewing art 
and thinking about art as value and virtue. Although the ekphrasic metaphor grounded the 
chapter, The Rhetoric of Vanitas demonstrates that the visual experience of a work of art 
is best understood using Aristotle’s third category of the epideictic, as mentioned. 
The strength of Rhetorics of Display is that the material discussed in several 
chapters clearly established links to epideictic, visuality, and viewing as rhetorics of 
display. The reason the text was important to the dissertation is apparent in the title: The 
Rhetorics of Display. According to Prelli, rhetoric is about display—how things look or 
appear—a premise that insists on the full range of how displays operate rhetorically when 
they engage with those who become audience to them. 
The discussion in this section has tried to show how the seminal texts supported 
the idea of how situated audiences searched to locate mirror images of treasured values 
and possessions in identities of representative symbols and forms—how the genre 
typified, within the milieu, Dutch identity. 
Prelli’s attention to reinvigorating rhetoric’s focus on visualization and the role of 
the image/subject supports the heuristic of verisimilitude in the dissertation. Epideictic 
and ekphrasis illuminated the idea that works of art are types of human experience that 
include reason, judgment, and emotion. To say this differently, works of art examined 
from linguistic rhetoric and the study of discourse alone fail to extract the full range of 
human experience available from a work of art. 
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Section 5: Findings and Implications 
The analysis that follows briefly discusses key research findings important to each 
chapter. The findings support this dissertation’s thesis: through verisimilitude, works of 
art reveal the interplay between the material display (aesthetics) and cultural meaning 
(rhetoric) imposed on works by situated audiences. The thesis emphasized that period 
audiences make use of viewing practices to perceive works of art. Ekphrasis and 
epideictic were considered as rhetorical methods for viewing works of art. 
I became aware that cultural or symbolic practices and aesthetic practices of 
perception were different but not mutually exclusive. Rather, each view offered a fresh 
perspective for the viewer in conversation with the work of art. Investigating the way 
situated audiences may have practiced viewing tragic drama and vanitas painting showed 
how viewing itself mediated audience perceptions of works of art. 
Chapter 2 Key Findings 
Chapter 2 interweaves pity and fear by investigating how the emotions could be 
different but similar in meaning in Rhetoric as compared to Poetics. Chapter 4’s findings 
support the theme of emotion, the predominant theme in the dissertation, discussed 
previously. 
In the chapter, Aristotle shows how tragic emotions are performed by actors—in 
gestures and movement to communicate emotions—specifically, pity and fear. For 
example, Aristotle says actors should not speak too effusively nor understate the point. 
The chapter explained how the emotions of pity and fear are mediated through the actor 
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and received mimetically by the spectator.65 
The first finding interweaves Plato’s refuted claim: that art is an inferior appeal to 
human emotions. Aristotle’s rejoinder in Poetics shows instead that in mimetic 
performance on the tragic stage, emotions are integrated into a poetic structure. Aristotle 
shows that the focus on so-called “negative” feelings has root in our multidimensional 
natures, so negative feelings in the play educate human sympathies. This is one positive 
aspect of viewing tragic plays because dramatic tragedy mimics actual life: humans 
experience pity and fear, and they understand these feeling are painful. 
The research revealed—in a second finding I did not anticipate—that from a 
viewing perspective, situated audiences may have received performance emotionally 
(aesthetically) and cognitively (rhetorically). The idea of how an audience experiences 
relief (through catharsis, a concept I did not discuss) of the “negative emotions” of pity 
and fear complemented the view that tragedy appealed to viewers’ intelligent emotions 
(my term) or complemented the sympathetic response (finding 4 extends this idea). Pity 
and fear are not generally pared with intelligence. Aristotle shows, however, that the 
audience is drawn intellectually to the well-constructed, suspenseful plot. Although the 
viewing audience is moved emotionally, it is reasonable to conjecture that the intellect is 
stimulated as well: the audience has to make sense of how emotions become embedded in 
the well-ordered plot. 
Second, where suffering is involved, the mind grasps the fear and the body 
responds. Fear is not simply a matter of unpleasant sensations; it involves the body.66 
                                                          
65 As stated previously, by investigating the interweaving of pity and fear in the interaction between actors 
and audiences in dramatic tragedy, I draw attention to how sensory expressions and emotions of pity and 
fear are communicated and received in performances on the dramatic stage. 
66 Aristotle, De Anima, 403; 16–19. 
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Rhetoric explains that being frightened encompasses an expectation of suffering.67 
Aristotle recognized that a drop in body temperature in old age paves the way for 
fearfulness.68 Emotions thus involve a cognitive component. 
A third finding in Chapter 2 aided by Prelli was that aesthetic effects and cultural 
awareness specifically functioned in the intersection between appearance and 
concealment, between truth and belief. What was interesting was to grasp that the viewer 
of a tragedian play knows something that a character does not; for example, Oedipus does 
not know his tragic flaw. Far from being comical, actors endeavor to bring the pity and 
fear inherent in Oedipus’ actions and character before the eyes of the viewer. These 
actions may be construed to constitute how the material form interweaves with content in 
Greek tragedy. 
A fourth finding was that suspenseful emotions when skillfully constructed by 
actors, transformed, in the end, the audiences’ response of pity and fear to pleasure. The 
pleasure mentioned by Aristotle69 seemed likely an emotional relief: aesthetic pleasure 
that includes contemplation restores a sense of wholeness. In other words, the audience is 
empathically healed of suffering, so beautiful are the words and emotions. The view of a 
homeopathic theory of relief of pity and fear—one that includes empathy, cognitive 
understanding, and pleasure—demonstrated that Aristotle achieved his desired results: his 
skillful approach successfully interwove the construction of the plot, developed visual 
effects, and prompted emotional affects, holistically.70 
                                                          
67 Aristotle, Rhet., 138 2b20–34. 
68 Insight observed by W.W. Fortenbaugh, in Aristotle on Emotion. London: Gerald Duckworth Ltd., 2008, 
75–80. Also Aristotle, Rhet., 1389b20–2. 
69 Aristotle, Poet. I. 
70 Poetics is considered to have been less influential in its time compared with what is generally understood 
to be its more famous contemporary, Rhetoric. This could likely be because of Rhetoric’s direct importance 
for law and politics that it evolved to become more relevant to everyday lie. However, Rhetoric and Poetics 
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By investigating the interweaving of pity and fear in the interaction between 
actors and audiences in dramatic tragedy, I drew attention to how sensory expressions 
and emotions of pity and fear communicated rhetorically in tragedian performances on 
the dramatic stage. 
Chapter 3 Key Findings 
Vanitas painting in the Dutch 17th century was considered a type of symbolic 
work of art. The method in the chapter featured the viewing practices ekphrasis and 
epideictic to enable study of the difference between how content and form were 
represented and how they operated strategically in the painting. Two key findings are 
emphasized here and are featured in the chapter. 
The first finding highlighted the interrelationship between painting and 17th 
century viewer. Rather than simply observing vanitas painting, I posited that viewers 
understood the forms in the painting as associations of one thing to another—without a 
supportive story—more like a 20th century abstract painting. Abstract ideas of a spiritual 
nature communicated vis a vis implication. Religious metaphor (content) interwove with 
things earthly or form; content was read through form. Although vanitas painting is more 
secular than religious, familiar antecedents, such as religious diptychs and triptychs and 
secular emblem prints provided a reference for the viewer. Like the diptych, symbolic 
meaning or content was juxtaposed in sophisticated forms. Moreover, the engagement 
with the painting required from the period viewer a greater interpretative role than mere 
passive looking. The viewer was required to read the metaphor through form. 
                                                          
are two sides of the same coin because Poetics preceded Rhetoric: both are part of the aesthetic dimension 
as I have discussed. In Aristotelian philosophy, this aspect is regarded as a metaphysical aspect of things. 
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The second key finding I observed was that since what was thought to produce a 
painting worthy of praise was based on the rules of rhetoric, the liberal arts and good 
writing,71 it followed that Herman Steenwyck based the iconic forms of his Vanities on 
the rules of rhetoric. I showed through ekphrasis how vanitas painting conveyed a 
message with moral overtones—urging the 17th century viewer to relinquish vanity and 
earthly pleasure—pictured in odd detached objects against a void background. The 
chapter expressly emphasized the tension between content and form, each a type of 
rhetoric. Moreover, one or the other is likely foregrounded in the mind or the viewer.72 
The case study illustrated this phenomenon. The claim was that forms dominated in 
Harmen Steenwyck’s Vanities. The painting presents a visual puzzle of carefully selected 
objects pictured against a bleak empty background. The Biblical metaphor is, 
nonetheless, apparent and powerful. By extension, if we craft a vanitas-style metaphor 
for the 21st century, it could exhort the viewer to seize the day, to eat, to drink, and be 
merry for tomorrow we die.73 Or, possibly the nihilistic metaphor: existence is futility, 
the human struggle is absurd. 
Through the investigation of content and form in vanitas painting, the chapter 
validated the major claim that works of art are appropriate subjects of rhetorical 
investigation; in other words, cultures invent and reinvent themselves to a large degree, 
aesthetically and rhetorically. The peculiar culture dictates the spirit of the age. Vanitas 
painting deepens understanding of how examining viewing as rhetorical practice that 
                                                          
71 Rhetoric divides what—the subject content—from how—the techniques and effects in bringing the 
content to life (form). Aristotle phrased this as the difference between logos (the logical content of a 
speech) and lexis (the style and delivery of a speech), in “Silva Rhetoricae,” by Gideon Burton. 
72 Prelli’s insight in Rhetorics of Display opened the paradox of the revealed and the concealed. 
73 “A man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry: for that shall abide 
with him of his labour the days of his life, which God giveth him under the sun,” Ecclesiastes 8:15. 
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embraces aesthetics—even in a narrowly constructed milieu—contributes to the subfield 
of visual rhetoric. As mentioned, no study had yet probed an approach to works of art 
across millennia in this manner. 
The growth of the study of visual imagery in rhetorical studies has resulted in an 
emerging recognition that visual images and mimetic performance have provided access 
to a range of human experience not always available through the study of discourse 
alone. My dissertation offers an alternative approach to the study of visual rhetoric. It is 
meant to remind the contemporary reader that to revive an ancient perspective on rhetoric 
using fresh perspectives is worthwhile. 
